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Foreword
Over 40 years ago, Jack Hirshleifer, James C. DeHaven, and Jerome
W. Milliman introduced the idea of California water markets in Water
Supply:  Economics, Technology, and Policy.  Since then, numerous
presentations have shown how California’s existing system of aqueducts
could be used to move water to the highest bidder.  Why then has the
development of water markets—a policy that might provide enough
water for decades of growth—taken so long to gain acceptance?
Part of the answer is provided in Ellen Hanak’s report, Who Should
Be Allowed to Sell Water in California? Third-Party Issues and the Water
Market.  The report notes many obstacles to the expansion of water
markets; however, Hanak focuses on a key player—local governments.
Local officials, especially in rural areas, are fearful of losing a resource
that is a key component of future economic growth.  And the specter of
bone-dry Owens Valley haunts residents, officials, and investors alike.
For these and other Californians, the problem can be put very simply:
“No water, no life.”
Although the amount of water sold through markets is only 3
percent of all water used in the state, 22 of the state’s 58 counties have
adopted ordinances restricting groundwater exports.  With the rise of
groundwater transfers during the drought of the early 1990s, the fear of
uncontrolled “mining” of the aquifers became widespread in many rural
counties.  In effect, the counties—through a burdensome review process
and the prospect of negative public opinion—have discouraged potential
sellers from seeking permits in the first place.  Hanak finds that,
controlling for other factors, these counties have been selling less water,
and more of their sales have been to in-county buyers.
The report also points to the need for effective policies pertaining to
land fallowing, or idling crops to sell water.  If fallowing affects other
employment and business opportunities, a case can be made for
economic mitigation.  Some stakeholders are concerned, however, that
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direct compensation to those whose businesses are affected would
establish a dangerous legal precedent, generate excessive claims, and
create unrealistic expectations about the potential community benefits
from water transfers.  Given such concerns, communities may prefer the
status quo to the risk of losing the benefits that flow from the control of
this precious resource.  Fair and sustainable rules for fallowing would go
a long way toward balancing the needs of local users with the potential
gains that result from water transfers.
Finally, the report helps explain why it has taken so long to
implement water markets.  The concerns expressed at the local level—
including the prospect of rapidly growing urban centers appropriating
water without adequate compensation—are as real as ever.  Nevertheless,
Hanak shows that there are solutions in the making, and that with
proper concern for users, local communities, and the environment,
markets could play a key role in addressing California’s water supply
problem for decades to come.
David W. Lyon
President and CEO
Public Policy Institute of California
vSummary
At current patterns of water use, California faces the prospect of
chronic shortages of this vital resource before the year 2020.  Among the
measures that can alleviate supply and demand imbalances is the
development of a water market.  A market enables the historical holders
of water rights—mainly farmers in the agricultural heartland—to transfer
water to other users willing to pay more for it.  Potential buyers include
urban and industrial users, other farmers with higher-value crops and
more limited supplies, and environmental programs to support fish and
wildlife habitats.
Although significant trading has occurred since the state began
promoting this solution in the late 1970s, obstacles remain.  In
particular, communities in the source regions have raised concerns over
the potential adverse effects of water sales on local groundwater users and
the local economy.  In the absence of clear state-level policy on these
“third-party” effects, many counties are attempting to gain an oversight
role through local ordinances.
This study examines the issue of third-party effects of water transfers
in California from the economic, institutional, and legal perspectives.  It
also evaluates potential mechanisms for resolving the conflicts between
those wishing to trade in water and the wider community.  Drawing on a
range of data sources, including a new database on water transfers and an
extensive set of interviews with water users and county officials, the
analysis aims to answer the following questions:  How has resistance to
water transfers affected California’s water market to date, and what are
the likely effects of that resistance?  What distinguishes cases where
conflicts have been successfully resolved from the stalled deals?  Are
revisions of state water law a necessary or desirable means for dealing
with third-party issues, or should solutions be left to local institutions?
We begin with some background on the water market and the rise in
local resistance to it.
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Water Market Trends
Jumpstarted by a prolonged drought in the late 1980s and early
1990s, California’s water market is now a firmly established—if
modest—feature of the state’s water allocation process, with annual
trades accounting for roughly 3 percent of water use.  The state has been
a major player, notably by running drought year water banks and
purchasing water for the environment.  As expected, agricultural water
districts are the main suppliers, with Central Valley farmers typically
accounting for three-quarters of all sales and farmers in the desert valleys
of Imperial and Riverside Counties furnishing the rest.
Contrary to expectations, urban agencies have played a limited role
in market growth.  Instead, the main sources of demand have been
directly and indirectly linked to new environmental regulations.  Direct
purchases for instream uses and wildlife reserves have accounted for over
one-third of the increase in purchases since 1995.  The other growth
sector, accounting for over half of market expansion, has been agriculture
in the San Joaquin Valley.  Farmers there whose contractual water
deliveries have been cut back by environmental mitigation programs have
turned to the market for replacement water.
However, municipal agencies are the principal buyers of long-term
and permanent contracts, which account for roughly 20 percent of all
sales.  Legislation passed in 2001 requiring that local governments
demonstrate adequate water supplies for development should increase
urban demand for long-term water transfers.  Municipalities’ success in
forging these deals and ensuring new supplies will depend on their ability
to smooth the waters of community resistance in the source regions.
The Rise of Local Resistance to the Water Market
Concerns in the source regions relate to two distinct types of
negative effects of water marketing on third parties.  When sales reduce
the quantity or degrade the quality of water available to other users, this
constitutes a physical externality.  California law protects other surface
water users, including fish and wildlife, from such effects under the “no
injury” statutes of the Water Code.  These protections do not extend to
groundwater users, however, because groundwater—a major source of
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supply in many regions—is not regulated by the state.  Once the state
made it clear that the market was open for business during the early
1990s drought, the fear of uncontrolled “mining” of the aquifers became
widespread in many rural counties.
The other type of negative effect can occur when farmers idle
cropland to sell water.  Any resulting losses to the local economy—in
jobs, sales, or local tax revenues—constitute an economic effect or
pecuniary externality.  There is no legal tradition in California or
elsewhere in the United States for protecting third parties from this type
of effect.  The state’s widespread use of fallowing contracts to purchase
water for the 1991 drought water bank generated considerable discord in
some Sacramento Valley counties, where local businesses and farm
workers were affected.
Rural communities have responded to the lack of state-level, third-
party protections by putting in place local restrictions on water
marketing.  By late 2002, 22 of the state’s 58 counties had adopted
ordinances requiring a permit to export groundwater or to extract
groundwater used in substitution for exported surface water.  Counties’
right to invoke police powers to protect groundwater resources was
upheld in a 1994 appellate court decision favoring Tehama County.  In
effect, the absence of state protections for groundwater users provides the
legal justification for county-level action.
In some counties, the ordinances reflect a broader intent to
discourage any type of transfer—whether or not linked to
groundwater—that might harm the local economy.  Counties do not
have the legal authority to ban crop idling for water sales, but some water
districts have adopted policies to that effect.  This appears mainly to be a
practice of districts whose boards are elected by the community at large
rather than districts where only landowners have a vote.  The recent
controversy over a proposed long-term transfer from the Imperial
Irrigation District to San Diego erupted when Imperial—whose board is
elected by popular vote—was pressured to fallow land despite district
policy against the practice.  Landowner-run districts have been more
likely to fallow land for the water market, especially in periods of low
crop prices when the water is less valuable in agricultural uses.
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Effects of County Restrictions on the Water Market
To measure the effects of local resistance on the water market, the
study assessed the role of county ordinances restricting exports.  In
counties with ordinances, those wishing to export groundwater or surface
water that is replaced by additional groundwater pumping can go
through an environmental review process to obtain a county permit.
The very low number of permit applications suggests, however, that this
process is more useful as a deterrent than as a screening mechanism.
High up-front costs and the likelihood of negative public opinion
guiding the decision process are both factors discouraging parties from
filing.
A lack of groundwater permits will not necessarily block transfers if
alternatives such as land fallowing are available and acceptable to farmers
and their water districts.  In the aggregate, however, there is likely to be
an effect on the market, both in reducing total sales and in shifting some
water to in-county users, who will typically be willing to pay less than
outsiders.  A statistical analysis of county trading behavior from 1990 to
2001 provides evidence of both effects.  In any given year, the presence
of an export restriction reduced a typical county’s trades by 14,300 acre-
feet and shifted 2,640 acre-feet to in-county buyers.  Since 1996, total
out-of-county sales, or “exports,” were reduced by 932,000 acre-feet, or
19 percent, and total sales by 787,000 acre-feet, or 14 percent.  Overall,
the negative market effect of county restrictions cancelled out the positive
effect of a generally improved trading environment resulting from state
and federal regulatory changes.
The Scope for Resolving Third-Party Issues
Local resistance is likely to remain a force to reckon with in market
development, especially for the long-term, interregional transfers from
agricultural users that municipalities will seek to support growth.
Moving forward requires finding solutions that provide communities in
source regions with adequate safeguards against the potential negative
consequences to local water users and the local economy.  What have the
experiences to date taught us about the scope for positive resolution of
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these conflicts, and what role can policy play in this process?  The
responses are distinct for the two types of third-party effects.
From Groundwater Protection to Groundwater Management
Groundwater is a shared resource, with many users drawing from the
same aquifer.  In the absence of regulation, these users do not have clear
incentives to avoid overexploiting the resource.  Because the state does
not exercise authority over groundwater, the onus for developing
management systems falls on local users.  Concerns over the groundwater
effects of trade have arisen in California’s rural heartland, where local
management systems are inadequate or altogether absent.  In this
context, county ordinances restricting exports can be justified as a first-
step precautionary measure to protect local water users from the effects of
an unbridled water market.
This defensive strategy is nevertheless suboptimal from the
standpoint of local as well as statewide interests.  A policy limited to
restricting exports does little to stabilize the aquifer in places subject to
overdraft.  It also makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make economic
use of the underground storage space through groundwater substitution
transfers and banking of imported surface water.  Attaining these goals
requires a more assertive, comprehensive strategy of groundwater
management that protects local users while providing opportunities to
address supply and quality problems and allowing those with sound
transfer and banking projects to participate in the market.
California’s rural areas have so far eschewed the more comprehensive
management systems that govern groundwater in Southern California
and in many coastal counties.  In these regions, high population densities
and special technical problems such as saltwater intrusion have led to the
introduction of adjudicated basins and special districts with full
regulatory authority over the resource.  Nevertheless, there is a
movement under way toward more active groundwater management in
some of California’s rural counties.  In some places, the county itself or a
special district with countywide jurisdiction has played a convening role
for county water users; in others, water districts overlying a shared basin
have grouped together to develop a groundwater management plan.
xKey ingredients of active management include the establishment of
effective basin monitoring systems and the development of guarantees to
mitigate any harm to third parties from market-related activity.  A
question that remains on the table is whether a strictly voluntary
management principle is adequate—a policy still favored by many rural
Californians—or whether target levels and pumping restrictions need to
be developed for the program to be effective.
Developing effective local groundwater management systems places a
central responsibility on local authorities—water districts and city and
county governments.  But the state also has a key role to play, given the
statewide benefits of sound local management.  Three current forms of
state support are appropriate:  providing technical assistance, making
funds available to support system development, and encouraging the
adoption of programs with sound content by attaching conditions to the
release of state funds.  Once systems are in place, there is also an
opportunity for private funding of groundwater infrastructure, especially
for municipal supply projects.
Mitigating the Economic Effects of Land Fallowing
For fallowing, the problem is one of determining the ground rules
under which those with access to water rights may take land out of
production and sell water to others.  Available studies suggest that the
aggregate local effects of fallowing have been quite small for programs
idling anywhere from 6 to 29 percent of acreage, with local gains from
the program largely balancing out local losses.  But the modern track
record is limited, and popular sentiment in rural areas tends to be shaped
by the dire consequences of fallowing for the local economy in the
Owens Valley almost a century ago.
The key policy issues on the table concern the rules to limit negative
community effects:  rules on the scale and content of fallowing program
design and rules concerning financial mitigation.  Both state law and
locally determined guidelines already address the first point.  Section
1745.05 of the Water Code requires public review of fallowing that
exceeds 20 percent of the local water supply.  In designing fallowing
programs, water districts increasingly include restrictions to maintain the
viability of the idled land and to make sure that participating farmers are
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not solely in the business of selling water.  The economics of fallowing
also plays a natural mitigating role.  Farmers have incentives to fallow the
crops that generate the least profit per acre-foot, and these tend to be the
low-value, highly mechanized commodities that generate the lowest on-
farm employment and the least value-added through further processing.
Even with this combination of operating rules and incentives to limit
negative effects to the local economy, there remains the question of
whether the community should receive some sort of compensation.  At
the federal level, there are some precedents for mitigating economic
effects when policy changes shift employment and business opportunities
in some sectors or regions.  With different degrees of success, federal
mitigation programs have aimed to assist affected workers and businesses
to make a transition to other economic activities.
A parallel case could be made for mitigating the economic effects of
sizable, long-term fallowing operations, especially if they generate
systematic hardships for low-income groups or local governments.  In
two large long-term deals pending approval, a transfer from the Palo
Verde Irrigation District to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California and one from the Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego,
funds have been earmarked for local communities.  This will no doubt
become a standard component of any future deals of this type, where
large volumes of water are sold to distant urban agencies over more than
a decade, with expectations of some systematic effects on local
employment opportunities affecting low-income immigrant
communities.
For temporary or intermittent fallowing operations, such as those
undertaken in the Sacramento Valley since 2001, there are larger
questions about the appropriateness of mitigation.  Two buyers, the
Department of Water Resources and Metropolitan, have developed a
policy to provide mitigation funds, but it remains unclear what damages,
if any, merit mitigation.  Many are uncomfortable with the term
mitigation because it implies the direct compensation of affected parties.
In part, this wariness stems from an expectation that the fallowing
programs will generate little if any hardship to low-income workers,
given the highly mechanized nature of production process for the rice
crop being fallowed and the considerable workload generated by land
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maintenance and improvement activities on fallowed acreage.  It also
stems from a concern that a direct compensation program would
establish a dangerous legal precedent, generate excessive claims, and
ultimately create unrealistic expectations about the potential community
benefits from water transfers.  For these reasons, it may make more sense
to think of such funds as providing opportunities for community
development rather than mitigation.
Since 1998, the legislature has considered three bills to
institutionalize mitigation, but none has met with approval.  Further
legislative actions on the fallowing question should be avoided for the
time being, for two reasons.  First, there is a limited track record on
fallowing and no experience with implementing mitigation funds.
Second, in the major short- and long-term fallowing programs slated to
occur, the transacting parties themselves have been adopting design
measures to limit negative effects and setting up funds to benefit the
community.  These cases provide the opportunity both to assess the
consequences of responsible fallowing and to experiment with use of
funds for community benefit.  If, as the farmers in the Sacramento Valley
and Palo Verde argue, the overall effects are not harmful to the local
economy, this may help build wider confidence in a new model for
fallowing that can displace the ghost of Owens Valley.
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11. Water Marketing and Third
Parties
Over most of the past century, the water needs of California’s
growing economy and population have been met by increasing water
supplies.  The result has been a complex mosaic of hydraulic investments
in surface storage and conveyance undertaken at local, state, and federal
levels.  This “developed” surface water system provides the state’s
agricultural, residential, and industrial customers with roughly two-thirds
of the water they use, the remaining third coming from groundwater
reserves.
Until recently, the system generally has met the needs of these users,
except in periods of severe drought.  Concerns that insufficient water
resources were being devoted to the environment—and in particular to
the survival of endangered wildlife—have led to reductions, beginning in
the early 1990s, in the amounts available to some agricultural and
municipal users.  With the environment now explicitly considered as a
user with legitimate (and sometimes paramount) requirements, and with
the promise of continued, rapid population growth, the state’s
Department of Water Resources projects chronic water shortages before
the year 2020 at current patterns of use (Department of Water
Resources, 1998).
Redressing supply and demand imbalances through additional
surface reservoir development has become more difficult.  Hydrological
options are less favorable, cost considerations loom larger, and concerns
about the potential environmental consequences of such investments play
a much greater role in the public decisionmaking process.  This difficulty
has prompted considerations of alternative technologies to increase
supply, through “groundwater banking”—or storing excess run-off in
underground aquifers—and through recycling and desalination.  It has
2also heightened interest in making better use of the existing supply
through conservation efforts and the development of a water market.
Water Marketing as a Component of California’s
Water Future
A market permits the temporary, long-term, or permanent transfer of
water from the existing rights-holders to other water users in exchange
for payment.  In California, these rights generally have been appropriated
for many decades under the state’s “first in time, first in right” legal
system.  Water transfers are seen as a way of adding flexibility to the
state’s water supply—both to address temporary drought conditions and
to accommodate longer-term changes in the pattern of demand.
Because water systems have been intimately linked to the
development of California’s agricultural heartland, the bulk of use rights
are held by farming interests in the Central Valley and the desert counties
to the south that rely on Colorado River water (Hundley, 2001).  In
normal water years, agriculture uses about 34 million acre-feet of water,
or 80 percent of the total used by Californians for their combined
residential and business needs (Department of Water Resources, 1998).
Agricultural users often pay significantly less for water than municipal
and industrial users do in the coastal metropolitan areas, even allowing
for differences in transportation and treatment costs.
Ready availability of water has enabled California to become the
nation’s largest agricultural economy, with one of the world’s most
extensive irrigation systems.  This can be seen as a successful outcome of
past federal and state support to the development of western agriculture
through large-scale hydraulic projects.  As other demands for water
continue to grow, however, there has been increasing pressure to weigh
this policy goal against one emphasizing the scarcity of this natural
resource.  In an era when pricing has been advocated as a solution for a
whole range of resource allocation issues, water transfers are seen as a way
to accommodate the changing pattern of demand while compensating
water-rights-holders for forgoing their own access.  The discussions on
water marketing have often emphasized the potential of the market to
move water from agricultural to growing urban areas, many of which are
3willing to pay more for the water than it is worth to the seller in the next-
best agricultural use.  But a water market can also help balance supply
and demand within the agricultural sector, as farmers with higher-value
uses for the water purchase it from those with more-senior rights and
less-productive farms.  Finally, market-based transfers are seen as a
potential tool for reallocating water from agriculture to the environment
through voluntary means rather than rationing.
State and Federal Support for Water Marketing
California’s foray into water marketing began in 1977, a year of
severe drought.  Two reports commissioned at that time, one by the
governor and one by the legislature,1 strongly endorsed water marketing
as a component of the state’s water future.  The governor’s commission
also advocated a number of changes in the Water Code to facilitate
transfers, notably provisions to ensure the security of water rights for
transferring parties and access to the use of conveyance facilities.
Although many of the recommendations were accomplished in the years
that followed, the 1980s saw little uptake in market activity.
In the early 1990s, several events significantly changed the trading
climate.  First, natural conditions provided the occasion for a large-scale
experiment in water trading when a multiyear drought prompted the
state to initiate an emergency water bank in 1991.  The following year,
in response to findings that the federally run Central Valley Project
(CVP) was having deleterious effects on the indigenous wildlife of the
San Francisco Bay-Delta water system, Congress passed the Central
Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA).  The CVPIA mandated that
800,000 acre-feet of project water (of a total of 7 million) be returned to
instream uses to regenerate salmon runs and that another 400,000 acre-
feet be allocated to wildlife refuges.  The CVPIA also contained
provisions to facilitate water marketing and introduced a mechanism for
the project to purchase additional water for environmental purposes.  In
1994, contractors of the State Water Project (SWP) concluded
negotiations for the Monterey Agreement, a revision of project operating
____________ 
1Governor’s Commission to Review California’s Water Rights Law (1978); Phelps
et al. (1978).
4rules that included measures to make it easier for contractors to transfer
water to one another.
At the close of the decade, two further state and federal actions were
significant.  Under instructions from the Secretary of the Interior in
1996 and 1997, California began to devise a plan to reduce its use of
Colorado River water to the contractually allocated amount of 4.4
million acre-feet over a 15-year period.  This 4.4 Plan created strong
incentives for water transfers between agricultural and urban users of
Colorado River water within California.  In 2000, state and federal
authorities launched the Environmental Water Account (EWA), a
program of water purchases for the environment under CALFED, a
multiagency state and federal program to restore health to the fisheries of
the San Francisco Bay-Delta system while securing water supplies to
agricultural and urban users.
The Rise of Third-Party Concerns in the Selling
Regions
Although substantial trading resulted from these policy changes,
those wishing to enter the water market—on either a short- or long-term
basis—have encountered a number of obstacles.  Central among these is
the question of how to deal with the “third-party” or indirect effects of
the transfers on other water users and the larger communities where
water is being sold.  Community resistance has soured a number of deals
over the past decade and has likely prevented others from being
proposed.  Many of California’s rural counties have introduced
ordinances that directly restrict groundwater exports and indirectly
restrict the sale of surface water.  In several counties, the ordinances
circumscribe the rights of individuals and local water agencies to engage
in groundwater banking.
These measures respond to the potential consequences of the
transfers on the local community.  Short-term transfers during the
drought water bank in the early 1990s raised two contentious issues.
First, communities were concerned about local economic consequences
when some farmers fallowed their land to sell water, simultaneously
drying up demand for labor and other farm inputs and cutting off the
5supply of raw materials to local processors.  Second, farmers who sold
their surface water and maintained their crops by pumping more
groundwater than usual were in some cases seen as reducing the overall
quantity and quality of supplies available to other water users.
Community concerns can be exacerbated if the seller makes a
multiyear commitment.  For the proposed long-term transfer of water
from the Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego, negotiated as part of
California’s 4.4 Plan to reduce Colorado River use, leaders in the
Imperial Valley have been reluctant to agree to multiyear land fallowing.
Sending water toward urban coastal areas adds to the uneasiness of such
long-term transfers:  Will such areas take precedence in the future,
regardless of the terms of the transfer?
Some observers express a general skepticism regarding the market for
water, given the sharp regional disparities between the wealthy
metropolitan areas on the coast and California’s agricultural valleys,
which lag far behind in terms of income, employment, and education
levels.  In this view, arguments about market efficiency are little more
than a justification for draining the poorer hinterland of the resources it
may need for more favorable growth and development in the years ahead.
Although the tone of the debate is at times highly charged, local officials’
resistance to transfers can be seen as a precautionary approach to a
potential irreversibility problem:  Once the water is gone, they will lack
the money and political influence to get it back.  Reinforcing this
concern is the specter of the Owens Valley affair—the notorious deal in
the early 20th century wherein Los Angeles bought up so much of that
region’s water that the local agricultural economy collapsed.
Community opposition to water transfers challenges the notion that
water rights belong to users and suggests instead that water is a
community resource.  The county ordinances are an attempt to impose a
level of local oversight on water transfers not provided for in state law,
which is not uniform in its treatment of transfers or in the assessment of
effects on third parties.  State approval is required only for transfers
involving surface water rights acquired since 1914, certain types of
groundwater banking, and any water that is “wheeled” (conveyed)
through a publicly owned facility (e.g., the California Aqueduct).  Only
in the latter case must the state ensure against unreasonable negative
6economic effects on the source county; for the other transfers, there is
simply an obligation not to harm other legal users of the surface water
(i.e., other rights-holders), fish, and wildlife.  There is no provision to
protect other groundwater users, as groundwater rights remain largely
unregulated by the state.
Although there is some question as to whether the county ordinances
would stand up to a legal challenge, there is no doubt that they arise
where communities are not confident about the existing legal and
political process governing transfers.  The question nevertheless remains
as to whether counties are managing community interests effectively;
specifically, an overly conservative policy on transfers can lead to missed
opportunities for enhancing collective welfare.
The Scope for Resolving Third-Party Issues
This study examines the issue of third-party effects of water transfers
in California from the economic, institutional, and legal perspectives.  It
evaluates potential mechanisms for resolving the conflicts between those
wishing to trade in water and the wider community.  By drawing on a
range of data sources, including original survey work, the analysis aims to
answer the following questions:  How has local resistance to water
transfers affected California’s water market to date and what are the
likely future effects?  What distinguishes the cases where conflicts have
been successfully resolved and the stalled deals?  Are revisions of state
water law a necessary or desirable means for dealing with third-party
issues, or should solutions be left to local institutions?
The report begins by providing some background on the water
market and on the extent of community response.  Chapter 2 presents an
overview of the statewide water market since the mid-1980s, drawing on
a new dataset developed for this study.  It shows the evolution of total
volumes transferred and the composition of the market—by geography,
types of water users, and shifts in end use—in response to the state and
federal policy changes outlined above.
The next two chapters document the rise in local restrictions on
water marketing, with a specific focus on the adoption of county
ordinances.  Chapter 3 summarizes the statewide trends and discusses
some of the legal, economic, and operational issues that the ordinances
7raise.  Drawing on county-level economic indicators and qualitative
information gathered from interviews with county officials and water
users, Chapter 4 explores why certain counties have adopted export
restrictions and others have not.
Chapter 5 examines whether and how local opposition affects the
water market.  This examination includes a review of the permitting
process for exports in counties that have adopted restrictions and a
statistical analysis of the factors influencing water transfer behavior at the
county level.
The study then turns to the policy questions that arise from the
economic effects of land fallowing and the physical effects on water users
arising from transfers involving groundwater.  Both economic theory and
institutional practice provide justifications for mitigating negative effects
of water transfers.  In theory, any transfer that truly raises efficiency by
moving a resource into a higher-value use will generate sufficient gains to
enable the losers to be compensated, such that the well-being of all
parties is enhanced or maintained.  For transfers that affect the
availability of the physical resource to other water users, compensation is
justified on grounds of efficiency as well as equity (Coase, 1960).
This principle already underlies the state’s policy to “make whole”
other surface water users affected by a transfer.  More generally, it forms
the basis for environmental mitigation of development projects.
Measures might include providing alternative sources of water supply to
the affected party or devising some other form of financial or in-kind
compensation.  Compensation mechanisms are not always easy to devise
and reach agreement on, however, particularly when the damages are
unclear or difficult to quantify.  Chapter 6 examines these issues as they
apply to the economic effects of land fallowing, and Chapter 7
investigates the physical effects on water users of groundwater transfers
and the related practice of groundwater banking.
Mitigating harm to groundwater users implies the existence of an
effective system for managing groundwater resources more generally.
Because these resources are almost always shared by multiple parties,
groundwater management usually requires collective oversight.  In
California, there is a vigorous debate concerning the appropriate level of
governance for groundwater.  At one extreme are those who argue that
8groundwater should come under the jurisdiction of the state alongside
surface water (Sax, 2002).  At the other extreme are those who argue
against any restrictions on individuals’ rights to pump.
The middle ground in this debate has sought solutions involving
local institutions.  Two potentially competing approaches have grown in
popularity since the early 1990s—the establishment of groundwater
management plans by local water entities overlying a shared basin and
the coordination of groundwater management at the county level
through groundwater protection ordinances.  Chapter 7 examines the
policy and institutional questions that arise from these approaches, with a
particular focus on the role counties are and might be playing.
Chapter 8 concludes by summarizing the policy issues that face state
and local governments in addressing third-party issues and the role local
entities can and should play in the statewide water market.
92. California’s Water Market,
by the Numbers
This chapter documents the evolution of the state’s water market
from the mid-1980s to 2001, drawing on a new dataset on individual
water transfers developed by the author from a variety of state, federal,
and local sources.  The data allow an analysis of volumes transferred by
duration, region of origin and destination, initial and final use, type of
transacting party, and affiliation (if any) with the large state and federal
water projects.  The discussion highlights two areas of particular interest.
First, to what extent has the market responded to the policy measures to
encourage trading over the past two decades?  Second, does the trading
that has occurred correspond to expectations?
Who Can Sell Water and What Kinds Can They
Sell?
The state’s Water Code provides two basic guidelines on who can
participate in the water market and what they can sell:  Sellers must be
rights-holders, and the water they sell must be “wet.”  “Wet water” is the
term commonly used to contrast with “paper water”—water rights held
on paper for which actual water is not available.  Under the appropriative
rights doctrine governing most of the state’s surface water, the “use it or
lose it” clause dictates that rights lapse for any water not used for five
consecutive years.  The Water Rights Division of the State Water
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) estimates that there are roughly
three times as many paper claims on surface water as water available in
the system.  Water-rights-holders must therefore demonstrate that the
water they propose to part with is indeed water that they would
otherwise use in some way.  Without this safeguard, the seller would end
up transferring “paper” water that someone else is already legally using.
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Sources of wet water are of four basic types:  surface storage, excess
surface water, conserved surface water, and groundwater.  The first two
sources are not widely available.  Only a limited number of rights-holders
have surpluses available in surface storage, and the use-it-or-lose-it
principle limits conditions under which excess surface supplies are
actually considered wet.  Contractors with the CVP and SWP projects
are the only ones who have been able to sell regular excesses of surface
supplies, on grounds that their rights are determined by contract rather
than the appropriative doctrine.1  Otherwise, rights-holders may sell the
excess surface water generated in very wet years.  These are times when
overall market demand is more limited.
Conservation and groundwater are more generally available options.
Conservation can be achieved through investments to improve the
efficiency of the conveyance and use systems (e.g., canal lining,
installation of drip irrigation, recycling), or through land fallowing.
Groundwater can be transferred directly or, more commonly, can be
used on-site in lieu of surface water transferred to another party.  This
latter practice, known as “groundwater substitution” or “groundwater
exchange,” is a form of “conjunctive use” of groundwater and surface
water.  With conjunctive use, the groundwater aquifer serves, in effect, as
an underground reserve that can be drawn on to a greater or lesser degree
as the quantity of available surface water varies.  In some places where
prior pumping activity has generated unused space in the aquifer, active
storage or banking projects are increasingly popular.  As a consequence,
storage in underground banks is becoming a new source of water for the
market, much like surface storage.
Although the initial appropriation of water rights in the second half
of the 19th century primarily involved individuals and private
companies, most surface water rights today are held by local public
agencies:  special water and irrigation districts and some municipalities.
Legally, some of these parties actually hold long-term “contract
entitlements” rather than “rights” to surface water; the large state and
federal projects they contract with hold the actual water rights.  In some
____________ 
1A loosening of restrictions on such trades among Central Valley Project contractors
is arguably the main effect of the CVPIA on the water market to date.
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water districts, individual farmers have specific contractual amounts of
water (or “allocations”) assigned to them and are therefore in a position
to sell their surface water.
Generally, the right to pump groundwater (and hence, potentially, to
sell it) is available to all private individuals overlying the aquifer.  As we
will see in greater detail in subsequent chapters, there are few places
where rights are “quantified” (i.e., where users have rights to a specific
quantity of water) or where local agencies, rather than individuals,
effectively control access to the aquifer.  Current groundwater banking
operations typically involve local agencies (for instance, the Semitropic
Water Storage District and the Arvin-Edison Water Storage District in
Kern County each run programs) or consortia of private and public
agencies (for example, the Kern Water Bank).  Such programs could
conceivably be run by a single private entity if it were sufficiently large to
cover the banking area.  A case in point is the recently abandoned Cadiz
groundwater storage and dry-year supply project.  In this project, a
private agribusiness firm with land holdings in eastern San Bernardino
County would have banked and sold water to the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California.
The approval process for transfers varies according to the nature of
the water right as well as the source of water.  The SWRCB must
approve transfers (changes in purpose or place of use) involving surface
water rights established from 1914 onward, the year the state’s “modern”
Water Code became effective.  Transfers of surface water among
contractors of the federal and state water projects generally do not require
SWRCB approval because they do not involve a change in the purpose
and place of use assigned to the overall water right.  The projects
themselves must authorize these sales.  The general practice is for farmers
to go through the water district, which negotiates the transaction, and for
the state or federal project to decide whether the district may make the
sale.  Transfers of groundwater and of surface water held in pre-1914
appropriative rights do not require SWRCB approval.  However, they do
come under state or federal jurisdiction if government-owned conveyance
facilities are involved, which is likely to be the case in most parts of the
state.
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It was not possible to track systematically the type of water being
sold in the data presented below.  On average, local public agencies
(water districts, irrigation districts) account for over 90 percent of the
volumes sold since the mid-1980s, with private parties and mutual water
companies making up the balance.  The share of direct private activity
was highest during the early 1990s, when the state contracted directly
with individual farmers for a substantial portion of the water acquired
under the drought water bank.
The data presented focus on annual flows of water resulting from
temporary transfers (under one year), long-term transfers (over one year),
and what we have termed “deferred exchanges,” which involve a promise
that the buyer repays the water (along with a cash payment in some
cases) to the seller at a later date.  The data on a fourth category, the
permanent transfer of water rights or contract entitlements, are presented
separately.  Such transfers amount to an outright sale of the rights to use
the specified amount of water in perpetuity or for the remaining duration
of the contract in question.  Because the actual amount accessible to the
buyer can vary with the conditions of the water year, it is not strictly
appropriate to consider an annual flow of water transferred.  For more
details on the sources and methods used to construct the water transfers
database, the reader is referred to Appendix A.
Overall Market Trends
The statewide water market got a jumpstart during the last multiyear
drought, which began in 1988 (Figure 2.1).  Market growth was largely
driven by direct interventions of the Department of Water Resources.
DWR began making dry-year purchases to offset lower deliveries to State
Water Project contractors and wildlife refuges in the first year of the
drought.  These early operations, which involved only a handful of
Sacramento Valley water districts (most notably the Yuba County Water
Agency), quickly brought the total volume traded to over 500,000 acre-
feet, three times the pre-drought levels.  In 1991, when the dry-year
market was opened up to any willing buyers and sellers, DWR purchased
821,000 acre-feet of water for resale, bringing the overall market volume
to over 1.1 million acre-feet.  Water banks and other dry-year purchases
were also operated in 1992 and 1994.  From 1988 to the end of the
13
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
Ac
re
-fe
et
 tr
ad
ed
 (th
ou
sa
nd
s)
Acre-feet traded
Rainfall
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Ra
inf
all
 in
de
x
Dry
Normal
Wet
NOTES:  For details, see Table A.1.  Rainfall is measured by the Sacramento 
Valley 40-30-30 index, an indicator of water supply conditions for the state’s 
primary river system (see Appendix D).
Figure 2.1—Short- and Long-Term Water Transfers in California Since 1985
drought in 1994, state and federal dry-year purchases for resale and
environmental uses accounted for over 40 percent of a market that had
jumped from an average of 150,000 acre-feet to over 600,000 acre-feet
per year. 2
Although the second half of the 1990s saw a succession of wet years,
market activity remained strong, with volumes typically exceeding the
drought-year levels, especially by the end of the decade.  The only dips in
____________ 
2The average market volume as measured by end-user purchases is just over 500,000
acre-feet for the 1988–94 period.  This discrepancy arises mainly because DWR’s
purchases were higher than its resales to other users in some years.  The gap was most
notable in 1991, the first year of the water bank, when purchases exceeded resale volume
by over 400,000 acre-feet.  In several years in the 1990s, there were also smaller
discrepancies between purchases and sales of water user pools, notably the SWP “turn-
back” pool, described in the text, and the Sacramento River Water Contractors’
Association, a pool run by some CVP contractors.
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a generally upward trend in purchases occurred in the exceptionally wet
years of 1995 and 1998, when many areas of the state experienced
flooding.  With annual trades now exceeding 1.2 million acre-feet—
eight to ten times the levels of the mid-1980s—the market appears firmly
established as a component of California’s water allocation process.
It is also useful to consider the size and scope of the market from
three other perspectives.  First, the statewide market at current levels
represents only 3 percent of all water used by Californians for municipal,
industrial, and agricultural purposes (Department of Water Resources,
1998).  Second, although there has been an increase in the number of
long-term transfer agreements, the market continues to be dominated by
short-term transactions, negotiated on an annual basis, which account for
about 80 percent of the total volume transferred.  Finally, the size and
scope of the market are strongly influenced by the intervention of state
and federal authorities.  This influence stems not only from their
important direct role in purchases but also from the relative ease water
users have in gaining approval for transfers within the confines of the
state and federal projects.
Since 1988, direct government purchases have accounted for nearly
one-third of the total volume traded.  Transfers among contractors
within the same projects (SWP, CVP, and the Colorado River Project)
account for more than half of all water sold (Figure 2.2).  Transfers
within the CVP and the SWP have generally increased in response to the
more-flexible trading rules adopted by those projects in the early 1990s.
The growth has been most pronounced within the SWP, for which
internal transfers were rare before the Monterey Agreement.  By contrast,
the “open market,” a residual category defined broadly to include any
transfers between water users not associated with the same project,
accounts for only 15 percent of the water transfers recorded over the
14-year period.  This share initially increased immediately after the
drought, but it has been on the decline again recently, as direct
government purchases for environmental programs have been on the rise.
In this context, it is noteworthy that a provision in the Central Valley
Project Improvement Act to allow project water to be sold to
noncontractors, considered a major innovation at the time, has
gone virtually unused.  Such transfers invoke a $25 per acre-foot
15
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Figure 2.2—Share of Total Water Transfers, by Type of Market, 1988–2001
environmental surcharge, a fee that appears to have proven prohibitive
until now.3
Water for the Environment:  A Key Factor in
Market Growth
Market growth in the aftermath of the drought has been largely
driven by environmental concerns.  The influence of environmental
policy is most readily seen by comparing the patterns of water purchases
during the multiyear drought (1988–1994) to those in the more recent
period (1995–2001), when rainfall has generally been above normal
(Figures 2.3a and 2.3b).
The most obvious element of the new role for the environment is the
rise in direct purchases for instream uses to support aquatic life and for
wildlife refuges, through federal and state programs and most recently
____________ 
3With the aid of a simulation model, Loomis (1994) predicted that this surcharge
would make it unlikely for out-of-project transfers to occur except under severe drought
conditions, when buyers would be willing to pay enough to cover it.
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the CALFED EWA.  As one of the beneficiaries of DWR’s drought
purchases, the environment already accounted for 12 percent of demand
during the 1988–94 drought.  Since 1995, this share has doubled on
average; it reached a third of total demand in 2001, the first full-fledged
year of the EWA.  On an average yearly basis, environmental purchases
have increased by 155,000 acre-feet, out of a total market gain of
430,000 acre-feet.
The less obvious component of environmentally related demand is
the rise in purchases by San Joaquin Valley farmers.  Although this
group’s change in market share is less dramatic (moving from 37 percent
to 44 percent over the two periods), its increase in volume (228,000 acre-
feet per year) accounts for over half of total market growth.  Much of this
growth can be linked to the changes introduced under the CVPIA in
1992, which mandated that a portion of project water be returned to
instream uses.  Since then, the CVP’s agricultural service contractors
located south of the Delta received full project deliveries in only the two
very wet years, 1995 and 1998.  One outcome has been the development
of an active water market, as certain contractors (most notably Westlands
Water District) sought to offset reductions in deliveries via purchases.
Within the San Joaquin Valley, CVP service contractors’ market share of
purchases has risen from 63 percent to 87 percent across the two time
periods.
The corollary of this growth has been a decline in the relative
importance of municipal and industrial water users.  Whereas cities were
the main recipients of traded water during the 1988–1994 drought with
42 percent of all purchases, their share since 1995 has been halved.  With
the exception of 1991, when purchases nearly reached 500,000 acre-feet,
volumes have remained relatively flat, at around 200,000 acre-feet per
year.  The modest role of urban demand contrasts with the frequently
voiced assumption that a water market would develop primarily as a
response to population growth and the ability of urban dwellers to pay
more than agricultural users for water.4  As we will see below, cities are
significant players in defining the market for long-term and permanent
____________ 
4See Phelps et al. (1978) and Vaux and Howitt (1984) for early economic
arguments in favor of a water market in California.
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transfers of water.  This pattern suggests that their role may increase as
this part of the market develops.
Agriculture’s Leading Role in Market Supply
Economists have typically assumed that agriculture would be the
leading source of water supply, and this assumption is confirmed by the
data.  In most years, agricultural water users provide at least 90 percent of
supply.  It is nevertheless interesting to note that the introduction of
“turn-back” pools within the State Water Project has made a significant
amount of urban agency water available to agricultural users in wet years.
Under the program, introduced as one of the reforms in the 1994
Monterey Agreement noted in Chapter 1, SWP contractors are able to
sell back amounts of project water they will not need if there are willing
SWP buyers.5  From 1998 to 2000, the turn-back pool generated
200,000 acre-feet or more of water per year, or roughly one-fifth of total
market supply.
Given the primacy of agricultural supply, it is not surprising to find
that the main source regions are the Central Valley (served by the CVP,
the SWP, and several large, autonomous, surface water projects) and the
agricultural valleys to the south served by the Colorado River Project
(Table 2.1).  In most years, the Central Valley has furnished about three-
quarters of the total volume transferred.  Within this region, there are
pronounced shifts, depending on the nature of the water year.  From
1988 to 1994, Sacramento Valley farmers and districts supplied about 45
percent of all water sold.  Although this share fell considerably after 1994
(in some years, to under 10 percent of the statewide market), the region
again provided over 40 percent of the water in 2001, the first dry year
experienced since the previous drought.  In the interim, the market
shifted to the San Joaquin Valley, which established a vibrant
intraregional market to supply water-short districts within the region.
In every normal to wet year since 1993, the first year of CVPIA
____________ 
5Because the sale price is fixed below the level of per-acre-foot charges incurred by
the seller for project water, the pool’s attractiveness to sellers is relative, not absolute:  It
enables them to pay less than full price for contract amounts in excess of current needs.
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Table 2.1
Regional Sources and Destinations of Water
 1988–1994 1995–2001
Sales by water users
Sacramento Valley 1,924,937 1,057,064
San Joaquin Valley 1,363,037 3,715,039
Southern California 970,942 1,577,597
San Francisco Bay Area 87,195 82,575
Other 3,055 88,694
Total sales 4,349,166 6,520,969
  
Purchases by water users  
Sacramento Valley 135,079 515,509
San Joaquin Valley 1,450,917 3,253,292
Southern California 1,187,157 1,234,555
San Francisco Bay Area 313,197 43,505
Other 6,152 14,993
  
Purchases of environmental water 408,672 1,484,255
% from Sacramento Valley 74 17
% from San Joaquin Valley 25 81
Total purchases 3,501,174 6,546,109
   
Exports (imports) of nonenvironmental water  
Sacramento Valley 1,488,725 288,383
San Joaquin Valley (190,683) (739,455)
Southern California (216,215) 343,042
San Francisco Bay Area (230,738) 9,070
NOTES:  For details, see Tables A.3 and A.4.  The bulk of the difference
between total purchases and total sales in the first period is the surplus
purchased by DWR and distributed through means other than sales to other
end users.  There were also some small discrepancies in both periods between
purchases and sales of user pools.  These discrepancies account for the fact that
nonenvironmental exports and imports do not sum to zero.  See footnote 2 in
this chapter.  All water measurements are in acre-feet.
implementation, San Joaquin Valley farmers and districts have furnished
at least half of the total amount transferred.  It is common for
agricultural districts in this region to restrict out-of-district transfers to
cases where land in the recipient district is owned or leased by the same
farmer.
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The two Central Valley regions are the principal suppliers of
environmental water (Table 2.1).  There has been a major source shift
from north to south of the Delta since the early 1990s drought, with the
institution of restoration programs along the San Joaquin River system,
supplied by area water districts.  Kern County water users have also been
major suppliers of the EWA.  Most environmental water is used in the
region of purchase; the main exceptions are EWA purchases of water
north of the Delta, which facilitate the delivery of project water to users
in the south while protecting Delta fisheries.
The Southern California region, defined broadly to include both the
desert counties and the coast, generates most of the remaining quarter of
total supply.  The largest single source has been the Imperial Irrigation
District, which has operated a 110,000 acre-feet per year long-term
transfer with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWDSC) since 1988.  In the mid-1990s, there was also a large two-
year transfer to the MWDSC by the Palo Verde Irrigation District,
another agricultural contractor on the Colorado River Project.
With the exception of the early 1990s drought, when several Bay
Area cities made substantial purchases, no other region has played a
significant role in the market on either the supply or demand side.  The
Bay Area’s share in demand has dropped from 9 percent of the total in
the drought years to only 1 percent in the more recent period.  This
region’s share in supply is about 2 percent.
Most Transfers Are Local or Regional
We have already seen that the San Joaquin Valley is both a major
supplier and a purchaser of water.  The market in Southern California is
also primarily regional in nature (Table 2.1).  The only exports leaving
the region are the transfers by municipal agencies to the SWP turn-back
pool, purchased by San Joaquin Valley agricultural districts.  In the
Sacramento Valley, the only region in the state where water users
purchase significantly less than the volume sold, exports are concentrated
in dry years.  In years with normal to high rainfall, two-thirds of the
water is transferred to other water users within the region.
Another way of seeing the shares of local and regional markets is to
look directly at the source of water obtained by users.  Figure 2.4 shows
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Figure 2.4—Nonenvironmental Water Purchases, by Location of Selling Party
this breakdown, for nonenvironmental water only, according to the
location of the selling party in relation to the buyer.  Nearly one-quarter
of total volume is purchased from parties in the same county and another
half from parties in the region.  Interregional transfers account for the
remaining 25–30 percent of the market.6  Only a relatively small fraction
of these transfers (one-fifth) are negotiated directly between parties in
different regions; the lion’s share moves through banks and pools run by
DWR.  This pattern highlights again the important role played by the
government agencies in California’s water market.
Given the need for federal and state agency approval for the use of
conveyance facilities, this role is indispensable for any interregional
transfers of water physically moving across the Delta.  Approval decisions
are complicated because pumping additional water through the Delta can
affect water quality standards and put protected fish species in danger.
When an agency acts as an intermediary, it is able to facilitate the
movement of water across the Delta.  Agency input has also been crucial
____________ 
6Because this graph presents data from the standpoint of end-user purchases, it
includes only the water bank volumes that were actually resold in the first period, not the
full amounts acquired by DWR.
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in successful district-to-district transfers—for instance, the 2001 transfer
of 160,000 acre-feet from Sacramento Valley CVP contractors to the
Westlands Water District.  Many observers believe that the absence of
state or federal agency sponsorship significantly complicates the approval
process for cross-Delta transfers.
From Farms to Cities:  A Key Element of Long-
Term and Permanent Transfers
Our records show 15 approved long-term transfers and 14
permanent transfers of surface water rights or entitlements from 1985 to
2002.7  At least ten additional transfers were pending approval in late
2002.  As noted, long-term transfers have generally accounted for about
one-fifth of all trades since the late 1980s.  Volumes traded surpassed the
250,000 acre-feet mark for the first time in 2001.  Contract duration
runs from a low of two years to a high of 35, with an average of 15 years.
The permanent transfers, bunched at the end of the decade, total another
175,000 acre-feet.  These mainly concern the transfer of SWP contract
entitlements under the Monterey Agreement (representing over 110,000
acre-feet) and the transfer of pre-1914 water rights among parties within
Kern County.
Almost all these transfers involve shifts of water from agricultural to
urban uses.  The handful of exceptions includes one long-term deferred
exchange and one long-term transfer between districts with a large
municipal customer base (Solano County Water Agency and the Mojave
Water Agency; Placer County Water Agency and Northridge Water
District, respectively) and several long-term transfers from agricultural
districts to the environment (most notably, as part of the negotiated
agreement for the restoration of the San Joaquin River).  Only two long-
term transfers between agricultural districts appear, one in the
Sacramento Valley and one in San Joaquin, and two permanent transfers
of contract entitlement among agricultural users (both in the San
Joaquin Valley).
____________ 
7For details on the transactions discussed in this section, see Tables A.5 and A.6.
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This trend holds for transfers pending approval in 2002.  Key among
these are two large long-term agriculture-urban transfers within the
Colorado River Project (Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego, Palo
Verde Irrigation District to MWDSC) and several permanent transfers of
CVP contract entitlement from agricultural water districts to towns in
the San Joaquin Valley.  Thus, agricultural users remain the largest single
source of demand for water in today’s market, but they conduct their
purchases almost entirely through temporary arrangements.
Also noteworthy is the highly local character of much of the long-
term and permanent transfer market.  Transfers involving CVP
contractors and water agencies with their own surface supplies have
essentially taken place in the neighborhood, between districts and
municipalities in the same or adjacent counties.  The only cross-regional
movements of long-term or permanent water involve SWP contractors
and Colorado River contractors.8  In both cases, the transfers came about
mainly as part of global renegotiations of project operating rules.  Under
the Monterey Agreement, Kern County agriculturalists negotiated the
sale of contract entitlement to municipal users in Southern California
and the San Francisco Bay Area in exchange for greater certainty of
supply for their remaining SWP entitlement.  Contractors within the
Colorado River group have been under intense pressure to set up
transfers from the agricultural valleys of the desert counties to coastal
municipal agencies as part of California’s obligation to reduce its use of
Colorado River water under the 4.4 Plan referred to in Chapter 1.
The stronger presence of municipal agencies in the market for long-
term and permanent water contracts is logical, given their need to ensure
reliability of supplies for growing populations.  Looking ahead, we
should expect residential demand to increase, as a consequence of
demographic trends themselves and recent legislation that makes a tighter
connection between water supplies and land-use planning.  In 2001, the
legislature passed the “show me the water” bills, SB 610 (Costa) and
____________ 
8Although technically within the same region (Southern California), most of the
Colorado River transfers involve buyers and sellers at quite some distance from one
another.  The one deal involving close neighbors is the pending transfer from Imperial
Irrigation District to Coachella Valley Water District.
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SB 221 (Kuehl), which require that local governments demonstrate the
adequacy of water supplies for growth.9  Long-term transfers are among
the measures considered adequate for this purpose.
Summing Up
Jumpstarted by a prolonged drought in the late 1980s and early
1990s, California’s water market has now become a firmly established
feature of the state’s water allocation process.  The market remains largely
intraregional in nature, with the state’s Department of Water Resources
directly mediating most transfers across regions.  The market is also
highly segmented, with over half of the volumes traded among
contractors of the large state and federal water projects and another third
involving direct purchases by state and federal agencies for drought relief
and environmental mitigation.
Outside drought years, when urban agencies have been important
buyers, the main sources of demand have been directly and indirectly
linked to environmental concerns.  Direct purchases for instream uses
and wildlife reserves have accounted for over one-third of the increase in
purchases since 1995.  The other growth sector, accounting for over half
of market expansion, has been agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley, as
farmers whose contractual water deliveries have been cut because of
environmental mitigation programs have turned to the market for
replacement water.
Municipal agencies are the principal buyers of long-term and
permanent contracts.  In light of the state’s rapid population growth, it is
not surprising that municipal agencies are taking the lead in negotiating
long-term and permanent arrangements for water supply.  Legislation
passed in 2001 requiring that local governments demonstrate adequate
water supplies for development should increase urban demand for long-
term water transfers.  As we shall see, municipalities’ success in forging
these deals and assuring new supplies will depend on their ability to
smooth the waters of community resistance in the source regions.
____________ 
9See Association of California Water Agencies (2002) and Department of Water
Resources (2002b).
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3. The Rise of Local Restrictions
on Water Marketing
As state and federal authorities have taken steps to facilitate water
marketing in California over the past two decades, concerns over
potential negative effects of the market on the source regions have
prompted many county governments to erect new barriers to trade.  This
chapter describes the statewide trends in county adoption of groundwater
protection ordinances and raises some of the key legal, economic, and
operational questions concerning their implementation.
The Mobilization of Rural Counties
By the end of 2002, 22 of California’s 58 counties had adopted
ordinances that restrict the export of groundwater.  Although the specific
language of the ordinances varies, one common thread is their focus on
the regulation of exports, as distinct from groundwater uses on-site.  In
most ordinances, “exports” are defined as shipments of water beyond the
county’s administrative boundaries.  Although several counties apply
instead an “out-of-basin” definition of exports, and several others an “off-
parcel” definition, a review of the implementation record suggests that
these nonadministrative boundaries reflect an intent to protect the
ordinance against potential legal challenges (discussed below) rather than
to regulate groundwater use within the county.1
The precursor to this movement was the adoption by three northern
counties (Butte, Glenn, and Sierra) of urgency ordinances prohibiting
____________ 
1Counties with “out-of-basin” restrictions include Inyo, Kern, Mono, and Siskiyou.
Counties with “off-parcel” restrictions include Tehama, San Benito, and Sierra.  Imperial
County’s ordinance has separate restrictions on exports leaving the county and on
groundwater extractions for within-county use.  As discussed in Chapter 5, only three
counties within this group—Imperial, San Benito, and Sierra—have enforced a
permitting process for within-county uses.  For details, see Hanak and Dyckman (2003).
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the “mining” of groundwater in 1977, a year of severe drought.  Modoc
County followed suit early in the following year, with an ordinance
limiting transfers outside the groundwater basin.  Over the next 15 years,
a handful of Sacramento Valley and mountain counties introduced
ordinances with explicit export restrictions.  The slow pace may be
explained in part by the fact that two counties, Inyo and Nevada, saw
their ordinances successfully challenged at the trial court level during the
1980s.2  The floodgates opened once a third county, Tehama, won an
appellate court victory in 1994, upholding its authority to regulate
groundwater.
Since the Tehama decision, which was widely publicized in water
law and county government circles,3 14 counties adopted explicit export
restrictions for the first time, and three counties regularized urgency
ordinances adopted earlier (Figure 3.1).4  Geographically, the group is
concentrated in rural California:  the mountain counties to the north and
east, the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, and Imperial County to
the south (Figure 3.2).  By and large, these counties fall into the group
traditionally considered “source” regions for the state’s water supply;
many have relied heavily on groundwater for agriculture.
Over this period, five other counties adopted groundwater protection
ordinances that focus on management of groundwater resources within
the county or in a particular geographic subarea.5  The regulations
include various types of restrictions on extraction for on-site use (e.g.,
well permitting, flow monitoring, pump taxes).  In effect, the county
____________ 
2Inyo County’s ordinance was successfully challenged by the City of Los Angeles in
1983 (City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. County of Inyo, case no.
12,908, July 8, 1983).  Nevada County’s ordinance, introduced in 1986, was successfully
challenged in a suit brought by the Truckee-Donner Public Utility District in 1988.
Inyo pursued the matter through negotiations with the City of Los Angeles and
reintroduced a revised ordinance in 1998.  Nevada County did not seek review and has
not reintroduced an ordinance subsequent to the Tehama holding.  For this reason, we
have not counted Nevada among the 22 counties with export restrictions.
3See Goldsmith (1995a, 1995b) and Bunn (1997).
4In addition, Modoc County introduced a more stringent ordinance restricting
exports out of the county rather than the basin in 2000, and Inyo reintroduced an
ordinance in 1998 to replace the one invalidated by its court proceedings in the early
1980s.
5For details, see Table B.1, middle column.
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Figure 3.1—Adoption of County Ordinances Restricting Exports
assumes an authority resembling that exercised by other specialized
groundwater institutions present in the state:  basins adjudicated by the
courts, special groundwater management districts created through acts of
the legislature, and certain special water districts that exercise full control
over access to the resource.6  In adjudicated basins, use rights are
attributed to individual users in much the same way as surface water
rights.  In the special districts with groundwater authority, the districts
have the authority to regulate individual water use, typically through
pump taxes.
Counties with these types of groundwater management institutions
tend to be located along the coast and in Southern California; most have
significant urban populations.  The on-site groundwater protection
ordinances appear to substitute for or complement the activities of special
districts and adjudicated basins.  Ordinances substituting for other
measures include those of San Diego and Napa Counties; in Napa,
____________ 
6For maps showing the location of these institutions, see Figures B.2 and B.3.
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NOTE:  Kern County’s ordinance is limited to the southeast portion of the 
county within the Lahontan hydrologic region.
Figure 3.2—California Counties with Groundwater Export Restrictions, 2002
officials view the ordinance as an alternative to a costly adjudication
process.  Counties where the ordinances complement other institutions
include Monterey, Mendocino, and San Bernardino.  In Monterey, the
ordinance applies to several zones not already covered by a special
groundwater district.  Mendocino’s ordinance applies only to the town of
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Mendocino, where a special district has groundwater authority.  The San
Bernardino ordinance applies to desert regions of the county not already
under a local management system and notably excludes the Mojave
Basin, which is adjudicated.
At first glance, several of the mountain counties (Lassen, Modoc,
Mono, and Sierra) seem to be exceptions to this geographical division
because they have adopted both special groundwater management
districts and countywide ordinances restricting exports.  However, all but
one of the six special groundwater districts in these counties were set up
with the primary purpose of controlling exports rather than for local use
management.7  Siskiyou County also appears as a partial exception, by
virtue of the presence of one adjudicated basin.  As noted above, several
of the counties with export restrictions have ordinances that would, in
principle, provide authority to regulate in-county uses as well.  However,
this authority appears to be exercised actively in only three counties—
Imperial, San Benito, and Sierra.
An Overview of Export Restrictions
All 22 ordinances restrict the direct export of groundwater; those
adopted since 1996 also implicitly restrict exports of surface water by
regulating the extraction of groundwater used to replace exported surface
supplies.  Sacramento’s ordinance overtly restricts surface water exports
of any kind.  A handful of counties (Madera, San Joaquin, and Fresno)
have specific restrictions on the use of county groundwater basins as
storage sites for groundwater banking projects.  San Joaquin County
supervisors recently introduced a separate ordinance restricting the
location of aboveground storage as well, in response to a proposed project
to convert two islands in the Delta into surface storage areas.
In most counties, restricted activities require a county permit, which
invokes a review under the California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA).8  Permit applicants are expected to conduct from one to several
____________ 
7The exception is the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District, which was
initially intended to regulate agricultural pumping in response to drought conditions.
8In four of the five counties with ordinances oriented toward local groundwater
management (San Diego, Mendocino, Monterey, and Napa), the process involves
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studies.  Applications go through a multilayered review by county
departments and commissions, with the final decision most often in the
hands of a political body (the board of supervisors or a body appointed
by the board).  If approved, permits generally run from one to three
years.
Most ordinances provide certain categorical and conditional
exemptions to the permitting process.  Water districts or landowners
with service areas or holdings overlying adjacent counties typically do not
need permits for water use on those lands.  Most counties also provide a
blanket exemption to permitting as long as quantities remain within
historical use levels.  A number of the mountain counties exempt bottlers
of spring water, as long as the bottling is done within the county.
Finally, various counties exempt specific types of local entities—such as
incorporated cities and water districts—from permitting altogether,
either because the counties have assurances that the entities already
engage in sound groundwater management practices or because there are
questions of regulatory authority and an interest in avoiding
jurisdictional conflicts.
Legal Issues
The question of jurisdictional authority is at the heart of the legal
issues raised by the county ordinances.9  In California, municipalities
may invoke police powers to protect the public welfare in areas not
regulated by the state.  This is the basis for the groundwater protection
ordinances, because groundwater falls outside state jurisdiction.
The lawsuit filed in 1992 against Tehama County by two
landowners, Baldwin and Myers, challenged this position, arguing that
some provisions of the California Water Code already dealt with local
groundwater protection, thereby “preempting the field.”  Three areas of
state intervention were cited:  the specially enacted groundwater
management districts (noted above); Section 1220 of the Water Code
________________________________________________________ 
incorporation of a groundwater review or overlay in a regular ministerial process, rather
than application for a discretionary permit with CEQA review.
9For a detailed discussion of the legal issues raised by the ordinances, see Hanak and
Dyckman (2003).
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(enacted in 1984), which restricts the direct export of groundwater out of
the Sacramento River Basin; and the recently enacted AB 3030 (Water
Code Sections 10750–10753.9), which authorizes existing water agencies
to create groundwater management districts.  The county lost in trial
court but prevailed at the appellate level, with a holding that the cited
state legislation did not preempt the county’s ability to regulate an
arguably open field by establishing a review process in the interest of
public health and safety.10
The Tehama case was the first appellate decision to address the issue
of county authority to regulate groundwater extraction.  As noted, it
followed at least two earlier Superior Court rulings that took the opposite
position, holding that the state had preempted the power of cities and
counties in this domain.
Although there have been no further proceedings against county
groundwater ordinances, several potential legal concerns were not
addressed by the Baldwin v. County of Tehama case.  The first of these
relates to provisions of the Water Code governing surface water transfers,
where it would be difficult to argue that the state has not occupied the
field.  Sacramento’s ordinance, which openly restricts any surface water
exports, would suffer under such a legal challenge.  County ordinances
that indirectly restrict surface water exports by restricting groundwater
substitution may also conflict with the state’s authority in this area.
Some ordinances may also be open to legal challenge on the grounds
that they exceed the county’s police power.  Court decisions have tended
to take the view that governments, in exercising this power, should take
the minimum steps needed to protect public health, safety, and welfare.
In counties where it is possible to demonstrate that there is already a
significant problem of overdraft, imposing export restrictions is a classic
use of police power, as it protects residents’ ability to exercise their
property rights.
However, a number of counties are not in a position to justify the
export restrictions on the basis of current needs.  The widespread
exemptions for historic use levels are, in effect, an admission that there is
____________ 
10Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 31 Cal. App. 4th 166, 173-74 (1994, 3rd Dist.);
review denied, Cal. Sup. Ct., March 17, 1995.
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no current threat to public health, welfare, and safety.  In such cases,
applying restrictions could amount to barring present use somewhere in
the state to preserve future use in the areas of origin.  In addition to
potentially exceeding the extent of police powers, an overly protective
ordinance may violate Article X, Section 2 of the California
Constitution, which requires that “the water resources of the state be put
to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable.”11  Many
counties are in the process of incorporating the ordinances into their
General Plans as a way of shoring up the basis for the restrictions.
In a different vein, there is some debate over whether the ordinances
could be subject to a federal Commerce Clause challenge.  As noted
above, the language in most of the ordinances is jurisdictionally based,
restricting exports beyond the administrative boundaries of counties
rather than hydrologic basins or some other distinction that reflects the
physical links between groundwater extraction and harm to adjacent
users.  This language raises the potential for a challenge of discrimination
based on arbitrary distinctions.12  Although this issue has not been raised
in any of the court challenges to date, it has been of some concern for
ordinance drafters in several counties, as reflected in the move to an “out-
of-basin” or “off-parcel” permitting system.13
A final, and arguably more significant, legal concern is that the
ordinances generally do not distinguish between native groundwater and
imported surface water banked underground.  As a result, even
____________ 
11In the Tehama case, the 4th Appellate Court rejected this argument, observing in
a footnote that the issue “is not so simple as plaintiff’s cursory argument supposes.”
Counties may nevertheless have reason for some concern over a potential future legal
challenge against “hoarding water.”  Note too that the source of county regulatory
authority—police power—relates to current threats and not anticipated future threats.
12The case law precedent is Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas (1982), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that discriminatory groundwater export regulation interferes
with interstate commerce (Getches, 1997).
13Counties that moved from a county to a basin restriction include Inyo, Mono,
and Siskiyou.  Discussions with officials in Inyo and Mono revealed that compliance with
the Commerce Clause was a factor in this decision.  Kern County drafted its ordinance
with basin restrictions for similar reasons, following discussions with Inyo County
officials.  Constitutionality issues were also a factor in the drafting of the Tehama County
ordinance, which restricts use off-parcel rather than out-of-county.
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ordinances that do not directly address groundwater-banking projects do
so implicitly because the county might claim authority to restrict the
reexport of water brought in for temporary storage.  The legal ambiguity
on this question arises from overlapping and potentially conflicting
jurisdictions, as the state governs the surface water brought into the
county, whereas counties may seek to govern its reexport. The Water
Transfer Workgroup convened by the SWRCB in 2000 recommended
that county authority over imported banked water be limited to
preventing injury to local users, which could arise if the banking project
negatively affected either quality or quantity of water available locally.14
Economic Issues
The legal basis for county oversight of groundwater reflects the
underlying economic justification for regulation of a collective resource.
In an unregulated situation, a collective resource such as groundwater
risks mismanagement.  In general, individual users or water districts will
not have the incentive to prevent overuse, with negative consequences for
both quantity and quality of the water available in the basin.  In the
absence of state regulation, there is a strong case to be made for local
oversight mechanisms that encourage sound management.
Against this background, California’s county groundwater protection
ordinances raise two questions from an economic standpoint.  The first
relates to the scope of the ordinances themselves; the second to whether
counties are the appropriate level of local jurisdiction.
Concerning scope, the question is whether ordinances whose sole
focus is restricting exports can contribute to better management of the
groundwater resource.  Export restrictions could be a sensible
management tool, from an economic standpoint, in two situations.
First, when there is uncertainty about the characteristics of the
groundwater basin (size of the aquifer, recharge rate, etc.), restricting
exports could be a reasonable precautionary measure.  Second, in the
absence of consensus on mechanisms to manage groundwater use by
____________ 
14See the discussion of this issue in the report of the Water Transfer Workgroup
(2002).
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those within the basin, restricting exports at least ensures some upper
bound on extraction rates.
Even where this precautionary strategy is a sensible first step in
groundwater protection, however, it can quickly reach it limits as a
management tool.  A policy focusing on export restrictions can
discourage active management of groundwater basins, a practice that can
benefit local water users financially and enhance the regularity of supply
in overdrafted basins.  Active management can include various programs
involving the conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, such as
the intentional recharge of aquifers that have been drawn down and the
intentional drawdown of aquifers that are full.15  In most places, active
management programs require interactions with water users outside the
area—notably through transfers of surface water in lieu of groundwater
and through banking of imported surface water.  Prerequisites include
setting up information systems to better understand the aquifer and
establishing some form of local oversight on groundwater use.  All of this
implies moving beyond export restrictions to a more comprehensive
system of groundwater management.
In areas where the conjunctive use of surface and groundwater is not
feasible because of limited surface supplies, the case for moving beyond
export restrictions to active management is admittedly weaker.  Even
here, however, there can be benefits to understanding the limits and
opportunities of the resource base.  When groundwater supplies and
recharge rates are more than adequate, a well-structured export program
could be a boon to the local economy.
Are counties the appropriate level of jurisdiction to provide this
leadership?  The economic literature on the management of collective
resources shows that success is greatest when local oversight institutions
reflect a high degree of alignment of interests among concerned parties
(Ostrom, 1990).  The alignment can be geographical, increasing in the
extent to which the physical boundaries of the resource management
problem coincide with the jurisdiction of the local governing institution.
The alignment can also be relational, increasing with the capacity of
____________ 
15For a description of conjunctive use programs used in California, see Purkey et al.
(1998).
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concerned parties to participate in or affect the deliberations of the
governing institution.
In the case of groundwater protection and management, a natural
point of geographical organization might be the aquifer—or the larger
watershed draining into it.  In all but a few cases, these physical
boundaries correspond neither to those of the county nor to those of
other local institutions, such as water districts.  Recognition of this
“misalignment” has led to the formation of multiparty institutions to
address groundwater and watershed issues in many parts of the state.  For
groundwater, the most common institutional forms are groundwater
management programs created under the AB 3030 legislation noted
earlier or under joint powers authority.  According to Department of
Water Resources records, roughly 20 multiparty programs of this type
currently exist.  As we will discuss below, some of these programs show
promise as a structure for local resource management.
Creating new institutions is not without difficulties, however, and
there is some merit to considering counties as a potential rallying point
for local resource management, even if their administrative borders do
not coincide with the limits of the aquifer or watershed.  Counties have
the merit of having well-established representative institutions and public
consultation mechanisms and can provide a convening point for parties.
As such, they offer the potential for a high degree of relational alignment.
Together with cities, they are also the only local institutions with the
authority to invoke police powers, which could be a useful component of
a local resource management program.
Operational Issues
The extent to which the ordinances can play a beneficial role in local
water management also depends on the way certain operational issues are
handled.  Foremost among these is the review process for permitting.  In
many ordinances, this process is open-ended and involves significant up-
front costs.  A strong case can be made that those wishing to transfer
water should be responsible for conducting the necessary environmental
reviews (as is the practice for surface water transfer projects at the state
level).  In a number of counties, however, the initial requirements appear
disproportionately high—effectively calling for a full-fledged study of the
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aquifer before allowing any transfer project to go through, no matter how
small.  Whether intentional or not, this requirement can deter those
seeking permits.  It raises a potential legal issue of undue burden because
the first applicant bears the cost of the background studies for all those
who follow.  In many counties, questions can also be raised about the
transparency of the review process and the extent to which the technical
characteristics of the project will be considered by the political body
empowered to grant permits.  Finally, the number of reviewing entities
and effective amount of review time create other deterrents.
Summing Up
In the 25 years since the state adopted a policy in favor of water
transfers, a movement to regulate the water market has gained
momentum in California’s rural counties.  As of late 2002, 22 of the
state’s 58 counties had adopted groundwater protection ordinances
requiring a permit to export groundwater or to extract groundwater used
in substitution for transferred surface water.
Although this policy can be justified on economic grounds as a first-
step precautionary measure in the face of uncertainty about the resource
base, it is harder to justify in the longer run in the absence of a broader
water management program.  A strictly precautionary policy prevents the
water users in the county from actively managing their groundwater
resources, a practice that can reap financial and water supply benefits.  It
also makes counties susceptible to charges of “hoarding water,” which is
disallowed by the California Constitution.  Because groundwater is a
shared resource, active water management requires some form of local
oversight.  Whether counties or other local institutions are better suited
to the task is an open question to which we will return below.
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4. Why Do Some Counties
Adopt Export Restrictions?
As we have seen, counties with ordinances restricting water exports
are concentrated in California’s inland rural regions—the mountain
counties to the north and east and the Sacramento and San Joaquin
Valleys in the center.  Despite this common denominator, however, there
are some clear distinctions within the group.  Some counties are
agricultural powerhouses; in others, farming is a marginal activity.  Some
are sparsely populated; others contain large and fast-growing
metropolitan areas.  Nor is geography a complete determinant:  Over a
third of the counties in these regions have not adopted ordinances.
This diversity suggests that the rural county ordinance movement is
not monolithic; a range of factors may influence individual counties’
choices.  This chapter explores some of these factors, using two
approaches.  First, we examine whether there is a statistical basis for
predicting which counties adopt ordinances, taking into account
characteristics about county economic and water conditions and
institutional factors.  Second, we use a more qualitative lens, drawing on
information obtained from interviews with county officials and water
users.  This discussion highlights the specific dynamics at play in each of
the three regions noted above.
Factors That Make a Difference
Because the timeline of county adoption is idiosyncratic, we will
confine the statistical analysis to a simple “yes” or “no” prediction of
ordinance adoption and not attempt to model the factors determining
the year of adoption.  This leads us to focus on characteristics that vary
across counties, measured, when possible, in the mid-1990s, when the
adoption movement was fully under way.
38
Data on County Water Economy and Institutions
We could expect two structural factors to be important in the
decision to adopt water export restrictions:  the local economy’s
dependency on water and the extent to which exports might compromise
the groundwater resource base.  To measure the first of these, we have
identified four indicators.  Two capture the role of agriculture, the
primary water-dependent economic activity:  the share of farm jobs in
total employment and the share of agriculturally related jobs, a category
including agricultural services and agro-processing.1  A third indicator,
the share of irrigated acreage in total farm acreage, reflects the intensity of
water use as an input.  Counties with higher proportions of dry-land
farming or rangeland will have lower agricultural water needs.  The
fourth indicator, the share of residential population dependent on
groundwater, captures the relative importance of groundwater as a water
source.  Ideally, we would have included a comparable measure for
agriculture, but the share of groundwater in farming is not known in
many counties.  We might expect all four of these measures to be
positively related to the decision to adopt an ordinance restricting water
exports.
We might also expect counties whose groundwater basins are
experiencing serious overdraft to be more inclined to adopt precautionary
measures than those whose aquifers are full.  Identifying these locations
proved difficult.  A good measure of overdraft would be the extent to
which the water table in an aquifer was declining on a long-term basis.
There are no statewide measures of overdraft so defined, in part because
the Department of Water Resources does not have access to well data in
many areas, in part (and relatedly) because the issue raises thorny legal
questions.  Designation of overdraft has implications for the rights of
groundwater appropriators and can serve as a basis for adjudication
proceedings.
The last time DWR ventured an official designation of groundwater
basins in difficulty was in the 1980 Bulletin 118-80 (Department of
Water Resources, 1980).  The bulletin provides a list, established
____________ 
1See Appendix C for a description of data sources.
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through a process of data analysis and public review, of 11 basins that are
“critically overdrafted” and four basins “with special problems.”2
Although conditions of individual groundwater basins in the state may
have changed for better and for worse in the intervening years, this list
remains the best indicator of counties with an at-risk groundwater basin.
We would expect that counties overlying such basins would be more
likely to have adopted some type of restrictions.
It is also likely that institutions play a role in the decision to restrict
exports.  One unquantifiable but integral aspect is the degree of harmony
among the county’s institutions.  Counties where the water agencies are
not in conflict with each other and with the municipal and county
governments will be less likely, all else equal, to have the motivation to
impose export restrictions as a controlling mechanism.  This institutional
concordance can result from a range of factors:  limited number or low
diversity of institutions, overlap of county and water agency governing
bodies, or good working relationships borne of individual initiative.
Another important institutional factor is an affiliation with the
Regional Council of Rural Counties (RCRC), an association of counties
with populations generally below 300,000.  It began in the early 1970s as
an association of the mountain counties and subsequently expanded to
cover most of the small counties in the state.3  In 1995, on the heels of
the Tehama County court victory, RCRC established a water program to
promote the protection of member counties’ water rights.  The program
encourages members to adopt groundwater ordinances and to reflect
these in their general plans.  RCRC influence is transmitted in two ways.
For some counties, the secretariat has provided technical and legal advice;
more generally, the board of directors, made up of a supervisor from each
member county, serves as an important forum for information exchange.
____________ 
2See Figure B.4 for a map showing the location of these basins.
3As of 2002, RCRC had 30 member counties:  Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras,
Colusa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Glenn, Imperial, Inyo, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Mariposa,
Merced, Modoc, Mono, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, San Benito, Shasta, Sierra,
Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tuolumne, and Yuba.  Imperial County officially
joined in October 2002 but was informally affiliated with the group for some time before
membership.
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Cross-County Results
For several of these indicators, there is a considerable and statistically
significant difference in the mean values between counties with export
ordinances and those without (Table 4.1).  On average, counties with
export restrictions have twice the share of farm employment and 40
percent higher residential dependence on groundwater.  They are also
twice as likely to be members of RCRC.  The ordinance adopters also
register a third more irrigated farmland and appear nearly twice as likely
to overlie a critical or specially designated groundwater basin, although
the differences are not statistically significant at the 90 percent level of
confidence.  The one area where the groups do appear alike is in their
share of agriculturally related employment, at roughly 2 percent of all
jobs.
Several of these factors contribute to the probability of a county
adopting an export restriction in the expected ways.4  The most sizable
effects are associated with membership in RCRC and the presence of
an at-risk groundwater basin.  These factors increase the likelihood
of ordinance adoption by 30 and 26 percent, respectively.  Farm
employment also raises the likelihood of adoption.  A county with 10
Table 4.1
Average Characteristics of Counties With and Without Export Restrictions
Counties
With
Restrictions
Counties
Without
Restrictions
All
Counties
Farm employment (%) 8.0*** 3.8 5.4
Agriculture-related employment (%) 2.0 1.9 1.9
Irrigated farmland (%) 34 24 27
Residents using groundwater (%) 75*** 54 62
Counties overlying critical/special basin
(1980) (% of counties in group) 45 25 33
RCRC membership (% of counties in
group) 77*** 36 52
Sample size 22 36 58
***Indicates significant difference of group means at the 99 percent level of
confidence.
____________ 
4See Appendix C for a more detailed presentation of the statistical results discussed
here.
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percent of its workforce in agriculture is a third more likely to adopt an
ordinance than a county with only 2 percent of farm jobs.5
Somewhat surprisingly, agriculturally related employment appears to
have the opposite effect.  For a given level of on-farm employment,
counties with a higher share of value-added activities related to
agriculture are less likely to adopt export restrictions.  In effect, the
geographical link between agriculturally related jobs and farming is less
direct than is commonly thought.  Many counties with a relatively low
share of farming have significant processing activities.  The statewide
county average ratio of off-farm to on-farm agricultural jobs is 73
percent.  Only one county with an export ordinance (Sacramento)
exceeds that level.  Thirteen counties without ordinances do so—
including virtually all of the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern
California.  Many of these counties have more comprehensive
groundwater management systems, which do not discriminate against
transfers.
Regional Issues
To understand the reasons for adopting export restrictions, we
interviewed county and water district officials and other resource persons
in 36 counties, including most having some type of groundwater
ordinance and the key agricultural counties without one.6  The
interviews sought background on the following types of questions:  Was
the ordinance a response to a specific local event or a general
precautionary measure?  Is the main concern with activities of private
individuals or water districts?  Which types of prospective buyers raise
red flags—farmers in neighboring counties or distant municipal water
suppliers?  Is the objective mainly to control water exports or
groundwater banking projects?  Within the county, how contentious was
____________ 
5Neither the share of irrigated farmland nor the share of residential dependence on
groundwater has statistically significant effects on the adoption of export restrictions.
6The only counties with ordinances for which interviews could not be conducted are
Siskiyou and Monterey.  Counties without ordinances for which interviews were
conducted include Kings, Merced, Placer, Plumas, Solano, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Sutter,
Trinity, Tulare, and Yuba.  All 58 counties were contacted to verify whether an ordinance
was in place or under consideration.
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the adoption process?  Were exemptions granted because of jurisdictional
issues or because the exempted parties were considered to have an
adequate groundwater management system in place?
Although each county has a unique story in some respects, we have
opted to highlight the results of these interviews from a regional
perspective.7  The three regions singled out have different water supply
conditions and a different set of demands for agricultural and residential
uses.  These factors lend a specific regional character to the nature of the
perceived threat the water market brings with it.  So, too, do historical
events relating to water transfers.  Within this context, the weight of the
ordinance in a given county will depend on the local dynamics of the
adoption process:  whether it came in response to a specific event, the
degree of internal conflict, and the extent of public involvement
preceding adoption.
The Mountain Counties:  The Legacy of Owens Valley
Counties in this region are sparsely populated and have limited
agricultural production (Table 4.2).8  Many rely heavily—some
exclusively—on groundwater, although rivers and streams provide a
source of surface water in others.  An indicator of the extent to which
groundwater is a local concern is the fact that six of the 15 counties
overlie basins identified in Bulletin 118-80 as having “special problems.”9
The history of one of these basins, Owens Valley, has indelibly
marked the regional consciousness on water issues.  In the early part of
the 20th century, the City of Los Angeles bought up vast tracts of land in
the valley and began exporting large quantities of groundwater.  The
transfer had immediate consequences for the local economy, where
agriculture became unviable, and has proven over time to be deleterious
to the environmental health of the valley.  The expansion of pumping
capacity in 1970 with the addition of a second aqueduct exacerbated the
____________ 
7For a list of counties by region and a map showing county locations, see Table B.1
and Figure B.1, respectively.
8The only county with over $100 million in gross agricultural product in 1999 was
Siskiyou, which is part of the Klamath Project.  Neighboring Modoc, also in the project,
had output valued at just over $60 million in that year.
9Only Calaveras overlies a basin identified as subject to critical overdraft.
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Table 4.2
Regional Characteristics (County Averages)
Mountain
Counties
Sacramento
Valley
San Joaquin
Valley
Population 37,870 234,335
 (118,161)
430,075
Urban population (%) 0 41
(35)
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Agricultural output per capita ($) 882 3,530 4,366
Residents using groundwater (%) 67 78 88
Counties overlying critical/special
basin 7 0 8
RCRC membership 15 8 2
Export ordinances 8 7 4
Counties in group 15 10 8
SOURCES:  Population figures for 2002 are from the California Department
of Finance.  Urban population share is from the 1990 Census, the most recent year
for which this estimate is available.  Per capita agricultural output is from the 1997
Agricultural Census.  See also Appendix C.
NOTES:  Numbers are county average values for each region.  For a list of
counties in each region, see Table B.1.  For the Sacramento Valley, numbers in
parentheses indicate values excluding Sacramento County.
environmental problems, both in Mono Lake and in the Owens Lake
bed.  Following years of difficult and acrimonious legal proceedings, Inyo
County and a coalition of environmental groups reached mitigation
agreements with the City of Los Angeles in the early 1990s.  These have
resulted in a considerable reduction in the flow of water out of Mono
and Inyo Counties through the Los Angeles Aqueduct.10
The mountain counties also have an acute awareness of their status as
source regions for the federal and state water projects and the projects
developed by the City of San Francisco and East Bay Municipal Utilities
District.  Although these projects have not necessarily affected the
volumes of water available to local water users, whose needs are limited,
____________ 
10The settlement between the City of Los Angeles and the County of Inyo over
Owens Valley was reached in October 1991, and the Mono Lake settlement was reached
in September 1994 (Hundley, 2001).  Together, these agreements have reduced the City
of Los Angeles’s exports by an annual average level of 150,000 acre-feet, or one-third of
the conveyance capacity of the Los Angeles Aqueduct (personal communication, Jerry
Gewe, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, December 2002).
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there is a tradition of vigilance in defending the area of origin status, by
which counties can reclaim water they may need for future growth.11
Moreover, contention over the regulation of instream flows can at times
be significant.  One case in point is the current dispute over Central
Valley Project appropriations from the Trinity River.  The federal
government’s decision to reduce off-take, in response to concerns by
Native American tribes and environmentalists, has become the subject of
legal proceedings with project contractors in the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Valleys.  A second is the dispute on the allocation of water
between instream and agricultural uses on the Klamath River, which has
pitted agricultural water districts in Siskiyou, Modoc, and neighboring
Oregon counties against environmental and tribal advocates within the
same region.
Against this backdrop, one might expect these communities to be
wary of transferring water.  Several of the basins bordering the state of
Nevada have been the subjects of intense controversy for just this reason.
A project to market groundwater to Nevada from Long Valley, one of
the “special problem” basins underlying Lassen and Sierra Counties and
neighboring Washoe County in Nevada, prompted the introduction of
the state’s first special groundwater management district act in 1980.
Since then, potential export projects to Nevada from the Honey Lake
Basin (Lassen) and the Surprise Valley Basin (another “special problem”
basin underlying Modoc) led county officials to obtain special district
status for these basins as well.  In addition to the ability to limit exports,
the special groundwater management districts have the authority to
negotiate directly with the state of Nevada concerning joint basin
matters.12  County-level export restrictions have been adopted as an
additional safeguard, with little substantive consequence for the
management of these basins.
____________ 
11This includes the “County-of-Origin” statute (1927; Cal. Water Code Section
10505), the “Watershed Protection Act” (1933, Cal Water Code Sections 11460–
11464), the “Delta Protection Act” (1959), and the “Protected Areas” statute (1984; Cal
Water Code Sections 1215–1222).  See Hundley (2001), pp. 531–533.
12This authority has been essential, but the border counties nevertheless find
themselves at a disadvantage in cross-border basin management negotiations, because
groundwater extraction in Nevada is regulated at the state level.
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Although the potential for groundwater exports to Nevada has also
been an issue in Mono and Inyo Counties (as well as San Bernardino,
further south), the more-pressing concerns there have arisen from
modern-day projects to export groundwater to Los Angeles.  Inyo
County’s initial ordinance, passed by a ballot referendum in 1980, was
part of the county’s attempt to seek mitigation for the ongoing transfers
to the City of Los Angeles begun decades earlier.  But mitigation of both
Mono Lake and the Owens Valley has spawned a new set of concerns.
The freed-up capacity in the Los Angeles Aqueduct has sparked the
interest of several private firms, which see the potential to use it for
conveying water to the coast.  The Inyo County ordinance was revised in
1998 to expressly limit transfers through the aqueduct and any sales to
Los Angeles.
By contrast, in Calaveras and Tuolumne Counties, ordinance
adoption appears to have been largely preventive in nature, sparked more
by the Tehama ruling and RCRC encouragement than by any specific
threat to the groundwater resources.
On the whole, the introduction of ordinances in this region has been
spearheaded by county officials and has proceeded with little local
dissent.  The one exception is Calaveras County, where there were
protracted negotiations on the terms of the ordinance because of the
concerns of local farmers and the main surface water district.  The
challenges to Inyo’s initial ordinance were raised by landowning
“outsiders”—a private company, Anheuser-Busch, which hoped to
export water to use in its plants in Los Angeles, and the City of Los
Angeles itself, which sued the county and prevailed in the Superior
Court.13  Subsequent versions of the ordinance exempt the City of Los
Angeles from the permitting process, as its water use is regulated by a
separate agreement with the county.
Among the counties without ordinances, at least two have alternative
institutional mechanisms in place for management.  Plumas County
overlies the Sierra Basin, for which a special groundwater management
district was set up in 1980 to deal with in-basin supply problems, rather
____________ 
13City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. County of Inyo, case no.
12,908, July 8, 1983.
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than in response to export threats.  One commentator assured us, “Were
there a need to, the Board of Supervisors could vote in an ordinance in
no time.” El Dorado’s only groundwater supplies come from fractured
rock—a geological formation that does not lend itself to recharge in the
way alluvial basins do.  Well permitting has been strictly controlled in
the county for many years.
Sacramento Valley:  A Balancing Act Between the Surface
Water “Haves” and “Have-Nots”
The Sacramento Valley is an important agricultural region,
producing rice, tomatoes, and various fruits and nuts (Table 4.2).  It also
contains one of the fastest-growing metropolitan areas, centered on the
city of Sacramento.  Unlike the mountain counties, the valley is
simultaneously a source region for the large surface water projects and a
major surface water user.  The region is also relatively rich in
groundwater, which is a primary supply for residential uses and for some
farmers.  In 1980, not a single aquifer in the valley was on the critical
basin list.  Although several counties are now concerned about cones of
depression, or pockets of overdraft, the valley would still be absent from
that list if it were drawn up today.
Debates on water marketing are colored by two characteristics of the
region’s water supply:  the uneven distribution of surface water rights
within the valley and the valley’s overall abundance of supplies relative to
other parts of the state.  The distribution of surface water rights within
the valley reflects the historical patterns of water district formation and
construction of storage and conveyance facilities.  A number of water
districts and mutual water companies have senior rights to Central Valley
Project and State Water Project deliveries, by virtue of having laid claim
to the water before project inception.  Most of these senior contract-
holders are agricultural water users in the south-central and eastern parts
of the valley, in Glenn, Colusa, Butte, and Sutter Counties.  To the east,
Yuba and Placer Counties are also rich in surface water, thanks to
autonomous projects with aboveground reservoirs.  Districts along the
west side of the valley, served by the Tehama-Colusa Canal, have junior
rights to CVP water, typically involving both lower per acre allocations
and less-reliable supply from one year to the next.  In several counties,
47
independent groundwater pumpers—i.e., those not affiliated with water
districts—constitute a significant portion of the farming population.
“Area of origin” concerns—notably the perception that Southern
California’s thirst for the north state’s water would never be quelled—
are a longstanding component of the valley’s water lexicon.  A landmark
event was the 1982 defeat at the ballot box of the project to build the
Peripheral Canal, which would have facilitated the movement of water
past the San Francisco Bay Delta to southern contractors of the federal
and state water projects (Hundley, 2001).  Voters in this region (as
elsewhere in Northern California) were overwhelmingly opposed to the
project, which still looms as a symbol of the need for vigilance on water
rights.
Soon after this defeat, at the urging of valley and mountain counties,
the legislature added Sections 1215-22 to the Water Code to firm up the
area-of-origin protections.  Under Section 1220, it is illegal to directly
export native groundwater appropriated after 1975 outside the
Sacramento River Basin without the authorization of the overlying
county.  To authorize, the county first has to establish a groundwater
management plan to ensure that the export does not compromise
supplies for local needs.  Water purveyors south of the Delta were the
intended targets of the section, because earlier area-of-origin statutes
provided safeguards only with respect to the state and federal projects.14
It appears that the measure was largely preventive in nature, rather than a
response to specific transfer projects under consideration.
The multiyear drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s prompted
renewed fears about the need to protect native groundwater.  One source
of the problem was actual transfer activity that occurred under the state-
operated drought water bank.  Various water districts and individual
farmers in the region participated in the bank in all three years of its
operation (1991, 1992, and 1994).  In 1994, bank purchases sparked a
well-publicized controversy in Butte County, where water districts with
senior rights sold some of their surface water and engaged in additional
____________ 
14Personal communication, Clyde McDonald, September 2002.  Mr. McDonald
was a member of the staff of the bill’s author, Senator Norman Walters, at the time of
passage.
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groundwater pumping for irrigation.  When wells in parts of the county
ran dry, some independent pumpers linked this development to the
transfer activity.  Because there was no mechanism in place to monitor
the effects of the pumping or to mitigate third-party effects, the problem
festered and a heated conflict erupted among local water users.15
Although the Butte conflict may well have had repercussions beyond
county lines, the state’s considerations about using the region’s
groundwater as a longer-term source of supplemental supply for users
south of the Delta were probably at least as significant in generating
concerns about groundwater protection.  In the wake of the water bank
experience, the Department of Water Resources began development of a
supplemental water purchase program, intended to be a more systematic
approach to future water transfers.  Initially, the program envisaged
annual purchases of up to 400,000 acre-feet of groundwater from
Sacramento Valley basins.16  Upon release of the draft document in
1996, local reaction was immediate and sufficiently spirited to condemn
the proposal to mothballs.  In our discussions with water users and
officials throughout the region, the imprint of this proposal remains
strong, although the details have faded into the haze.  In explaining the
reasons for county mobilization, a typical recollection runs something
like this:  “Back in the early 1990s, DWR decided to put a straw into the
aquifer, so we knew we had to do something.”
The other well-publicized groundwater transfer controversy, which
provoked the drafting of the Tehama County ordinance, demonstrates
that exports to points south of the Delta are not the only concern,
however.  This case involved the direct pumping of groundwater off a
small parcel in proximity of the Tehama Colusa Canal, which the
landowner planned to use to irrigate his farmland in Colusa County,
farther south along the canal.  Section 1220 of the Water Code would
not be applicable in this type of situation, as it only limits the direct
____________ 
15Notably, DWR did not reserve the right in its purchase contracts to require
cessation of pumping in the event that effects were encountered.  A detailed case study is
provided in Thomas (2001).
16Department of Water Resources (1996b), as discussed in Thomas (2001).
49
exportation of groundwater out of the valley, not transfers within the
region.17
Thus, Sacramento Valley counties have put ordinances in place to
control two types of behavior, depending on the specific water supply
issues they face.  In several of the west side counties with limited surface
water supplies—Tehama, Shasta, and Yolo—the primary target has been
direct groundwater exports by private landholders located alongside
conveyance facilities, whatever the ultimate destination.
In a larger set of counties, the key issue is the dichotomy between
water districts with senior surface water rights and other users who rely
on groundwater.  Concerns have focused on the potential for surface
water districts to engage in indirect groundwater exports, by pumping
more groundwater and selling their surface water.  This problem has
played out in quite different ways across the region.
In Butte, the controversy went to the ballot box.  A coalition of
citizens’ groups angry with the water transfers sponsored an initiative to
give the county fairly sweeping control over groundwater management,
including the potential to introduce pump taxes.  In reaction, the county
farm bureau and local water districts proposed an alternative ballot
measure, limiting the scope of county oversight to exports.  It was this
second measure, supported by greater campaign funding, that voters
adopted in the fall 1996 elections.  Although the air has cleared in the six
years since its passage, the ordinance-by-initiative has left its mark on
local water politics.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Yuba County has avoided the
controversy over groundwater substitution altogether thanks to a
particular set of institutional conditions.  The Yuba County Water
Agency (YCWA), the wholesale purveyor to most of the county’s
agricultural water districts, has the entire county as its service area.  All
five county supervisors also serve as directors on the agency’s board.  The
agency has adopted a policy of immediate mitigation in the event of any
____________ 
17The common interpretation has also been that Section 1220 does not apply to
indirect groundwater exports via groundwater substitution, hence another argument for
county ordinances.
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well problems that could be linked to groundwater pumping for
transfers.
In the three other counties with significant potential for groundwater
and surface water interaction—Colusa, Sutter, and Glenn—this high
degree of overlap between county and water district jurisdictions does
not exist.  Ordinances were proposed as preventive measures to protect
local users from harm.  In Colusa, the county took the lead with RCRC
support, and the ordinance appears to have been passed with little
dissension by water districts.  In Sutter, county officials proposed an
ordinance as early as 1995 or 1996 but have held off on adopting it in
response to water district opposition.
Glenn is the only one of the three counties where, as in Butte, the
ordinance adoption process reflected a serious disagreement between
water users in the county.  Although the supervisors unanimously
adopted an export ordinance in 1990, a group of groundwater users
considered that it did not have the teeth necessary to protect them from
potential exports by the large surface water districts on the east side of the
county.  The group sought a legislatively sanctioned ordinance and
succeeded in getting both houses to pass one during the 1992 legislative
session.18  The governor vetoed the bill on the advice of the county’s
water districts.  It took a dramatic change in course by the largest water
district, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (GCID), to enable a new set of
working relations to develop among the county’s water users.
Soon after the veto event, an internal management crisis within the
district provoked the recall of the entire board and the hiring of new
management.  With the blessing of the district’s new board and the
county board of supervisors, one of the new GCID directors took the
initiative to organize an ad hoc, countywide water users group.  The
point of departure for the group was to find ways for the county’s
different types of water users to coexist in harmony.  GCID and some of
the other senior surface rights districts recognized that there would be
situations where they would be solicited and would want to transfer
water south, as during the recent drought.  The question was how to
____________ 
18SB 867, the “Glenn County Groundwater Management Act,” introduced by
Senator Mike Thompson in March 1991 and vetoed by the governor in September 1992.
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engage in transfers without harming other local users dependent on
groundwater.
After several years of informal meetings, the county board formalized
the process and nominated water users representing all the subbasins in
the county to a Water Advisory Committee.  In the discussions on
management alternatives to export restrictions that followed, observers
identified two key turning points.  First, the irrigation districts came
forward with a proposal for a new ordinance emphasizing “safe yield” of
the aquifer.  This proposal allayed the fears of some parties that there
would not be safeguards for protecting the aquifer in the event of
groundwater substitution-based transfers.
The question then became how to operationalize the concept of safe
yield, which is difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly.19  With
input from DWR’s Northern Office, the committee developed the
ordinance to follow the concept of  “basin management objectives”
(BMOs).  Under this system, water users in the different subbasins would
be responsible for establishing a monitoring system and determining
target levels for the aquifer under different water conditions.  The target
levels (or BMOs) are, in effect, a surrogate measure of safe yield.  Exports
will be restricted only if they lead to unacceptable groundwater levels as
determined by the targets.  Significantly, pumping for in-county use can
also be limited if problems persist after exports are cut back.  The Glenn
County supervisors passed the new ordinance in 2000, and the first set of
basin management objectives was adopted in 2001.  These are subject to
revision annually as data-gathering and knowledge improve.20
Over this same period, Sacramento County was involved in a similar
process, on a much larger scale, to find consensual solutions to its water
problems through the Sacramento Water Forum.  One outcome has
been the creation of a Regional Groundwater Authority to facilitate
____________ 
19“Safe yield” is generally used to mean a level of groundwater use that will not
cause long-term decline of groundwater levels.  Its estimation is complicated because
records of groundwater extraction are limited and recharge rates are highly variable from
one year to the next.  See Dudley (2000).
20For a discussion of the background leading up to the passage of the new
ordinance, see Brown et al. (2001).  For details on the basin management objective
philosophy and process, see Glenn County (2001) and Fulton and Dudley (n.d.).
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groundwater management across a set of water entities.21  The export
ordinance, adopted in 1980, was a response to the 1976–1977 drought
and to more general concerns about protecting water rights prevalent in
that period.  County water officials indicate that for local water
management purposes, the Water Forum process has largely supplanted
the ordinance.  The ordinance, recently transferred from the county code
to the statutes of the county water agency, may still be invoked for water
exports, however.
Following Glenn’s experience, a number of other northern counties
are in the early stages of adopting a BMO-based system:  Tehama,
Modoc, Siskiyou, Lassen, Butte, and Yolo.  As with Glenn, this
represents the potential for a significant departure from the export-
oriented approach of the past.  We will return to a discussion of BMOs
as a groundwater management alternative in Chapter 7.
San Joaquin Valley:  Coping with Overdraft and Surface
Water Scarcity
Favorable soils and climate and the availability of water for irrigation
have enabled the San Joaquin Valley to become California’s leading
agricultural region.  Historically, irrigation was developed with a heavy
reliance on groundwater, as surface supplies were less plentiful than in
the north.  The availability of imported supplies through the federal and
state water projects was a major boon to the valley’s agriculture.  Part of
the motivation for these infrastructure investments was to remediate the
problem of groundwater overdraft in the valley.  In 1980, most of the
valley’s groundwater basins were classified as “critical,” a result of decades
of agricultural pumping in excess of natural recharge rates.  All eight
counties overlie at least one of these basins (Table 4.2, Figure B.4).
Concern with overdraft has spawned active conjunctive use programs
in various parts of the region, whereby water districts take advantage of
the higher levels of surface supplies in wet years to recharge the aquifers.
The longest-running program of this nature is conducted by the
members of the Friant Water Users Association, along the east side of the
valley.  Overdraft has also provided the opportunity for groundwater
____________ 
21Thomas (2001) and McClurg (2002) provide detailed case studies.
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banking.  Kern County water districts have been the most active in this
area.
Although water tables have improved in some places since 1980 as a
result of natural and artificial recharge,22 the region has been under new
pressures because of environmental restrictions on Delta pumping.  The
reduced supply of imported project water, particularly to the CVP
agricultural contractors on the west side of the valley, has been an
important factor in the growth of the state’s water market.  Meanwhile,
ensuring adequate water supply for municipal and industrial uses is
becoming a bigger issue, as the valley is now one of California’s fastest-
growing regions.  Over the next two decades, its population is expected
to grow by 51 percent, or 1.7 million inhabitants.23  The only region
growing faster is the Inland Empire (Riverside and San Bernardino
Counties).
Higher populations have also meant that most of the region’s
counties do not qualify for RCRC; only Madera and Merced are
members.  Ordinances restricting exports have nevertheless been
proposed in six counties and adopted in four.  The debates on adoption
have been flavored by the problems of overdraft and surface water
scarcity.
San Joaquin County put in place an ordinance in 1996 over
concerns that groundwater transfers by farmers along the Delta Mendota
Canal, in the southwestern portion of the county, had contributed to
overdraft of that basin during the early 1990s drought.  In the years that
followed, ordinances motivated by similar concerns were proposed in
Stanislaus, Tulare, and Fresno.  In both Stanislaus and Tulare, where the
proposals do not appear to have come in reaction to specific transfer
activity, water districts successfully argued that they were already engaged
in adequate groundwater management practices.  In Tulare, most
districts are members of the Friant Unit, and there is an active multiparty
groundwater management plan linking a number of these.24  In
____________ 
22This is the case in Kern County, for instance (Kern County Water Agency, 2002).
23Projections are for the period 2000 to 2020.  See Hans Johnson (2002).
24Deer Creek and Tule River Authority, whose groundwater management plan was
introduced in 1995
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Stanislaus, several multiparty groundwater management plans and
associations were in place at the time of the proposal.25
In Fresno, the impetus for an ordinance was an impending
permanent transfer of surface water.  After prolonged public discussions,
the districts managed to gain concessions but not to forestall its passage.
At stake was a transfer of CVP contract entitlement from a small water
district on the west side of the valley.  The Widren Water District had
agreed to sell its entire entitlement (just under 3,000 acre-feet) to a real
estate developer for a new residential development near the town of
Tracy, in San Joaquin County.26  County officials raised concerns that
this agreement might lead to increased groundwater pumping to replace
the transferred surface water.  Although the amount of water was small,
county officials feared that the transfer could set a bad precedent.  The
Widren deal was blocked, following litigation under CEQA and
negotiation, but it convinced the board of supervisors to press for an
ordinance to prevent further transfers out of the county.
The Fresno ordinance went through over two dozen formal drafts
before adoption.  In particular, water districts did not want restrictions
on their ability to engage actively in the water market, on which many
farmers depended as a supplemental source of supply.  The version
ultimately adopted in 2000 reflects many of these concerns and makes
the Fresno ordinance unique.  In addition to the standard exemptions for
use by districts with lands in bordering counties, it categorically exempts
both water exchanges and temporary transfers.  It also provides for a ten-
year permit, whereas the other ordinances require renewal every one to
three years.
Although the initial impetus for the Fresno case was the potential for
groundwater substitution, a number of observers share the view that the
ultimate target is to retain existing surface supplies within the county,
whether or not substitution is involved.  While the Fresno ordinance was
being debated, another permanent transfer of entitlement was proposed
____________ 
25On the east side of the county, two local groundwater associations, including most
water districts and municipalities; on the west side, the Northern Delta Mendota
Groundwater Basin management plan, including five CVP contractors.
26Campbell (2000) provides a detailed discussion of the background to this
ordinance.
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involving Mercy Springs Water District, a neighbor to Widren.
Proposals have also been aired concerning the sale of entitlement from
Broadview Water District, in the same area.  All three of these districts
overlie lands affected by drainage problems, which severely reduce their
agricultural productivity and the likelihood of groundwater pumping.  If
the county attempts to block future transfers of surface entitlement,
districts may argue in court that the county is overstepping its authority.
However, the net effect of county opposition to transfers so far has been
to keep most of the water within the county.27
In Madera and Kern, the two remaining counties with ordinances,
the reasons for adoption were atypical for this region.  The Madera
ordinance was introduced to provide the county with oversight for
groundwater banking projects.  The controversial “Madera Ranch”
project that mobilized county residents and officials involved the ranch
owner, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), and several Central
Valley Project contractors.28  The project generated widespread county
opposition over potential negative effects to local water quality and
supply.  Some parties also believed that the primary project participants
were intentionally withholding information from local stakeholders.
Although the Madera ordinance also regulates both direct and indirect
groundwater transfers, these are generally not perceived to be major
issues in the county.  The two surface water districts that are members of
the Friant Water Users Association were granted exemptions, as was the
City of Madera.
At first glance, the appearance of an export ordinance in Kern
County may seem surprising, given the major role water agencies there
have played in the development of the state’s water market over the past
decade.  The Kern County Water Agency and districts such as Arvin-
Edison Water Storage District, a Friant Unit member, have actively
facilitated water exchanges and transfers and have been leaders in the
____________ 
27There is still no long-term deal concluded for Widren’s water, which is transferred
annually to other agricultural users in Fresno.  Part of the Mercy Springs entitlement will
pass over to users in Santa Clara and Santa Cruz Counties, and part will stay in Fresno
(see Table A.6).  The county is also encouraging prospective Monterey County purchasers
of Broadview’s water to take only part of the supply.
28For case studies, see Campbell (2000) and Thomas (2001).
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groundwater banking movement that has already helped ensure dry-year
supplies.  Closer examination reveals that the ordinance has nothing to
do with water management in the San Joaquin Valley part of the county.
Rather, the reasons for Kern County’s ordinance hearken back to the
water marketing concerns in Inyo and Mono.
The southeastern part of Kern overlies the Lahontan Basin, a
hydrologic area that also encompasses Inyo and Mono Counties.  The
ordinance was developed in response to concerns over a proposal by a
private water marketing company to buy a former alfalfa ranch overlying
the basin and transfer 10,000 acre-feet per year over a 40-year period to
the City of Los Angeles through the Los Angeles Aqueduct.  In light of
the low rainfall and lack of surface water in this desert and foothill area,
people worried that Los Angeles would “recreate an Owens Valley in
Kern County.”  Following a stopgap emergency ordinance, a permanent
ordinance was rapidly put in place to require environmental review of
any groundwater transfer out of the basin.  This was passed with the
approval of the Kern County Water Agency, and there was never any
serious consideration of extending the ordinance to cover the San
Joaquin Valley portion of the county.
Only two valley counties, Kings and Merced, have never had formal
consideration of export ordinances.  One observer suggested that Kings
County has not felt the need for one because there is a relatively
harmonious atmosphere among water districts, most of which operate
with a fairly high level of groundwater monitoring and management.
There is, notably, an active multiparty groundwater management plan
for users overlying the Tulare Lakebed.  Another observer noted that one
local agency, the Kings County Water District, has had its own
ordinance to prohibit groundwater mining since the 1950s.  Like the
Yuba County Water Agency, this district has board members who are
also county supervisors.
Merced County has benefited from a highly effective water planning
approach, spearheaded by the county’s two main purveyors—the City of
Merced and Merced Irrigation District.  In the mid-1980s, dissatisfied
with the ten-year planning horizon required by CEQA, the city decided
to do a 40-year general plan.  The plan raised questions over whether the
groundwater system in place would be capable of sustaining the much
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larger city of the future.  The city began discussions with the irrigation
district, and in 1991 the two parties embarked on a regional water supply
planning exercise, with considerable input from outside consultants for
the modeling work.  A Technical Advisory Committee with
representatives of county departments, other cities, the large water-using
industries, USBR, the regional water quality board, and the state and
federal environmental agencies provided regular input into the planning
process.
The Merced Basin regional water supply plan was completed in the
mid-1990s and provided the basis for a long-term regional conjunctive
use program that could meet the basin’s needs.29  Following its release,
the two lead agencies spearheaded the development of an AB 3030
groundwater management plan, involving 15 water purveyors in the
basin.  Founded in 1997, the Merced Area Groundwater Pool Interests,
or MAGPI, has a board of directors that meets quarterly and a Basin
Advisory Panel involving a wider range of stakeholders that meets
monthly.  Initially, the group focused on establishing an effective
monitoring system for the basin.  It has also begun investigating
conjunctive use projects in association with the Department of Water
Resource’s Integrated Storage Investigation program.
This process, both highly participatory and involving a great deal of
technical input, has preempted the need for alternative protective
mechanisms in Merced County.
Summing Up
A statistical analysis of California’s counties suggests that their
likelihood of adopting export restrictions varies with economic, water
supply, and institutional characteristics.  Counties with a higher share of
the workforce in agriculture are more likely to impose restrictions.  Other
key factors are the presence of a groundwater basin designated as
“critical” or having “special problems” by the Department of Water
Resources in 1980 and membership in the Regional Council of Rural
____________ 
29The water plan was updated in the late 1990s in collaboration with the University
of California, in connection with the plans to establish UC Merced.
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Counties, an association that has promoted groundwater ordinances
since the mid-1990s.
A qualitative review of the reasons for ordinance adoption suggests a
strongly regional character to the patterns observed.  Many mountain
counties have responded to specific threats of long-term groundwater
exports from their basins to Nevada and to the Los Angeles region.
Ironically, the mitigation settlements for Owens Valley and Mono Lake
have kept the threat of new groundwater exports very much alive because
of freed-up conveyance capacity in the Los Angeles Aqueduct.  The
menace of uncontrolled private groundwater pumping for sale to Los
Angeles also motivated Kern County’s ordinance, which covers only the
southeast portion of the county adjacent to Inyo.  Elsewhere in the San
Joaquin Valley, ordinances have responded to concerns about transfer
and banking operations in overdrafted basins and in an overall context of
surface water reductions.  In the Sacramento Valley, a major issue has
been local disparities in the distribution of water rights—notably the
ability of senior surface water-rights-holders to engage in groundwater
substitution while others risk shortages.
In general, Central Valley counties without ordinances have
benefited from greater institutional cohesiveness on water matters.
Countywide, umbrella water agencies have played key leadership roles in
both Yuba and the San Joaquin Valley portion of Kern County.
Elsewhere, substantial efforts have been undertaken to create new
institutions.  In Merced, an initiative begun by the city and the largest
water district in the early 1990s has led to a regional water planning
exercise and an active groundwater management plan involving all
players overlying the Merced Basin.  In Glenn and Sacramento,
stakeholder consultation has produced programs to actively manage the
groundwater basin.  In Glenn’s case, this process culminated in the
adoption in 2000 of a new county ordinance based on basin
management objectives, which has effectively supplanted the export-
permitting ordinance on the books since 1990.  A number of other
counties are now following Glenn’s lead.
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5. Water Market Effects:  Do
County Restrictions Have
Teeth?
What effects, if any, are county policies having on the state’s water
market?  Because most ordinances address both direct groundwater
exports and surface water exports that result in additional groundwater
extraction, we might expect significant overall market effects.  In counties
with restrictions, the only types of transfers not subject to local approval
are those involving water held in surface storage (available to few water
purveyors), excess surface water (available mainly in very wet years), or
water conserved through efficiency gains or land fallowing (available only
through investment outlays or forgone crop income).  If the ordinances
reflect a public view that out-of-county sales from any source should be
discouraged, even these types of transfers could be affected.  Of course, it
is also possible that county restrictions have little practical consequence if
enforcement efforts are ineffective.
This chapter assesses the market effects of export restrictions from
two angles.  First, it draws on information from county-level interviews
to evaluate ordinance implementation.  This discussion focuses on how
the permitting process has worked for out-of-county transfers.  Second, it
looks at the effects of the restrictions on county water marketing activity,
drawing on the database on water transfers presented in Chapter 2.
Export Permitting:  A Largely Uncharted Territory
In counties with ordinances restricting exports, those wishing to
engage in the restricted activity must obtain a county permit, which
invokes review under CEQA.  The permit-granting authority—in this
case, the county—determines the extent of CEQA review.  CEQA
obligations can be met with a relatively simple environmental assessment,
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if the county is satisfied that the permitted activity is likely to have little
or no negative effect, or if adequate provision is made for mitigation.
The county can also require a full-scale environmental impact review
(EIR), in addition to preliminary studies.  Moving from an
environmental assessment to an EIR easily increases costs for the
applicant by a factor of ten or more, with EIRs typically costing
$300,000 or more.
In the years since counties introduced a review process for water
exports, there have been few requests for permits and even fewer permits
granted.  Among the 22 counties with export ordinances, a total of 16
export permit applications have been tendered in four counties:  Inyo
(12), Mono (2), Tehama (1), and San Joaquin (1).1  Of the 16
applications, only one has been granted, in Tehama, and four remain
actively on file, in Inyo.
Most of the applications from Inyo and Mono have concerned
private sector transfers to Los Angeles.  The permit granted in Tehama
was for the movement of a small quantity of groundwater to land owned
by the same farmer in another county.  The application in San Joaquin
was for the reexport of imported banked groundwater by the East-Bay
Municipal Utilities District in 1997.2  After a protracted review process,
the permit was denied in response to concerns about granting a
noncounty entity access to the aquifer.  A permit for groundwater
banking was nearly filed in Madera by a private water firm, Azurix, a
partial subsidiary of the Enron Corporation, which intended to pursue
the Madera Ranch project that was at the origin of that county’s
ordinance.  Whether Azurix’s sale of the property in 2001 without filing
____________ 
1As noted in Chapter 3, three counties in this group have actively required
permitting for some in-county water movements.  In San Benito, there were five
applications for small residential subdivisions, of which three were approved and two
withdrawn.  In Sierra County, one permit was granted for a transfer of treated wastewater
from an industrial property to adjacent property in agricultural use.  In Imperial County,
19 conditional use permits have been granted since 1994 under the well-permitting
process instituted in 1972.  Recently, Imperial County’s Board of Supervisors rejected a
groundwater use petition that had been pending for eight years for use on a farm near the
San Diego County border.  Among reasons for the rejection were apparent concerns that
the applicants might subsequently transfer some of the water to the Borrego Water
District in the neighboring county (Mitchell, 2003).
2For a detailed case study, see Thomas (2001).
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was more a result of its own financial problems or the continued local
controversy remains a matter of speculation.  A broad local coalition of
interests was against both the project and the involvement of an outside
firm, and popular sentiment was prominently displayed on billboards
along Route 99 admonishing Enron/Azurix to stay out of the valley.
In two other counties, those interviewed indicated that permit
applications might be on the horizon.  In Calaveras, where the ordinance
is quite recent, the Calaveras County Water District is investigating a
potential conjunctive use project and intends to launch an application if
the study confirms the project’s viability.  In Sacramento, officials
anticipate that a groundwater export being considered as part of a water
quality mitigation program may trigger a permitting requirement.
The limited permitting experience in counties with export
restrictions stands in stark contrast to that of counties whose
groundwater protection ordinances were put in place to regulate within-
county uses.  In San Diego, Napa, and Mendocino, the review process
has been active, with numerous approvals granted.3
When asked to account for the relative dearth of permitting activity
in counties with export restrictions, observers offer three explanations.
The first holds that there is little local interest in transferring water
outside the county anyway; the ordinance is merely an expression of the
popular consensus.  The second explanation is that the ordinance may be
ineffectual in screening exports that continue to occur.  This could arise
either through lack of public awareness of the permitting requirement or
lack of good surveillance to ensure compliance of those inclined to avoid
permitting.  The third and most common view holds that the permitting
process itself discourages transfers.  Up-front costs of environmental
review, the likelihood of rejection in places hostile to transfers, and the
limited length of time for permits once granted are all cited as deterrents.
In a number of counties, officials admit that this “discouragement factor”
is at least partially intentional.  Legally, counties cannot prohibit exports,
but they can make it difficult for potential sellers to obtain approval.
____________ 
3San Bernardino’s ordinance was approved late in 2002, too recently to have
established a record on permitting.  We were unable to obtain information on the
implementation of Monterey’s ordinance.
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In principle, the information requirements and up-front study costs
depend on the hydrological characteristics of the basin and the extent to
which a knowledge base has already been established through prior
studies.  In practice, another consideration is the degree of public
confidence in the process.  In places where prior experiences have
engendered a distrust of water transfers, the up-front requirements are
bound to be higher than where there is no particular local history.
A case in point is Butte County, where water officials would like to
see a permitting process that effectively screens transfers for third-party
effects without blocking the possibility of water marketing.  In light of
the heated controversy surrounding the adoption of the ordinance,
however, it is likely that the first test case would need to go through a
full-scale environmental impact review.  The cost might be worth it for a
long-term transfer program, but it virtually precludes anyone wishing to
engage in short-term transfers from applying.  Faced with the
opportunity to sell water under DWR’s dry-year purchase program in
2001, farmers in the Western Canal Water District elected to generate
surface water through land fallowing rather than applying for a permit to
engage in groundwater substitution.  As it happened, rice prices were
sufficiently low that year that some farmers found it worthwhile to forgo
crop revenues.  More generally, it might have been better for all parties to
consider groundwater substitution, but the district was effectively
prohibited from pursuing that option.
Effects on the Water Market
The Butte example highlights the fact that the ordinances will not
always limit trade in water if alternative means such as fallowing are
available and acceptable to farmers.  Because this will not always be the
case, however, ordinances limiting the use of groundwater for transfers
could have aggregate effects on the market.  These effects would be
compounded if the ordinances have a more general dissuasive effect on
water exports from any source, which appears to be the intent in some
counties.
Aggregate market effects of two types might be expected.  In counties
where there are willing buyers locally, the ordinances might be expected
to shift supply from exports to in-county uses.  In counties without local
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demand, or where the local demand is more limited than the potential
supply, there would be an overall reduction in the volume traded.  The
alternative prediction—of no effects on the volumes of total transfers and
transfers leaving the county—would correspond to a scenario where the
ordinances are generally ineffectual.
Data Sources
To examine whether there is evidence of these effects, we will employ
the database on water transfers in California presented in Chapter 2.4
The analysis covers the 12-year period beginning in 1990, the point at
which data on counties of origin and destination become more precise.
The aim will be to determine the effect of export ordinances on two
county-level measures of water trading:  annual sales and annual
“exports,” defined as transfers going to users outside of the county.
We will focus the analysis on two geographical groups.  The first is
the set of 34 “water trading” counties—counties that appear at least once
in the transactions database over the period under review (Figure 5.1).
This includes all 18 Central Valley counties, the Southern California
region, the inland portion of the San Francisco Bay Area, and San
Francisco itself.  It excludes the mountain counties and counties along
the north and central coast.  These nontrading counties are excluded for
statistical reasons; the key econometric models cannot be estimated when
they are included.  Moreover, there may be structural reasons for the lack
of trading activity in many of these counties:  Counties along the coast
and to the far north rely on local river and groundwater sources and are
not hydraulically connected to the state’s main water arteries.  It is
possible that some local trades occur in these regions that we have not
been able to trace with our sources.
The second geographical group is the set of 18 Central Valley
counties.  It is interesting to look separately at this region for two
reasons.  First, Central Valley counties have been the major source of
water for the market since the early 1990s.  Second, this region has the
greatest potential for groundwater-related transfer activity, both through
____________ 
4For a detailed description of data sources and methods used in the analysis, see
Appendix D.
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Transfer activity
Figure 5.1—California’s Water-Trading Counties, 1990–2001
groundwater substitution transfers and through groundwater banking.5
The potential role of groundwater in this region stands in stark contrast
to the situation in Imperial County, the other major water supplier.
Although Imperial has imposed groundwater export restrictions since
____________ 
5See Purkey et al. (1998) and related work from the Natural Heritage Institute on
the potential for groundwater banking in the Central Valley.
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1996, these restrictions are unlikely to have much practical influence on
the overall volume of water sales.  Imperial County has vast quantities of
surface water rights from the Colorado River and few areas with usable
groundwater.6
To see whether the presence of an ordinance affects county trading
behavior, it is necessary to control for other factors that might also be
important.  Multiple regression techniques allow us to isolate the effect
of the export restrictions while holding the influence of other factors
constant.  We have selected a set of seven variables—described in
Appendix D—to account for agricultural and residential demand and
water supply conditions.  In addition, we will test for the effects of state
and federal policy changes on the trading environment by including a
time trend in the regressions.  If the new operating rules are effectively
increasing transfer activity, above and beyond what would occur because
of changes in the other variables noted above, this variable should be
positively related to sales.  A time trend also captures the effect of
“learning-by-doing” by water users as they gain familiarity with the
market.
Results
County regulations have noticeably restricted sales in the statewide
market.  In any given year, the typical county with an export restriction
sold 14,308 acre-feet less than a county without one.  The estimated
effect on exports is larger—at 16,948 acre-feet—although the difference
is not statistically significant.  These results suggest that the county
restrictions have not only reduced sales but have also resulted in some
shifting of water from external to within-county buyers, by an average of
2,640 acre-feet per year.  The quantitative effect of export restrictions is
even more pronounced when the analysis is restricted to the 18-county
Central Valley sample.  Holding other factors constant, export
ordinances reduce overall sales by 20,789 acre-feet and out-of-county
____________ 
6In large parts of Imperial County, the groundwater is too saline for agricultural
uses.  Salinity is also a limitation for groundwater use in San Benito County, the other
non–Central Valley county within the “trading counties” group that has an export
ordinance.
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sales by 26,245 acre-feet.  The corresponding increase in local sales
induced by ordinances is nearly 5,500 acre-feet per county per year.
Since 1996, the point at which a number of counties began to adopt
ordinances, the restrictions have reduced exports by 932,000 acre-feet, or
19 percent of all out-of-county sales (Figure 5.2).  Of this total, 145,000
acre-feet that would otherwise have been exported have been sold locally.
The lion’s share (787,000 acre-feet) has simply been kept off the market.
In all, this represents a 14 percent reduction compared to the level of
predicted sales in the absence of county restrictions.  For the Central
Valley counties, these effects are even larger:  a 39 percent reduction in
exports and a 25 percent reduction in overall sales because of restrictive
ordinances.  The resulting shift from exports to the local market appears
to have increased within-county sales by nearly 50 percent.
Meanwhile, state and federal measures to improve the trading
environment, as measured by the time trend, have had a substantial
positive effect on water sales.  The typical county was likely to sell 42,000
acre-feet per year more in 2001 than in 1990, under identical conditions
of water supply and agricultural demand.  During the first six years
analyzed here, the positive effect of state and federal support far
outweighed the negative effect of county restrictions (Figure 5.3).  As the
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Figure 5.2—Market Effects of Export Restrictions Since 1996
67
Increases in sales from 
state and federal policy
Reductions in sales 
from county restrictions
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1990–1995 1996–2001
Ac
re
-fe
et
 (th
ou
sa
nd
s)
Figure 5.3—Market Effects of State and County Policy Environments
number of counties with restrictions has grown, this has ceased to be the
case.  From 1996 to 2001, county restrictions cancelled out the positive
effect of state and federal policies to encourage trade.
Counties introducing export restrictions may have reduced their
trading activity for reasons other than the ones captured in our model.
In this case, the strong correlation we observe between ordinances and
the reduction in sales and exports would not imply causality.  In light of
the reasons given for ordinance adoption, however, we regard this as
unlikely.
The bigger question is whether the ordinances will continue to wield
the same effect in the years ahead.  The pending long-term transfers from
the agricultural to the municipal contractors of the Colorado River
Project, negotiated as part of California’s program to reduce its overall
use of project water, will substantially increase overall volumes traded
statewide.  The combined transfers from Imperial Irrigation District to
San Diego (200,000 acre-feet), Imperial to Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California and Coachella Valley Water District (100,000
acre-feet), and Palo Verde Irrigation District to MWDSC (111,000 acre-
feet)—achieved through a combination of land fallowing and efficiency
gains—represent over 30 percent of the amount traded in 2001.  This
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shift of activity by water users in Imperial County, which has an export
ordinance, is bound to alter the statistical relationship between trades and
county restrictions in the statewide market.7
For counties in the Central Valley, the other main source of market
supply, nothing on the immediate horizon suggests a weakening of the
effect of export restrictions.  Some Sacramento Valley observers have
suggested, however, that the restrictions could loosen under another
major and prolonged drought.  With external pressure to make water
available, counties may have little choice.
A more positive impetus for change lies in the possibility that
counties will move beyond export restrictions to a wider groundwater
management system, thereby ensuring protection of local users without
discouraging market activity.  The Glenn County experience in 2001
indicates how this might work.  That year, several of the county’s CVP
settlement contractors participated in a program to send water to
Westlands Water District, using a combination of fallowing and
groundwater substitution to free up surface water supplies.  The potential
groundwater effects of the transfer were monitored through the county’s
new basin management objectives system as part of the more general
monitoring program being established by the county’s water users.  In
conjunction with the export, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District also made
surface water available to some water-short entities within the area, at a
lower price.
Summing Up
Have county-level groundwater export restrictions had an effect on
the water market?  The record on permitting suggests that they have.
The very low number of permit applications supports the view that this
process is more useful as a deterrent than as a screening mechanism.
____________ 
7As an indication, we incorporated all pending long-term transfers listed in Table
A.5 to the sales and export data for 2001 and reran the regressions for the 34-county
sample.  With just one year of the new Colorado River Project trades (assumed at full
volume), the estimated effect of county restrictions diminishes in size and statistical
significance.
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High up-front costs and the likelihood of negative public opinion
guiding the decision process are factors discouraging parties from filing.
As the recent experience in Butte County demonstrates, a lack of
groundwater permits will not necessarily block transfers if alternatives
such as fallowing are available and acceptable to farmers.  In the
aggregate, however, there is likely to be a market effect, both in reducing
total sales and in shifting some water to in-county users (who will
typically be willing to pay less than outsiders).  We find evidence of both
effects in a statistical analysis of county trading behavior from 1990 to
2001.  In any given year, the presence of an export restriction reduced a
county’s trades by 14,300 acre-feet and shifted 2,640 acre-feet to in-
county buyers.  In aggregate terms, this reduced out-of-county sales by
932,000 acre-feet, or 19 percent, and total sales by 787,000 acre-feet, or
14 percent, since 1996.  Overall, the negative effect of county restrictions
cancelled out the positive effect of a generally improved trading
environment resulting from state and federal regulatory changes.
Looking ahead, the key question is whether communities can move
beyond an export restriction mode to one combining protection of local
users with the flexibility to allow water trading where feasible.  In areas
where the groundwater effects of trade are the concern, this means
establishing systems for monitoring, mitigation, and actively managing
the aquifer.  Land fallowing, a key alternative source of water for the
market, also raises questions of harm to local communities.  As the
economics of the water market make this an increasingly attractive
option for some farmers, there is a need to consider how and when
economic mitigation programs will be a necessary component of water
transfers.  The following chapter addresses this issue.
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6. Mitigating the Economic
Effects of Land Fallowing
Land fallowing has been the basis for several major water transfer
programs in California since the early 1990s and is an integral feature of
the active agricultural water market within the San Joaquin Valley.
Noncontroversial in some situations, the concept of idling farmland to
sell water has generated tremendous conflict in others.  At issue are both
equity questions and the potential aggregate consequences of fallowing.
In this chapter, we address the economic, legal, and institutional issues
that fallowing for the water market raises, with a focus on the following
questions.  Under what circumstances is it important to address the
distributional consequences of the transaction?  What do we know about
the conditions under which fallowing would cause harm to the local
economy, and what policy alternatives are available to minimize negative
effects?  We begin with a review of California’s recent experiences with
land fallowing for the water market.
California’s Recent Experiences with Land Fallowing
DWR’s Dry-Year Programs
Fallowing was a major component of the 1991 drought water bank,
accounting for 415,000 acre-feet of the 821,000 acre-feet purchased.
Most of the contracts were negotiated directly with individual farmers,
who were paid not to irrigate and were compensated on the basis of the
imputed water savings.  In Yolo County, where a substantial part of the
fallowing occurred, the board of supervisors took the view that the state,
as purchaser, should indemnify the county for the losses it incurred as a
result of the decreased economic activity.  Notably, the county observed
an increase in demands for unemployment-related social services as a
consequence of lower farm labor employment.  Challenging both the
72
legality of the claim and the facts on which it was premised, DWR
declined to pay the county the modest amount requested.1  It also cut
the fallowing program short.  In the 1992 and 1994 banks, water was
purchased entirely from surface storage and groundwater exchange.
Over time, however, the Yolo episode has led DWR to approach the
fallowing question somewhat differently.  When it launched a new trial
run with fallowing during its 2001 dry-year program, DWR made
arrangements to pay a 5 percent fee ($3.75 per acre-foot) to Butte
County to handle the associated mitigation costs of the transfer by
Western Canal Water District.  As we will discuss below, this raised both
practical and legal issues at the county level that are still being worked
through.  It nevertheless appears that the state’s current default position
is to compensate for third-party effects of fallowing for its own water
purchases.  Mitigating the effects of fallowing is also a central focus of the
programmatic environmental impact review now under way for the
Environmental Water Account, a joint state-federal program.
Long-Term Fallowing Along the Colorado River
The year following the drought water bank experience, MWDSC
launched a two-year fallowing program with the Palo Verde Irrigation
District (PVID).  Under the trial program, the district idled land to free
up 93,000 acre-feet of water per year for MWDSC.  Encouraged by the
outcome, the two parties then developed a long-term transfer
arrangement, under which PVID farmers will fallow up to 29 percent of
their 91,000 irrigated acres of land, to send up to 111,000 acre-feet
annually to the coast.  The 35-year transfer was in the final stages of
approval by the boards of both agencies in late 2002 and should get
under way in 2003.  Both the PVID board and area farmers regard the
transfer as an opportunity for the area’s economy on the grounds that it
helps stabilize farm incomes.2  A $6 million fund has been set aside to
____________ 
1The bill submitted by the Yolo County Board of Supervisors was for $129,305 to
cover general assistance and Aid to Families with Dependent Children entitlements for
450 persons deemed to have lost their employment because of the water transfers (Gray,
1994b).
2See “Rural Palo Verde Valley Agrees to Colorado River Pact” (2002) and Lyn
Johnson (2002).
73
compensate the community for potential income losses from lower
agricultural activity.
At the same time that Palo Verde farmers and the PVID board were
lauding the forthcoming fallowing program in the local press,
representatives of the neighboring Imperial Irrigation District (IID) were
going on record with their doubts over whether they would vote for a
similar program for sending Colorado River water to San Diego.  Unlike
the Palo Verde deal, the Imperial deal with San Diego has been one of
the biggest water controversies in recent California history.  Palo Verde’s
transfer was premised on land fallowing, but this method was essentially
imposed on Imperial because environmental constraints precluded the
preferred option of conserving water through more efficient irrigation
practices.  Like some other local agencies, IID had a policy disallowing
fallowing as a source for water transfers.
Accordingly, the initial transfer deal, agreed to in 1998 by the IID
and San Diego County Water Authority boards, explicitly ruled out
fallowing.  It was not until early 2002, during the environmental review
phase of the transfer, that objections were raised to the efficiency-based
method.  By reducing the district’s agricultural runoff, the irrigation
improvements would hasten the increase in salinity levels in the Salton
Sea, a major aquatic bird sanctuary along the Pacific flyway.  By this
time, the transfer had become a linchpin of California’s 4.4 Plan to
reduce its use of Colorado River water over a 15-year period.  Under the
threat that the U.S. Secretary of the Interior would immediately reduce
California’s annual supplies from 5.2 to 4.4 million acre-feet if parties
within the state did not reach an agreement by the end of 2002, IID was
pressured to consider land fallowing as an alternative means of
conserving water for the transfer.3
____________ 
3Technically, the agreement that needed to be reached among California’s Colorado
River contractors by the end of 2002 is the “Quantification Settlement Agreement,”
under which the senior agricultural contractors—Palo Verde, Imperial, and Coachella
Valley Water District—agree to “quantify” their water rights to a specified amount.  Up
to now, in the order of seniority, these districts have had the right to any amount of water
they can put to beneficial use, within the overall allocation available to the state.  The lack
of a firm upper limit on use has meant that any transfer deals concluded between any one
of the parties and a more junior rights-holder (notably Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California and San Diego) would not necessarily result in a reduction of water
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Negotiations over this transfer have been extremely complex, in part
because the fate of the Salton Sea is uncertain, even without the loss of
runoff from Imperial’s farms.  Created in 1905 when massive river
flooding broke through a canal erected by area farmers, the sea has relied
on agricultural runoff from the district ever since as its primary source of
replenishment.  Even without the transfer, the sea is predicted to become
too saline to support the fish and other marine life on which the birds
feed within one to two decades unless extraordinary actions are taken.4
So far, the science of the problem has proven elusive, with uncertain
proposals involving price tags of about $1 billion or more.  As a
consequence, one of IID’s major concerns in the transfer talks has been
to bind its liability limits with respect to the sea’s future health.
The other major sticking point has been the fallowing question.
Once fallowing became the suggested means of achieving the water
savings for the transfer, the deal switched from one that was “win-win”
for the district to one involving winners and losers.  An efficiency-based
transfer program would involve keeping all the land in production while
creating local jobs to carry out conservation investments.  A fallowing
program implies some job losses.  The debate over just how many and
over what time horizon has been central to the negotiation process.
Under the terms of a proposed deal negotiated in October 2002, the new
per-acre-foot price to be paid by San Diego includes enough additional
money to cover up to $20 million in mitigation funds over 15 years.
The maximum annual acreage to be fallowed is 30,000 (of a total of
450,000 irrigable acres in the district).  Imperial would be free to switch
from fallowing to efficiency-based methods of water savings beginning in
year 16.  San Diego would agree to cover any excess costs of third-party
effects beyond those provided for in the $20 million.5
________________________________________________________ 
use by the agricultural contractors.  This problem arose with the initial transfer of
110,000 acre-feet from IID to MWDSC begun in 1988 and noted in Chapter 2.  The
transfer was based on efficiency gains in IID’s network, financed by MWDSC.  Although
the gains were realized (and allocated to MWDSC), IID actually increased its water use in
the subsequent period.
4See Imperial Irrigation District and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (2002).
5For details of the proposal as per the October 15, 2002, agreement, which has
remained the basis of the proposals on fallowing, see “Summary of Water Agreement,”
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In sharp contrast to the Palo Verde case, no one in the Imperial
Valley has gone on record to praise the deal, except to say that it was the
best the negotiators could do in a difficult situation.  In the months
leading up to the October negotiations, both federal and state authorities
had made it clear that the district risked having its water rights
challenged in the absence of a successful transfer agreement.6  In
December 2002, IID’s board voted 3-2 against the terms of the deal
brokered in October.  Although the effects of fallowing were cited as one
of Imperial’s Board’s concerns, the “deal-breaker” in the end appeared to
be the lack of adequate guarantees against possible lawsuits over
environmental effects to the Salton Sea.7  The fate of the transfer remains
uncertain at the time of this writing (May 2003), but the latest proposal
brokered by the state involves an additional $200 million in state funds
directed to mitigating effects to the Salton Sea.
Fallowing in the San Joaquin Valley
The planned Palo Verde transfer and the possible sale by Imperial are
the state’s first large long-term water transfers based on land fallowing,
but they are not the only places where this is taking place.  Fallowing has
been a regular feature of the temporary agricultural water market within
the San Joaquin Valley since the early 1990s.  The district-to-district
transfers of this type mainly involve moving water from land owned or
leased by the same farmer to more productive, water-short land elsewhere
in the valley, notably within Westlands Water District and several
neighboring CVP contracting districts.8  Fallowing, in these contexts, is
accepted as part of the farmers’ overall land management plans.  Water
districts allowing this activity do vary, however, in the extent to which
they impose conditions on the transfer.  In some districts, once the land is
leased there are no restrictions on transfers to other lands farmed by the
________________________________________________________ 
October 17, 2002.  The maximum amount to be fallowed is not explicitly mentioned in
the agreement but has been cited elsewhere by IID directors and others (Vogel, 2002).
6See statements by U.S. Interior Department Assistant Secretary Bennett Raley in
Kasindorf (2002).  For a discussion of state policy, see Kasler (2002).
7See Conaughton (2002).
8Drainage problems, which are reducing the productivity of some areas within
Westlands, have also encouraged land fallowing for water sales within the district.
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lessee.  For farmers within the Kern County Water Agency service area, a
casual lease is not sufficient for gaining the right to transfer the water.
Land retirement was also the basis for the permanent transfer of up
to 130,000 acre-feet of State Water Project entitlement from Kern
County farmers to municipal users under the Monterey Agreement.
Importantly, however, this proposal came about as a way of reallocating
water from land that had already come out of production because of
marginal economic conditions; it did not precipitate crop idling.  Two
recent sales of SWP entitlement by Kings County farmers, one to other
farmers and one for municipal uses, were also predicated on removing
water rights from lands that are becoming unprofitable to farm.9  Recent
proposals by some water users in Kern County would involve a
multiyear, rotational fallowing scheme to free up water for municipal
users outside the county.10  Whether and under what conditions such
programs are acceptable to the wider community is one of the subjects
currently on the table in a countywide review of water transfer policy
launched by the Kern County Water Agency.
In the eastern part of the San Francisco Bay Area and in San Joaquin
County, several long-term, local agriculture-to-urban transfers also derive
some of the water savings from land fallowing or land retirement.11  Such
____________ 
9Sales by Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District to Dudley Ridge Water District
(for agriculture) and Antelope Valley–East Kern Water Agency (AVEKWA) (for
municipal uses).  For details, see Table A.6.  Technically, there is no explicit fallowing
requirement under the terms of the transfer; rather, lands for which SWP entitlement is
sold are permanently disallowed from receiving future SWP entitlements.  The transfer to
Dudley Ridge involved lands owned by the same farmer; the water will be used in Dudley
Ridge where the land is more productive.  The transfer to AVEKWA involved lands
being taken out of production by a large ranch, which is scaling back operations.
10See Semitropic Water Storage District (2002).
11This includes the ongoing transfer from Byron-Bethany Irrigation District to
Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, Zone 7 (for which
water is made available through temporary fallowing of approximately 600 acres and
water savings from 300 acres of land already retired) and the proposed transfer of contract
entitlement from the Westside Irrigation District and Banta Carbona Irrigation District
to the City of Tracy (made possible by preexisting land retirement).  See Tables A.5 and
A.6 and the environmental documentation for these transfers (Alameda Flood Control
and Water Conservation District Zone-7, 1994, and CH2MHill, 2002a, 2002b).
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transfers raise somewhat different issues from the cases where fallowing
involves sending water to a distant destination. The selling districts
defend the action on the grounds that residential development is in all
events encroaching on the area’s farmland; the transfers provide a way of
lessening costs for the remaining farmers while moving water locally to
new uses.  Objections, when raised, relate to concerns over the
consequences of development within the area, not to an outflow of
economic opportunity.12
Future Trends?
Recent developments in the Sacramento Valley suggest that
fallowing for transfers to points south of the Delta will be an increasingly
important component of the water market.  As noted, DWR purchased
water conserved through fallowing from farmers in Butte County for its
2001 dry-year program.  Fallowing was also the primary source of the
water for the transfer from CVP settlement contractors in the
Sacramento Valley to Westlands in that year.13  As the fate of the
Imperial–San Diego transfer remained uncertain in late 2002, officials of
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California—the agency that
stands to lose the most water if the state fails to meet the deadline for the
4.4 Agreement—unveiled a plan to purchase 205,000 acre-feet from this
same group of senior water-rights-holders in 2003.  For this transfer,
again primarily based on land fallowing, Metropolitan has proposed to
include a $5 per acre into a mitigation fund (5 percent of the $100 per
acre-foot price negotiated for the water).  Once the details of this one-
year deal are worked out, the water districts intend to discuss possible
longer-term arrangements combining fallowing and groundwater
____________ 
12For instance, the Sierra Club has taken issue with the pending sales to Tracy on
grounds that they encourage sprawl (Cooper, 2002).
13Participants in the program included Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, Princeton-
Codora-Glenn Irrigation District, Provident Irrigation District, Reclamation Districts
108 and 1004, several mutual water companies, and private farms with individual CVP
contracts.  Of a total of 160,000 acre-feet, 91,000 acre-feet were made available through
fallowing, corresponding to approximately 27,500 acres.
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substitution.  The fallowing is concentrated on acreage planted to rice,
for which prices are at historical lows.14
Thus, we see diverse local reactions to the prospect of fallowing and
to mitigation.  So far, the only substantial mitigation programs envisaged
are for the two large long-term transfers of Colorado River water and for
temporary purchases by two big buyers—the state itself and the largest
urban water agency.  There is, as yet, no real track record on either the
consequences of a long-term fallowing program or the “how-to” of
mitigation.  Before turning to some of the practical questions of
designing programs to limit negative effects, we examine briefly the
economic and legal issues of fallowing for water transfers.
Economic and Legal Issues of Land Fallowing for
Water Sales
Economic Incentives and Third-Party Effects
From the seller’s standpoint, fallowing to free up water for the
market is likely to be most attractive, the higher the sale price of water
and the lower the value of the water in agricultural uses.  This is why
short-term land fallowing is often seen as flexible tool for coping with
drought conditions.  At such times, water will fetch a better market price,
thus compensating farmers for forgoing their own use.  It is also why
longer-term fallowing programs for sale to municipal users may be
appealing to some farmers, because the municipal market can generally
afford to pay a higher price than can other agricultural users.
The incentive structure for individual farmers will depend critically
on the rules established by the local water district.  In some situations,
the bulk of the proceeds will go directly to the farmer who is idling land.
In a surprising number of cases, however, the proceeds remain at the
district level and go toward keeping down costs to other users.  This was
____________ 
14See Economic Research Service (2002).  Changes in the U.S. farm support
programs since the second half of the 1990s have also made it more attractive to fallow
when farm prices are low.  Under current programs, farmers of commodities eligible for
price support (notably rice and cotton in California) are paid on the basis of historical
acreage rather than current acreage.  As a result, they are not penalized for idling the land
to make the water available for the market.
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the procedure for the Monterey Agreement transfers in Kern County, as
well as the transfer in the Bay Area noted above.  Without a change in
operating rules, this redistribution would also occur in the many districts
that do not attribute specific contract amounts to individual landowners
but rather deliver water on the basis of annual requests.15  The attraction
of “farming water” instead of farming land is clearly greater when
individuals, and not districts, stand to benefit from the sale.
From the standpoint of the surrounding community, the effects of a
fallowing operation will depend on the interaction of two types of effects.
On the one hand, there are the effects of the changes in land use on on-
farm and farm-related employment, tax revenues, and, indirectly, the
wider economic activity of the area.  On the other hand, there are the
proceeds of the water sale, which, if spent locally, contribute to job and
revenue creation.  Thus the aggregate effect of a water sale achieved
through a reduction in cropland is not necessarily negative, even in the
short run.  If, as is typically assumed, farmers elect to fallow the low-
value crops—which produce less profit per unit of water used and which
require relatively lower labor inputs—the associated employment and
revenue reductions will be limited.  If, at the same time, they reinvest
proceeds of the water sales into farming operations, for instance, by re-
leveling the land or making upgrades in equipment, this reinvestment
can have a positive effect on employment and revenues.
Typically, however, there are some losers from land fallowing, even
in a generally positive scenario such as the one described.  The new
investments in land leveling or other farm improvements will give a
boost to those sectors, whereas the fall in crop output will reduce the
demand for specialized services such as harvesting and processing and, in
all likelihood, some farm labor.  This is why the notion of mitigation
enters the equation.  Mitigation is envisaged both as a short-term
compensation for income losses and as a means of assisting those who
may be permanently affected by a long-term water transfer to adjust to
the new economic circumstances.
____________ 
15For instance, Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District and
Madera Irrigation District.
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Nevertheless, mitigation for land fallowing poses some distinct
economic, legal, and policy questions.  The negative effect on those who
lose out is an economic spillover effect, or what economists sometimes
refer to as a “pecuniary externality”—the effect of one person’s business
decision on someone else’s financial outcome.  This stands in contrast to
a “physical externality,” which occurs when a water transfer negatively
affects the quantity or quality of the physical resource available to other
users.  From the standpoint of economic theory, a transfer that results in
a negative physical externality requires compensation.  Compensation
helps to ensure a socially efficient outcome by preventing overuse of the
resource.  By contrast, there are no efficiency grounds for compensating
those affected by a pecuniary externality.  Rather, the issue is one of
equitable distribution of the benefits (Howe et al., 1990, Howitt, 1994).
Lack of Legal Provisions for Mitigation
The legal issues raised by the two types of effects are also quite
distinct.  There is a legal tradition for protecting third parties from the
negative physical externalities associated with business decisions.  In
California, the no-injury provisions of state water law, established in case
law as early as 1862, specifically aim to prevent negative physical effects
on other water users, including wildlife.16  However, there is no clear
legal tradition for protecting individuals from the effects on their
livelihood of a change in other people’s business decisions—and this is
what compensation for the economic effects of land fallowing implies.
At the federal level, exceptions arise when a region or sector is
negatively affected by a policy change considered beneficial for society as
a whole.  Notably, national programs have been available since the early
1960s to assist workers in industries affected by trade liberalization, and
special regional programs were introduced in the 1970s to assist forestry
workers affected by the expansion of national park areas in the western
states.17  More generally, federal, state, and local governments provide
____________ 
16The no-injury rule was established in the court case Butte T. M. Co. v. Morgan, 19
Cal. 609 (Gray, 1994a).  The environmental protections for fish, wildlife, and instream
beneficial uses were codified in Cal. Water Code Section 1738 in 1980.
17See Appendix F in Illingworth et al. (2002).
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transitional assistance to workers facing negative economic conditions
through unemployment insurance and other social programs.
In California, the only legal provision for protecting communities
from the economic effects of water transfers is found in the wheeling
statute of the Water Code (Sections 1810–12), introduced in 1986.
Under this statute, the transport of water through public conveyance
facilities must be done “without unreasonably affecting the overall
economy of the environment of the county from which the water is
being transferred.”  To date, these protections have not been invoked.  In
effect, it is difficult to demonstrate that fallowing programs pass the
(admittedly vague) unreasonable effect test.  Available studies suggest that
fallowing programs would need to be considerably more extensive than
those in recent years to have significant negative county-level effects
(Table 6.1).
The studies, which examine the effects of fallowing anywhere from 6
to 25 percent of a county’s irrigated farmland, find that it is likely to
have no more than a 1 percent effect on overall county economic activity,
even when the payments to farmers for the water transfers are excluded.
This level was exceeded in only two counties—Colusa and Glenn—in a
study simulating the effects of a 25 percent cut in surface water supplies
(with no revenues for water sold).  A 22 percent reduction in land farmed
in the Palo Verde area under the test program had insignificant effects on
income within that limited region, a result that is also anticipated even if
farmers engage in maximum fallowing (29 percent of total acreage) under
the upcoming long-term program.
However, the same studies also demonstrate that there can be
significant localized negative effects on individual farm workers and
businesses and on local public agencies such as school districts.  Thus,
there may be ethical grounds for devising mitigation programs, even
when a transfer does not trigger the legal requirement to do so.  The case
for mitigation is stronger when the transfer has negative distributional
implications—a concentration of losses to low-income farm workers and
processing plant laborers and accrual of most benefits to the relatively
wealthy members of the community (or, in the case of absentee
landlords, nonmembers).  Given the structure of California’s agricultural
economy, where wages are low, unemployment rates high, and large
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proportions of the workforce belong to minority groups, it has become
common to consider this question under the general rubric of
“environmental justice.”
Because water is a public resource, and water marketing a policy tool
of the state, some scholars have argued that mitigation of the
distributional consequences of fallowing should be an integral part of the
transfer process (Sax, 1994; Howe, 2000).  In this spirit, legislation to
provide mitigation funds for third-party effects of water transfers has
been introduced on three occasions since 1998 and most recently in the
2002 session.  The first, AB 2027, proposed a task force to review third-
party effects of long-term water transfers and provide specific
recommendations for partial or full mitigation.  AB 732, introduced in
February 1999, provided, in addition, for the creation of county water
transfer management plans to be used to identify and mitigate effects of
water transfers of any duration.  The most recent bill, SB 1993, returned
the focus to long-term transfers.  It proposed requiring an economic
analysis report for effects on the county of origin and a binding letter of
commitment for a community mitigation fee ($1 per acre-foot or $5 per
acre-foot if fallowing is involved) and the establishment of an
independent board to distribute mitigation funds.  Although a diverse set
of groups has lent support to the idea of institutionalizing treatment of
third-party effects—including the California Farm Bureau, the United
Farm Workers, and Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California—there has as yet been insufficient legislative backing.
Whether or not communities have a legal right to it, some form of
mitigation may be the only way to make a transfer program acceptable to
them.  A substantial mitigation program would no doubt have been
required for the county to accept continued fallowing-based purchases in
Yolo after 1991.  The mitigation fund has become a cornerstone of the
negotiations for the transfer from Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego.
Are Landowner-Run Water Districts More Likely to Fallow
(and Less Likely to Propose Mitigation)?
Water districts appear to differ in both fallowing policies and
mitigation demands, depending on their governance structure.  In
California, these special districts have two basic forms of governance.  In
84
popular-vote districts, the entire community residing within the service
area elects the board of directors.  In landowner-run districts, voting is
restricted to landowners, usually in proportion to assessed land values.
Most of the fallowing-based transfers on record to date have been agreed
to by landowner-run water districts, privately run mutual water
companies, or individual farmers.
The notable exception is Imperial Irrigation District’s pending
transfer to San Diego.  Districts such as Imperial, whose boards are
elected by popular vote, appear less likely to entertain fallowing as an
option.  If the recent experience with Imperial is indicative, such districts
may also devote more attention to the community effects if encouraged
or pressured to fallow.18  In landowner-run Palo Verde, for a similar level
of acreage set-asides, over 35 years instead of 15, the fund is considerably
more modest ($6 million compared to $20 million-plus).19  It was the
buyer, Metropolitan Water District, that made the initial offer to
establish the fund.
This is not to suggest that landowner-run districts are uninterested in
maintaining the health of the agricultural economy.  Indeed, a statistical
analysis of the likelihood of water transfers by Central Valley water
districts and mutual water companies, not reported here, suggests that
overall, landowner-run districts have been less likely to transfer water
(from any source) than popularly run districts.  However, these districts
may be less constrained by community opinion if fallowing makes
economic sense for the farmers.  By virtue of their governance structure,
landowner-run districts will not have a built-in pressure to consider
mitigation of the third-party effects of fallowing.
These different reactions go to the heart of the policy debate
concerning mitigation.  By historical accident, water rights and
____________ 
18In Imperial, area farmers have become concerned that the board does not
sufficiently take their views on the transfer into account and have formed their own group
to make their voice heard—the Imperial Valley Water Users Association.
19For Palo Verde, where the total amount transferred over 35 years will range from
875,000 to 3.9 million acre-feet, this translates to somewhere between $1.50 and $6.80
per acre-foot for the fund.  For Imperial, the comparable figure is $14 per acre-foot, for 1
million acre-feet transferred to San Diego, plus 400,000–500,000 acre-feet of flows into
the Salton Sea.
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entitlements are held in community trust in some areas, in landowner
hands in others.  Should it be left entirely to the discretion of local
agencies to decide whether to deal with the third-party effects of land
fallowing?  Or should a principle be established whereby communities as
a whole are assured of deriving some benefit from a water sale, regardless
of how the water rights are held?
Underlying the debate is a nexus of legal and practical questions
concerning the appropriateness and the feasibility of mitigation.  Farmers
correctly point out that they are entirely free to reduce crop acreage for
business reasons; many are loathe to see the rules of the game completely
altered just because they receive compensation for the unused water
instead of simply abandoning it.  There is also a concern that
institutionalizing mitigation may create unreasonable expectations on the
part of the community:  Once the principle of mitigation is established,
some parties will claim damages, even if the actual effect of the transfer is
negligible.  In this respect, some point to the IID–San Diego
negotiations as an example of community control gone haywire, where
exaggerated fears about negative third-party effects may end up blocking
a deal that could benefit residents of Imperial County and the state as a
whole.
In considering policy alternatives, two sets of issues must be kept in
mind.  The first concerns the design of the fallowing program itself.
Both the scale of a program and its content will influence the extent of
effects on the local economy:  how many acres fallowed, which crops, in
which locations?  The second concerns the design of mitigation programs
to benefit the community.  Here, too, there are questions of size and
content:  How much is enough, who should benefit, who should manage
the funds?
Limiting the Aggregate Negative Effects of Land
Fallowing
One key objection to fallowing is that the sheer size of the program
could provoke a general economic decline in the region.  The concerns
stem from two characteristics of most agricultural economies.
Agriculture benefits from what economists call “network externalities”—
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the average costs of running input services and output marketing systems
tend to be lower the greater the number of market participants.  If
substantial quantities of land go out of production in conjunction with a
water sale, this can drive up the costs of doing business for everyone else
and eventually drive them out.  Agriculture also tends to have assets that
are not easily converted to other economic uses.  If agriculture moves
out, it is not clear that some other business will move in quickly to take
advantage of the assets.
These reasons highlight why local transfers of water from agriculture
to urban uses are less problematic than transfers to distant destinations.
If the transfer is responding to local economic growth, the concerns will
be with the details of that process rather than with the potential aggregate
consequences for the region’s economic well-being.
The oft-cited example of the economy-killing transfer is the Owens
Valley deal with Los Angeles in the early 20th century.  Although
technically a land sale rather than a land fallowing program, this transfer
had precisely the kind of spiraling cost implications that drove nonsellers
out of business (Hundley, 2001).  Remote and with few assets to attract
alternative business activities, the economy virtually shut down when
agriculture departed.  The area’s more recent incarnation as a natural-
resource-based resort area for coastal urban dwellers offers little
consolation to those in active agricultural regions who fear the
consequences of “farming water” instead of farming land.
The potential for a fallowing program to be oversized is well
recognized, even though there are no hard and fast rules for identifying
the threshold points.  Since 1992, the state has applied a legal rule of
thumb.  Section 1745.05 of the California Water Code contains a
provision limiting fallowing-based transfers to 20 percent of the total
water supply in the seller’s area in any given year.  Before exceeding this
amount, the contracting agency must conduct a public hearing.  This
threshold falls within the range of actual and proposed fallowing
programs (Table 6.1), which have been estimated not to generate
significant negative consequences for the local economies.
In part, this conclusion derives from the way fallowing is
undertaken.  For a given program size (measured in number of acres or
percentage of total cropland), the content of the program matters.  Crop
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choice affects local employment and revenues.  Whether land is kept in
rotation or simply retired affects the ability to recover the land for
agricultural uses in the future.  To a large extent, the economics of
fallowing will naturally encourage farmers to make the choices that are
simultaneously best for themselves and the local economy.  Notably, the
incentives will generally be to maintain higher-value crops, which
generate higher returns per unit of water used.20  Such crops also have
higher labor requirements and frequently higher potential for value-
added activities through processing and handling.  Likewise, farmers who
wish to maintain their land capital will automatically choose to protect
the resource by rotating idled land.
It is, nevertheless, reasonable to expect that fallowing programs
should impose some rules to minimize the negative effects on the local
economy.  This can include incentives to maintain economic ties to the
land, such as limits on total amount fallowed by any individual farmer,
rotation requirements, and upkeep requirements for idled land.  Such
provisions now appear to be a standard element of long-term fallowing
programs, as evidenced by the terms of the Palo Verde agreement as well
as proposals currently on the table in Kern County.  Likewise, districts
that will be involved in intermittent fallowing in the Sacramento Valley
plan to rotate the participating lands and farmers from one year to the
next, while keeping overall levels fallowed within historical variations in
irrigated acreage.
A more contentious issue, from a farmer’s standpoint, is whether
fallowing programs should also include guidelines on cropping choices.
In the draft agreement for the Imperial to San Diego transfer, where
significant differences in damage assessment are linked to assumptions
about crop choice, IID would undertake to “exercise best efforts to
minimize socioeconomic effects attributable to land that will be
fallowed.”21  In principle, this could include some form of cropping
guidelines.
____________ 
20Under both the drought water bank and the Palo Verde test program, most crops
retired were low-value, high water users:  rice, corn, alfalfa, wheat, and sudan grass
(Howitt, 1994; M. Cubed, 1994).  The fallowing programs in the Sacramento Valley in
2001 and proposed for 2003 mainly concern rice.
21Summary term sheet, October 15, 2002.
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Putting Together a Viable Mitigation Program
Whether motivated on grounds of fairness or pragmatism, the
practical issues of putting a mitigation program in place may determine
what is feasible.  In theory, the gains from trade make it possible to
compensate those who lose out with part of the proceeds of a transaction.
In practice, it can be difficult to determine the level of losses, to identify
those affected, and to set up a cost-effective system for providing
appropriate benefits.  Economists refer to these information- and
administration-related costs as “transactions costs.”  Finding ways to keep
transactions costs down is a key design challenge for mitigation programs.
Determining the Scale of Losses
Abstracting for the moment from the question of actual program
administration, consider the issues involved in establishing levels of loss
and identifying potential program beneficiaries.  Costs of a fallowing
program can be broken down into three categories:  the “direct” effects,
the “indirect” effects, and the “induced” effects.  The direct effects are, as
the name implies, the reductions in employment and revenues directly
associated with the reduction in farm activity:  reduced incomes for the
farmers themselves and farm workers.  The indirect effects capture the lost
income for those who do business with the farm community, as a result of
decreased purchases of goods and services for farming.  These include both
specialized suppliers (e.g., farm equipment suppliers and agro-processing
units) and general suppliers (e.g., gas stations and transporters).  Finally,
the induced or spillover effects capture the general effects on the local
economy of reduced expenditures by households and other institutions
that have lost farm income or income from related goods and services.
The effects at this stage are the most widespread—touching general-
purpose businesses and the government sector (local public agencies)—
as spending is reduced and tax revenues decline.  The combination of all
three effects reflects the “multiplier effect,” whereby the overall effect of a
change in economic activity is greater than the initial effect.22
____________ 
22Depending on the crop and the structure of the local economy, county-level
multiplier effects for agriculture are estimated to range from a low of 1.5 to a high of 2.5
(Lee et al., 1999).
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Attaching numbers to these categories can be done only with an
economic model, drawing on a combination of statistical information
and assumptions about how farmers and other agents behave.  Key
assumptions include which crops farmers will chose to idle (affecting
both direct on-farm employment and indirect crop-related services), a
function of expectations of future commodity prices and input costs.  As
noted above, the extent to which farmers reinvest the proceeds of the
water sale locally is also vital to the net economic effect, and this level
cannot be known with certainty ahead of time.  As a result, there is room
for debate over the economic effects of a land fallowing operation.
In the absence of an objective price tag, determining the size of a
mitigation program may be a matter for negotiation; witness the IID–
San Diego transfer.  When asked to account for the different views of the
two parties on the economic costs of fallowing, the General Manager of
the San Diego County Water Authority explained that this arose because,
“IID and SDCWA use different economists” (Mitchell, 2002).  For
smaller or temporary transfers, the question is whether it makes sense to
invest in the estimation of economic models or to apply some rules of
thumb, such as the “5 percent” rule that served as a basis for DWR’s
payments to Butte County for fallowing purchases in 2001 and by
MWDSC in the upcoming Sacramento Valley deal.
Program Content:  Targeted or General?
The direct, indirect, and induced effects categories are also useful for
thinking about the contents of a mitigation program.  The most
concentrated effects are likely to be felt at the first two levels:  farm
workers and certain specialized farm suppliers.  Unless the program is
implemented with a strong geographical bias—usually avoidable through
program design—the induced effects on the local economy are likely to
be more spread out.23
____________ 
23Howitt (1994) found that negative economic effects in Yolo during the drought
water bank were amplified by the fact that land fallowing was heavily concentrated in
certain areas.  In the land retirement program being considered for Westlands Water
District as a solution to drainage problems, geographically concentrated effects on the
local economy are anticipated because of the location of the drainage-affected lands
(Illingworth et al., 2002).
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The distribution of effects can help guide decisions on the
appropriate mix of targeted and general assistance.  Elsewhere, targeted
assistance programs have included direct income supplements, job search
and training programs for laid-off workers, and business support
programs for enterprises.24  General assistance might take the form of
measures to improve the economic environment of the area, for example,
infrastructure investments or reduced sales taxes, or might support
specific projects of benefit to area residents.
The strongest case for targeting is when the fallowing program will
result in long-term shifts in the demand for sector-specific labor.  Some
types of adjustment assistance may be warranted to help affected workers
make the transition to other sectors locally (or to other geographical areas
where there is more work in their sector).  In keeping with the equity
objectives of mitigation, targeted assistance would be especially
appropriate in situations where the main group is low-income rural
workers.  The key challenge will be to design effective programs to
benefit this population, which generally has limited English-language
abilities and low levels of formal education.  To help people move into
new sectors, these programs are likely to require considerable attention to
remedial skill development.
In principle, targeted assistance programs could also be considered
for short-term fallowing transfers.  In such situations, for which
transitional programs are presumably less relevant, the focus naturally
turns to the merits of a claims-based system.  A mitigation program
could, in theory, provide cash compensation to those whose business
activity temporarily suffers.  However, there are serious practical obstacles
to implementing a claims-based program effectively.  The costs of
administration (establishing decision rules on who can claim and
processing the claims) are likely to be high relative to the amounts
available for mitigation.  Because there is no well-established basis for
claims of this sort (in contrast to unemployment benefits, for instance),
there is also a risk that the volume of claims would be excessive.  From an
environmental justice standpoint, concerns have also been raised that a
____________ 
24See Appendix F in Illingworth et al. (2002).
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claims process is more likely to favor the more articulate, better-off
groups—for instance, fertilizer suppliers and crop-dusting pilots—rather
than ordinary workers.  As a result, a claims-based program risks sowing
more local discontent than harmony.  At the same time, introducing a
claims process opens a legal can of worms, because it implies liability for
economic damage.  For these reasons, some form of general assistance is
probably more appropriate for temporary mitigation programs.
More generally, development of new economic opportunities within
California’s rural counties may require attention to improving
investment incentives.  It is unlikely that the resources available in a
transfer mitigation fund would be adequate to this task.25
Program Administration:  Counties or Special Institutions?
Who should administer mitigation programs?  The arrangements for
the sizable, high-profile IID–San Diego program are elaborate and
involve a large number of players.  The agreement negotiated in October
2002 provides that IID establish a “local entity” for this purpose, in
consultation with Imperial County and other state and local interests.  A
team of economists representing both IID and San Diego would establish
methods for estimating and monitoring third-party effects.  The
mitigation plan would be developed in consultation with no less than
three state agencies:  the Resources Agency, the Technology, Trade and
Commerce Agency, and the Department of Finance.  Disputes
concerning funding, disbursements, or measurements related to
socioeconomic effects would be resolved through binding arbitration.
In Palo Verde’s case, an ad hoc committee, involving representatives
from both water districts (PVID and MWDSC) and community leaders,
is developing the arrangements for implementation.  It is anticipated that
the committee to be established for actual program administration will
work with a local nongovernmental community organization.26  For its
____________ 
25In the context of the transfer to San Diego, representatives from Imperial Valley
have raised questions about more general public investment support, for instance, the
location within the county of a cargo airport and a new campus for San Diego State
University (Yniguez, 2002).
26Personal communication, Ed Smith, Palo Verde Irrigation District, November
2002.
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trial run with mitigation for fallowing by a water district located mainly
in Butte County, DWR designated the county government to receive the
funds and to decide what to do with them.  For the pending transfer
from Sacramento Valley water districts to Metropolitan, a similar
approach is being taken, although some districts have indicated that they
prefer to administer the funds themselves rather than turn them over to
the county.
Butte County’s reaction to DWR’s proposal in 2001 highlights some
key practical issues that arise regarding the design of mitigation
programs.  The amount of funds involved is modest—just under
$63,000, corresponding to the one-time fallowing of just over 5,000
acres of rice lands (under 3 percent of the county’s nonrange farmland).
Although not averse to the principle of administering a mitigation fund,
the county declined to accept DWR’s initial proposal.27  In effect, the
county had no basis for knowing whether the funds would be adequate
to cover actual damages and did not want to accept responsibility (and
any implied liability) for mitigation under those circumstances.  The
funds will instead go toward a detailed study of the third-party effects of
the fallowing operation by a consultant of the county’s choice.  The
results may establish a basis for handling fallowing-related mitigation in
future years.
In this situation, DWR’s choice to select the county as the
administering entity was probably a good one.  The level of resources
involved certainly does not justify the creation of a specific local entity,
and the county is probably the more appropriate entity for responding to
third-party effects than the water district that sold the water, a
landowner-run district with no mechanisms in place for community
outreach.  Likewise, counties are probably an appropriate level of
administration within the Sacramento Valley and all but the largest San
Joaquin Valley counties.  A county-level administration would be
problematic in cases such as Palo Verde, where the region is isolated from
the county seat.
____________ 
27Personal communication, Vickie Newlin and Ed Craddock, Butte County
Department of Water and Resource Conservation, August 2002.
93
“Mitigation” or Community Development?
A local administrative capability can, in principle, reduce the
transaction costs of mitigation.  But the Butte experience—and the
current discussions on how to manage a fund in the upcoming transfer
from Sacramento Valley water districts to Metropolitan—also highlight
the need for clarity on several unresolved practical issues, particularly
with respect to short-term transfers.  How much mitigation is enough?
What guidelines should be adopted for deciding how to use the funds?
Given the practical and legal complexities inherent in instituting a
claims-based program, we have argued that it is more appropriate to
consider general assistance programs for short-term transfers.  This
greatly simplifies the process, reducing the need for certainty on actual
costs and the administrative burden of handling claims.  The question
nevertheless remains of how to spend the funds.  Water districts are
adamant that the funds—which ultimately come off the top of the
transfer price they receive—should not simply go into the “black hole” of
county coffers to support general operating expenses.
It is also unclear that it would be appropriate to direct the funds to
the county’s social program budget, which finances general assistance
programs and the county’s (relatively small) share of state and federal
programs for individuals and families in difficulty.  Although this was the
basis for Yolo County’s request for mitigation in the early 1990s,
observers in both Butte and Glenn Counties now consider that the
current rice fallowing programs are unlikely to increase the caseloads for
county social programs.  Given the highly mechanized nature of planting
and harvesting the crop, and the fact that farmers are generally making
improvements on their idled acreage, the primary anticipated effect is a
shift in demand for agricultural services (more leveling and less aerial
application of seeds and chemicals) rather than a reduction in farm labor.
It is possible, of course, that the reduced business in these sectors has
generated some layoffs of low-income workers, thereby increasing county
social program expenditures.  The detailed study of the local effects of
fallowing commissioned by Butte County will provide valuable insights
on this matter, both for Butte and for neighboring counties.
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An alternative proposal that appears to be gaining popularity, at least
within water circles, is to earmark the funds for the development of
county water management programs.  The development of monitoring
and evaluation activities generates considerable financial costs, for which
local funding sources are limited.  Although in some respects this type of
program might most directly benefit water districts and their members,
this use of funds could also be justified as providing general benefit to the
residents of the county.
Of course, other programs of a quite different nature could be
selected for support—for instance, adult education, computer literacy,
and youth programs.  In such cases, the responsibility for program
execution could be devolved to the appropriate local entity.
As these examples illustrate, a mitigation fund generated through
water transfers can be used for a range of activities that provide general
benefit to community residents in addition to more targeted support to
individuals in affected sectors.  In light of the legal concerns over the
introduction of a claims process, as well as the likelihood that such a
program may generate expectations that cannot reasonably be met, some
observers have suggested a shift in thinking about the concept itself.
Instead of  “mitigation,” which implies economic harm that needs to be
redressed, it might be better to think in terms of “community
development.”  From this perspective, there is an opportunity for the
wider community to benefit from the proceeds of a fallowing-based water
transfer, irrespective of the voting rules of the water agency and without
the presumption that farmers are causing harm by participating in the
water market.
Summing Up
Water conserved through land fallowing has been an important
component of the state’s water market since the early 1990s. On a
temporary basis, fallowing was used extensively for drought-related
transfers in 1991 and has reemerged as a source of supply from the
Sacramento Valley since 2001.  It is a regular feature of the short-term
agricultural water market within the San Joaquin Valley.  Increasingly,
rotational fallowing is being considered as a basis for long-term transfers
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from agriculture to municipal users, with one large program scheduled to
begin in 2003 and another under consideration.
Fallowing of low value, water-intensive crops can provide hydrologic
flexibility to the state’s water system and financial flexibility to farmers.
Nonetheless, there are potential negative effects on the wider community
in farming areas.  State law provides local communities with a safeguard
on the scale of fallowing programs by requiring a public review if more
than 20 percent of water for a transfer is to come from crop idling.
There is no institutionalized mechanism for compensating communities
for losses of jobs, incomes, and tax revenues resulting from crop idling.
Although these effects appear to be small when viewed in the aggregate—
for instance, as a share of county economic activity—they can be
important for some groups.
From a policy perspective, there is a need to determine whether
mitigation of the community effects of fallowing should remain an ad
hoc process—determined strictly on the basis of negotiations between
buyer and seller—or should become a legal obligation, as has been
proposed in recent bills to the state legislature.  The advantage of
maintaining the status quo is flexibility.  There may well be situations
where the likely effects are minimal or where there is little community
demand for mitigation.  The argument in favor of institutionalizing the
process is that it establishes some ground rules to be followed even when
the community has no voice in transfer negotiations.  It appears that
landowner-run districts have been more likely to consider fallowing and
less likely to seek out mitigation programs than districts whose boards are
popularly elected.  To date, the key proponents of mitigation have
instead been two large buyers, the state itself and the largest municipal
water agency.
Whether the process remains ad hoc or becomes institutionalized, it
will be important to clarify the terms and conditions under which
mitigation should be provided.  For long-term transfers involving
significant amounts of fallowing, the potential socioeconomic effects
merit specific study and review before the transfer begins, in parallel
fashion to the review of potential environmental consequences required
under the California Environmental Quality Act.  Long-term transfers
are also those where some form of adjustment assistance for displaced
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workers and affected communities is most warranted.  For short-term
transfers, the up-front study costs are too great (in time and money) to
merit a full socioeconomic impact study each time there is a proposed
fallowing arrangement.  It may be preferable to establish some rules of
thumb on mitigation amounts, based on a broad-level assessment of
likely effects.
There are both legal and practical reasons for avoiding a program of
direct compensation of individuals or firms, especially with respect to
short-term transfers.  Costs of administering a claims-based program
could quickly mount, and requests are likely to exceed available
resources.  A claims-based program also implies liability for economic
harm caused by a business decision, which is a break with U.S. legal
tradition.  Indeed, the very use of the term “mitigation” for land
fallowing may be somewhat of a red flag, simultaneously suggesting
liability and raising unrealistic expectations about the benefits that a
community may expect to gain from a transfer.  For this reason, it may
be preferable to think in terms of transfer-related community
development, with funds allocated to programs that benefit local
residents.
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7. From Groundwater Protection
to Groundwater Management
Native groundwater reserves and imported water banked
underground are major sources of water for transfers.  As we have seen,
concerns over the potential for the market to encourage overexploitation
of this resource—with negative consequences for both quantity and
quality of water available to local users—have been at the origin of the
county ordinance movement.  However, a policy that restricts exports
without encouraging better management of groundwater locally is
limited in two respects.  It cannot, in most circumstances, protect the
resource from overuse, and it does not provide the opportunity for
residents to realize the financial and water supply benefits of an actively
managed aquifer.
In this chapter, we examine the issues involved in moving from
groundwater protection to groundwater management at the local level.
The first concerns the development of effective strategies for mitigating
the effects of groundwater transfers and the related practice of
groundwater banking.  The second concerns the wider question of how
to develop local groundwater oversight systems that can effectively
manage the resource.  This discussion addresses the role that different
institutional levels can (or should) play, from the local water agency up
to the county and the state.
Mitigating the Effects of Groundwater Transfers
Economic and Legal Issues
The economic and legal issues concerning mitigation of groundwater
effects are somewhat different from those pertaining to mitigation for
land fallowing effects.  To recall the discussion of the previous chapter, a
transfer or banking operation that has negative effects on either the
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quantity or quality of groundwater available to other users constitutes a
physical externality.  From an economic efficiency standpoint, such an
effect requires mitigation by the parties engaging in the transfer.
Without mitigation, those parties are not fully taking into account the
consequences of their actions on the availability of the resource.  They
are, in effect, paying too little for the water and thereby have incentives
to use too much of it.
The problem arises because of the collective nature of the
groundwater resource.  In a groundwater basin that is entirely owned or
managed by one party, that owner automatically will take into account
the full cost of any extractions or, in economists’ parlance, “internalize”
those costs.  In a groundwater basin with collective access, but where the
withdrawal rights are fully attributed (for instance, by adjudication), the
full cost of the resource is also taken into account in the determination of
maximum sustainable yield.  The only collective problem in such basins
is to ensure adequate monitoring and enforcement of the rules on
withdrawal.
In the typical situation in California, neither of these stringent
management options applies, and users do not have clear incentives to
avoid overexploiting the resource.  Of course, overdraft can result strictly
from extracting too much water for local uses.  But the potential for
causing harm to one’s neighbors by sending water out of the basin is
more problematic, both politically and legally.
Legally, there are both local and state protections for groundwater
users with respect to water transfers.  As we have seen through the
Baldwin v. Tehama holding, county authority to establish groundwater
protection ordinances derives from its police power to protect public
health, safety, and welfare in fields not preempted by the state.  The legal
protection of local groundwater users is, by this reasoning, a matter of
public welfare.  Counties can assume this role because of the lack of full
protection of groundwater users under the state’s water code.  Because
the state has not exercised full regulatory powers over groundwater, the
no-injury provisions of the Water Code—designed to protect water users
from the negative effects of transfers—technically apply only to surface
water users.
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However, a strong case can be made that groundwater users are
protected in spirit under the no-injury provisions.  This is the
interpretation of the two state agencies that have oversight
responsibilities for transfers, the State Water Resources Control Board
(for transfers of water held in rights established since 1914) and the
Department of Water Resources (for transfers among State Water Project
contractors, for its own purchases, and for water wheeled through state-
owned conveyance facilities). 1  Significantly, the state filed an amicus
brief in support of counties’ right to adopt groundwater protection
ordinances during Tehama County’s appellate court case in 1994.  As
noted above, there are partial state-level protections of groundwater users
in the Water Code.  Notably, Section 1220 limits exports from the
Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins.  Case law from the
beginning of the last century has also established restrictions on the
export of groundwater from an overdrafted basin, since nonoverliers may
have access to water only if there is a surplus.2
Mitigation Options and Experiences
Surface water transfers that are legally subject to the no-injury
provision can either be proscribed by the SWRCB, if there is harm to
another water user, or mitigated by means of a “physical solution.”
Physical solutions involve providing the equivalent amount of water to
the affected water-rights-holder, notably through alternative sources of
supply.  This may involve covering the additional monetary costs
incurred to ensure that supply, so that the affected party is “made
whole.”  However, the no-injury law does not provide for purely
monetary solutions through which the affected party is financially
compensated for the loss of water.  In this respect, legal practice departs
from economic theory.  From an economic standpoint, monetary
____________ 
1Personal communication, Andy Sawyer, SWRCB general counsel’s office,
September 2002, and Jerry Johns, Chief of Water Transfer Office, Department of Water
Resources, December 2002.
2Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (California, 1902).  Within the Kern County
Water Agency service area, this doctrine is explicitly used to guide transfer policy.
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compensation for not using the water—if correctly determined—can be
equivalent to a physical solution.
For groundwater users, there are only very limited situations in
which there is a legal obligation to provide affected parties with a
physical solution.  Physical solutions have been imposed in court
decisions where a basin has been determined to be in overdraft and
pumping by junior or nonoverlying groundwater users is causing harm to
appropriators with more senior rights.3  Nevertheless, the principle of
making the affected water user whole through physical solutions has
guided the design of mitigation systems for groundwater transfers and
groundwater banking projects.  Mitigation actions include sinking new
wells, covering the additional energy costs incurred if pumping costs
increase, or providing an alternative supply of surface water.  In addition,
these systems generally have a built-in process for stopping or adjusting
pumping associated with the transfer if groundwater levels decline
beyond certain limits.  One key component in such systems is the ability
to adequately monitor groundwater levels, as well as quality and land
levels in some cases.4
To date, the most structured mitigation systems for groundwater
effects are found in Kern County, in the context of large groundwater
banking projects.  Both the Semitropic Water Storage District and the
Kern Water Bank faced situations where their proposed banking
activities had the potential to affect the groundwater supplies of a
number of adjacent water districts.5  The neighboring parties’ concerns
were taken into account during the project design and review phases.
The projects include elaborate monitoring schemes in which all parties
participate.  Project operation is guided by the “golden rule” principle,
____________ 
3For instance, this was required by the court in the case of City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th (Cal. 2000).
4Excessive pumping can cause land levels to sink, a phenomenon known as “land
subsidence.”
5For detailed case studies, see Thomas (2001).  The report also provides a case study
of the Arvin-Edison banking project with Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, for which mitigation provisions were greatly simplified by the fact that the
project has very limited potential groundwater effect on anyone outside the Arvin-Edison
district.
101
whereby nonparticipants must be at least as well off with the project as
without it.6  In Semitropic’s case, a formal groundwater target level was
established to provide assurances to local water users.  Under the “3 year–
15 fifteen feet” rule, Semitropic agreed to cut off pumping activities for
its banking operations with outside clients if the groundwater table
declines by more than 15 feet in the space of three consecutive years.
Since the banks began activity in the mid-1990s, they have
demonstrated the utility of a multiparty monitoring and information-
sharing system, but they have not really been tested for their ability to
respond to adverse effects.  The second half of the 1990s saw a series of
very wet years, which made a considerable amount of water available for
banking.  Withdrawals from the banks were first made in 2001 and to a
more limited extent in 2002.  So the projects have, for now, been purely
a boon to local water users.
Two other mitigation systems worth considering are in the
Sacramento Valley.  The first of these is in Yuba, where the Yuba County
Water Agency has overseen all of the groundwater substitution transfers
by its member units.  Its policy is to immediately mitigate the effects of
groundwater substitution transfers where there is a clear relationship
between the effect and the transfer.  Mitigation has mainly concerned
residential pumpers and has consisted of lowering pumps or deepening
wells, at times temporarily discontinuing nearby groundwater
substitution pumping until the situation is addressed.  Where the
relationship is not clear, there is an investigation before mitigation
action.
The second system is the BMO program recently established in
Glenn County.  This program does not yet formally incorporate
provisions for mitigating transfers, but it incorporates two essential
elements of a mitigation system:  a multiparty monitoring framework in
which transfer activity can be reviewed and a set of rules for determining
whether pumping activity associated with a transfer should be curtailed.
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, the largest district involved in
groundwater substitution transfers in 2001, put in place its own
____________ 
6Economists refer to this as the Pareto Principle.
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mitigation funds, to be accessed if needed under the county’s review
process.  As it happened, the system was provided with a test case during
this first year of operation.
The case involved the well of an independent agricultural
groundwater pumper whose farm is located on the periphery of GCID.
The farmer, Marvin Lohse, noticed a sharp decline in the pumping
capacity of his well during the summer of 2001, at a point when a
neighboring farm within the irrigation district had been pumping
extensively as part of the groundwater substitution program.  The matter
was brought to the Water Advisory Committee (WAC), which has
oversight responsibilities for groundwater monitoring and the
determination of groundwater target levels.  GCID had a policy of
immediately mitigating any damages caused by its own pumping but
considered that a technical review was needed to determine whether this
was the case.
The WAC’s Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) was designated
to conduct the review.  Once the season was over and testing could be
conducted, GCID financed extended pumping of the well neighboring
the Lohse farm so that potential interactions with the Lohse well could
be measured.  This and other test data were analyzed by staff members of
the Department of Water Resources Northern Area Office, who
participate regularly in the TAC.  At a recent TAC meeting, DWR
presented its final conclusion, confirming its initial finding that there is
no direct correlation between water levels in the two wells.7  Rather, the
data suggest that the loss of water in the Lohse well could have resulted
either from the higher overall levels of pumping by GCID during the
2001 season (a result of the transfer program) or from water management
activities up-gradient, in an area uninvolved in the transfers.  The
recommendation is to perform focused monitoring on the Lohse well the
next time there is a transfer program or a reduction in surface water
supplies to up-gradient users.
____________ 
7Glenn County Water Advisory Committee, minutes of the October 8, 2002,
meeting.
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Mitigation Design Issues
The Glenn experience highlights many of the issues that are still on
the table regarding the design of effective groundwater mitigation
systems.  The first of these relates to the quality of information on which
to base decisions.  Knowledge about groundwater basins is by nature
inferential.  Like economists measuring the effects of fallowing, hydro-
geologists can make use of hard data but ultimately must base their
conclusions on estimations and simulations of how the system works.
Even for aquifers with long and extensive well data, there is room for
surprises.  Notably, groundwater basins do not always register changes in
use in predictable ways.  There can be lags in adjustment of the water
table to use levels, and the basins themselves are known to shift.
The philosophy behind the Glenn County basin management
objective ordinance is one of adaptive management.  By this approach,
the county’s water users intend to improve their knowledge of how the
aquifer works, while making use of the resource, including for water
transfer projects.  Indeed, Glenn’s water users argue that the optimal and
most sustainable strategy cannot be known without this empirical
approach to basin evaluation.  Counties such as neighboring Tehama
appear to be taking a more conservative approach by aiming to compile
as much information as possible before becoming comfortable with
potential transfers.
A second, related issue concerns the timing of mitigation.  There is a
tradeoff between obtaining reliable information and responding quickly
to a claim of damage.  Unless there is already a clear set of baseline
information, immediate mitigation essentially precludes verification of
the link between the transfer activity and the decline in well levels of
those who claim harm.  The distinction is important because, as the
Glenn example shows, there can be other reasons why a well would run
dry.  In counties such as Glenn and Butte, where there are large numbers
of independent agricultural pumpers, “over-mitigating” by responding
immediately can pose a high financial risk to the parties engaging in
transfer activity.  Such districts worry that they may be held responsible
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for replacing agricultural wells throughout the county, whether or not
there is a link to the transfer activity.
On the other hand, failure to respond quickly to a perceived
groundwater effect can lead to political pressure to shut down the water
transfer system altogether.  With the benefit of hindsight, some observers
in Butte regret that the districts engaging in groundwater substitution for
the 1994 drought water bank did not opt for a liberal, rapid mitigation
policy when the first complaints were aired.  Failure to do so meant that
virtually everyone in the county with a well affected by the drought
ended up blaming the transfer, irrespective of his or her location on the
gradient.  The result has been a restrictive ordinance and a political
climate that may make it more difficult to put in place an alternative
groundwater management system focusing on active basin management.
GCID’s decision to wait for an investigation of the causes of the dry
well was made in a quite different context:  an isolated complaint, in a
county with a process established for technical review.  It nevertheless
reflects the growing pains associated with an adaptive management
approach, since not everyone in Glenn has emerged satisfied by the
conclusions.  Delaying mitigation also can make it difficult—if not
impossible—to make the affected party whole through a physical
solution.
A third issue that has arisen in Glenn concerns the practical matter
of funding.  Glenn’s review system has two essential ingredients for
handling third-party effects to groundwater users:  There is an impartial
technical review committee, and this committee—not the injured
party—bears the burden of investigating complaints brought forth by the
public.  Much of the work conducted by the committee is on a pro bono
basis, effectively contributed in-kind by the participating institutions and
individuals.  As the process has unfolded, however, the county office that
coordinates TAC and WAC activities has come to the conclusion that it
may need funds to cover its own expenses for the reviews.  This implies
some sort of transfer tax to cover the cost of the process, even if the
responsible water district ultimately pays for any actual mitigation that
may be warranted.
Discussions of the idea of establishing a groundwater mitigation
fund at the county level rather than at the level of the individual water
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districts have also started.  Some districts object to this idea, arguing that
any financial responsibility should remain decentralized.  Their concern
is that, as water transferors, they may bear the cost of groundwater
mitigation unrelated to their own transfer activity or to the more general
transfer activity occurring in the county.
Leaving aside the general reluctance for parties to see themselves
taxed—a view that may be even stronger in California’s rural areas than
elsewhere in the state—the debate on a transfer tax raises two key
concerns regarding the principles of mitigation for groundwater effects.
First, it is clear that the parties in Glenn need to find a way to collectively
finance the costs of conducting the review of third-party effects.
Without this, the foundation of the basin management objective system
is eroded.  If this means some sort of assessment in addition to in-kind
contributions of participating agencies, so be it.  However, it is less clear
that establishing a general mitigation fund through a transfer tax is the
appropriate response.  A tax to mitigate physical effects to water users
raises legal issues, because it simultaneously grants implicit legal coverage
to parties not currently covered under the no-injury law without
ensuring adequate protections.  A mitigation fund established ex ante
may not contain adequate resources to provide the specific remedies
required for affected parties.8
The second concern is the problem highlighted by the districts
themselves:  the risk of commingling mitigation for transfers and
remediation of other types of groundwater problems present in the
county.  The districts have a point in arguing that a tax on transfers is
not an appropriate solution to funding more general groundwater
management programs.  This would amount to discriminating against
transferring parties (in this case, parties with more substantial water
rights), without holding other parties responsible for actions affecting the
health of the aquifer.  The debate underscores the fact that ultimately, an
effective mitigation system for groundwater transfers must come
packaged within a wider groundwater management system.
____________ 
8These objections were raised to the proposed transfer tax in the “Model Water Act”
sponsored by a group of business leaders in the mid-1990s (Gray, 1996).
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Ingredients of Effective Groundwater Management
Systems
Unlike many of its western neighbors, California does not have a
state-regulated system for managing the exploitation of groundwater
resources.  Looking across the California landscape, one finds a
continuum of local management options.  At one end, there are fully
regulated systems that manage use through a combination of pricing and
quantity controls.  These include basins with a single managing authority
(such as certain special districts) and basins where individual property
rights have been attributed through a court-ordered adjudication.  As we
have seen, such systems tend to be adopted in places with higher
population densities or specific technical concerns over the nature of the
resource (coastal and desert areas or areas overlying fractured rock where
the resource is nonrenewable).  Most southern California and coastal
counties have such systems in place.
At the other end is the option of complete laissez-faire, where
individuals are free to extract groundwater without restrictions on
quantity and without fees other than their own pumping costs.
Although this has been the preferred local management option in many
parts of the state historically—notably in the agricultural heartland—it is
becoming an increasingly empty set.  Spurred on by a combination of
local initiatives and state-level prompting, counties, cities, and water
agencies have been putting in place local oversight systems since the mid-
1990s.
Because it does not purport to manage the resource in any other way,
the local system that most closely resembles the laissez-faire option is the
county ordinance restricting exports.  Further along the continuum, one
finds a range of local groundwater management programs, established
under a variety of authorities:  the provisions of AB 3030, the 1992
legislation specifically designed to enable the creation of groundwater
management plans, general joint powers authority (e.g., Sacramento
Regional Groundwater Authority), and, in Glenn’s case, the county’s
police power.  To date, the most common form is the AB 3030
107
groundwater management plan, with over 100 in existence, and with
roughly 20 involving multiple parties.9
As a group, these systems provide a framework for active, largely
voluntary management of the groundwater basin.  The focus is on the
development of monitoring systems and the organization of basin
replenishment activities.  There are only limited powers to introduce
either quantity controls or pricing mechanisms for limiting access to the
resource.10  Within the group, the county ordinance in Glenn may have
the most potential clout, because it provides for pumping restrictions
(first for exports, then for local agricultural uses) if target levels for the
groundwater basin exceed critical limits.
To a large extent, these local groundwater management systems have
yet to be evaluated.  In part, this relates to the relative newness of the
process.  In part, it derives from the fact that before 2002, local agencies
were not required to report on the plans.11  For this reason, there are no
precise statewide figures on the number of plans in existence and their
membership, let alone information on how well they have been
functioning.12  It is widely recognized that plans sometimes were adopted
on paper, with little real management content.13  Some local agencies did
so as a defensive strategy to keep the state from expanding its own
authority over groundwater.
It is nevertheless possible to highlight a set of questions about the
elements of a successful system.  The first question is whether a strictly
____________ 
9Figures are derived from DWR’s database on groundwater management plans.
10For instance, a local agency with an AB 3030 plan cannot “limit or suspend
extractions unless [it] . . . has determined through study and investigation that
groundwater replenishment programs or other alternative sources of water supply have
proved insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater” (Cal. Water Code
Section 10753.9).  Fees can be collected for groundwater management only after holding
an election within the affected area (Cal. Water Code Section 10754.3).
11The reporting requirement was introduced in 2002 through SB 1938.
12DWR officials estimate that they may have about 90 percent of the plans in their
database.  The information on member agencies of multiparty plans is also incomplete.
13The likelihood of relatively inactive AB 3030 plans is highest for individual
district plans, although it is also appears that some of the multiparty plans have many
passive members.
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voluntary system is adequate.  A number of management plans appear to
focus on recharge and replenishment activities, by bringing in additional
surface water when available.  This is consistent with the view that if the
plan is sufficiently proactive, there will not be a need for sanctions on
local users.
A second and related question is whether a plan can be effective
without establishing target levels for the water table.  Such levels are the
essence of the BMO approach—the levels can be adjusted as information
on the aquifer improves, but they can also be used to determine critical
conditions when pumping restrictions are warranted.  Beginning this
year, new legislation (SB 1938, Machado) provides local agencies with a
strong incentive to adopt such target levels; without them, a groundwater
management plan will no longer be eligible to receive state funds
administered by DWR for groundwater quality or construction projects.
The third question concerns the appropriate level of jurisdiction for
a local groundwater management system.  The systems now in place span
a wide range of options, from a single water district to multiparty,
multicounty arrangements (for instance, the Sacramento Regional
Groundwater Authority).  Many of the multiparty programs are
configured to correspond to the underlying groundwater basin.  This is
generally not the case for programs adopted by individual districts.  By
making state funding contingent on the presentation of plans to involve
other agencies overlying a basin, SB 1938 also establishes the principle
that AB 3030 programs should follow a basin approach whenever
possible.
Although it does not specifically address the physical aspects of a
groundwater basin or watershed, another bill passed in 2002 to support
“integrated regional water management” (SB 1672, Costa) reinforces the
notion that local agencies will need to group together to receive state
funding for water projects in the future.  Under this statute, regional
groups associating at least three local agencies will be eligible to receive
competitive grants for water management (including, but not limited to,
groundwater) under the latest water bond, Proposition 50, which passed
in November 2002.
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Role of Counties and Local Agencies
The 1990s have seen parallel developments for local groundwater
control in California, with on the one hand county-level ordinances and
on the other local management plans involving mainly water agencies
and rarely coinciding with county boundaries.  What interactions have
there been between these two developments, and what are the potential
roles of counties and local agencies in the future?
Within the San Joaquin Valley, the two approaches appear as
alternative paths.  In Merced, Kings, Stanislaus, and Tulare, multiparty
groundwater management plans provided an acceptable alternative, at
the local level, to the option of introducing a county ordinance.  This is
less the case in the Sacramento Valley, where ordinance adoption got off
to an earlier start and is more widespread.  In many counties there and
further north, the more relevant question is how export ordinances will
interact or coexist with more active groundwater management programs
as these develop.  In Glenn, a county ordinance for local groundwater
management has effectively replaced the initial ordinance restricting
exports.  In Sacramento, the Water Forum process led to a new
groundwater management system for the county, which incorporates
some out-of-county parties overlying the shared basin.  The county’s
export ordinance remains on the books and can be activated if officials
deem it necessary.
As noted, a number of counties in the northern half of the state are
currently building on Glenn’s experience with basin management
objectives.  Although it is too early to tell how this will play out, one
likely scenario is the adoption of countywide ordinances, as has been
done in Glenn.  Whether these counties will actively maintain their
export restrictions will depend on local factors, including the extent to
which the BMO adoption process creates an adequate level of trust
among local users and the extent to which the perceived threat of exports
is linked more to potential practices of local water agencies or to the
potential for private individuals to sell land for groundwater pumping to
an outside party.
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This analysis suggests that in some places, counties are likely to play
an active role in the movement toward more comprehensive groundwater
management, by virtue of already having played an active role in
establishing an oversight role for exports.  In this context, the county will
play the role of convener for local water users, whether or not there is a
complete overlap between county lines and the contours of the
groundwater basin.  The Glenn experience demonstrates one advantage
of a county-level approach over one affiliating local agencies along basin
lines:  the ability to readily implicate nonaffiliated parties, such as private
pumpers.14
In Kern and Yuba, both special cases by virtue of their countywide
umbrella agencies, a convening role has been key for county water policy
formation.  The most recent illustration of this is the public forum
launched by the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) in 2002 to
deliberate over future banking and transfer policy.  The discussions are
focusing on two issues:  use of State Water Project water in out-of-
county transfers and groundwater basin management in relation to
banking and transfers.  Whereas the first issue is mainly a matter to be
decided between the county, KCWA, and the 13 member agencies that
share the SWP entitlement,15 the forum on groundwater involves all
water users overlying the Kern Basin.  A key objective is for these parties
to come to a consensus on standards and methods for basin
measurement.
For the “county” to play a convening role, county administration
need not be heavily involved.  Most rural counties have limited staff and
budget resources to make available on water issues, and water districts are
generally wary of being managed by an entity with limited technical
expertise.  Most rural counties also have some form of consultative group
on water issues.  The models emerging from such counties as Glenn and
Butte demonstrate that these groups can play a significant role in
developing local water policy.  Indeed, in Glenn, the Water Advisory
Committee—composed of water users from throughout the county—is
____________ 
14In Glenn, private pumpers were organized along county district lines.
15The county’s involvement is predicated on the fact that county funds help defray
the cost of SWP water to local users, by roughly 13 percent.
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the county organ for groundwater matters.  The county administration
provides technical and administrative support to this committee’s work.
This experience reflects the core philosophy of local groundwater
management—that the policy needs to be developed and adapted
through a consultative process among water users.  For this reason, active
participation of local water agencies is a key component of any
multiparty groundwater management plan, whether organization is along
county lines or some other principle.  When the plan is backed by a
county ordinance, as in Glenn, it is useful to consider the respective roles
of the county and of the water agencies in groundwater management.
The county is responsible for monitoring and evaluation and, ultimately
(if necessary), policing water users.  Water agencies—together or
individually—are responsible for the planning, construction, and
operation of groundwater projects.  This type of management protocol
will generally be the appropriate division of labor, except in the few cases
where counties themselves hold substantial surface water rights.  Because
most counties share basins with their neighbors,16 county-level
management plans will logically need to coordinate with the players on
the other side of the border, be they other counties or local water
agencies.
In some places, a county-level management plan is less likely, either
because viable alternatives already exist or because the local dynamics
favor an alternative future path.  In light of their oversight responsibilities
for land use planning and economic development, the case could be
made that county administrations should nevertheless have a “seat at the
table” on local water policy.  This was, in essence, Fresno County’s
motivation for adopting an ordinance.
Role of the State
If there is one area on which local entities can easily reach consensus
regarding groundwater management, it is that the state should stay out
of it.  This includes the expansion of regulatory oversight through
legislative actions and through the exercise of additional authority by the
____________ 
16Both Yuba and Kern have the added advantage of overlying relatively distinct
basins.
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SWRCB.17  As a first reaction, local agencies generally do not even
appreciate far meeker forms of intervention, such as the incentive-based
system for state funding introduced by SB 1938 and SB 1672.  There is,
at the same time, a clear preference to avoid going down the road of
court-ordered solutions to groundwater management and recognition in
many places that some form of local management may be necessary.
A key ingredient of the successful local processes to date has been the
hard work, long hours, and initiative of individuals willing to do what it
takes to find consensus on local management objectives.  That said, the
state has played a crucial role in some cases, by providing technical
assistance (most notably, through DWR’s Northern Area Office) and
financial support.  Through several different grant and loan windows,
DWR is now able to provide seed money to develop groundwater
management plans and to help fund the development of monitoring
grids and infrastructure for replenishment and banking activities.18
State-level funding for local groundwater management initiatives is
justified because improved management at the local level benefits the
state as a whole, not just the local water users.  When sound local systems
are in place, this facilitates the active use of the aquifer, enhancing water
supply for the wider community.  Indeed, there is some evidence to
suggest that the strictly local benefits of improved management will often
be inadequate to spur users to put in place an oversight system.
Modeling exercises show that the annual increases in farmers’ pumping
costs (a function of declining groundwater levels) in a laissez-faire system
are typically not huge if groundwater use is limited to the overlying users
(Provencher, 1995).  Provencher (1991) and Knapp et al. (forthcoming)
____________ 
17See, for instance, the public response to the report recently commissioned by the
SWRCB on groundwater authority (Sax, 2002).
18AB 303, the Local Groundwater Management Assistance Act of 2000, has so far
made $10 million available for grants to conduct groundwater studies, implement
monitoring activities, and undertake groundwater management activities, through annual
appropriations of the general fund in 2000–2001 and 2001–2002.  Proposition 13 made
close to $122 million available for groundwater recharge and storage projects over this
period and is slated to make another $85 million available in 2002–2003.  Close to 90
percent of this is for grants; the rest is for low-interest loans.  Individual amounts are
modest (grants range up to $250,000, loans to $1 million).  It is anticipated that several
hundred million dollars will be available for groundwater projects under Proposition 50.
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found that under no-transfer conditions, improved management would
generate savings of only 2 to 3 percent in Madera and Kern Counties,
respectively.19  The benefits of management can increase substantially
once one considers the opportunity for active conjunctive use, banking,
and transfers.  In part, the increase in benefits occurs because in an
uncontrolled situation, transfers can hasten the speed of overdraft. 20
This underscores why those water users in a position to organize
transfer and banking projects—by virtue of senior surface rights or their
location on the aquifer—have every incentive to take a proactive role in
local groundwater management.  Failure to do so may lead to projects
being blocked by communities unwilling to support the risk of exports in
an unmanaged aquifer.  To some extent, the market opportunities
afforded by improved groundwater management also create incentives for
private sector support of these initiatives.  This will notably be the case
for urban supply projects, since municipal users can pay a higher price
for the water.  Judging from recent experience, the scope for private
capital appears greatest for investments to support banking projects
(recharge and pumping facilities and upgrades in conveyance).21
Before private funding can fill its niche, however, the locals will need
to have done the groundwork on putting in place a management system
with a protocol for monitoring, evaluation, and mitigation of potential
harm from the activities.  Not all local programs have required public
support for these efforts, but it often appears to provide the grease that
keeps the wheels turning.  For this reason, the legislative incentive of
such bills as SB 1938 and SB 1672, which orient the content of
____________ 
19These savings are measured in terms of the value of the groundwater per acre of
farmland per year.  Knapp and his colleagues find, for instance, that the annualized net
benefits from groundwater over a 50-year time horizon are $151.48 per acre under
laissez-faire management and $153.92 under efficient management, assuming no transfers
out of the county ($2.44/acre annualized net gain).
20Knapp and his colleagues found that gains from management with transfers (but
without banking) rose to $11.09 per acre per year, in part because benefits under laissez-
faire fell to $146.03 per acre.
21For instance, Semitropic Water Storage District is working with the private sector
on a proposed expansion of its banking facilities.  Private investors are also considering
funding of recharge operations in support of water supply for residential development
within the San Joaquin Valley.  The proposed transfer from Butte Water District to
Madera County is a case in point (see Table A.5).
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programs susceptible for state funding, may be a good accompanying
measure.  For public funds to provide public benefit, they need to
support systems that are truly moving in the direction of sound
management.
Summing Up
Further expansion of water marketing and water banking activities
will require safeguards for the use of groundwater basins.  These include
measures to protect users and the environment against potential adverse
consequences and to ensure the rights of those who bank water
underground.  Because state laws do not provide adequate protections,
mitigation systems for groundwater users must be developed at the local
level.  Key ingredients of a mitigation system consist of monitoring and
information-sharing with all players, an impartial technical review
process to investigate potential effects to third parties, and a mechanism
for mitigating those effects by measures that may include adjusting or
ceasing pumping activity.  Such systems are in place in Yuba and Glenn
Counties and in the groundwater banking operations in Kern.
The outstanding mitigation design issues are the tradeoff between
obtaining reliable information and acting quickly and the mechanism for
funding remedies.  Whereas a tax on water sales made possible by land
fallowing might be an appropriate means for funding social or economic
programs, such a tax raises legal issues for the mitigation of groundwater
effects.  A transfer tax to mitigate groundwater effects simultaneously
grants implicit legal coverage to parties not currently protected under the
state’s no-injury law, without ensuring adequate protections.
Ultimately, an effective mitigation system for groundwater transfers
must come packaged within a wider groundwater management system.
In California, fully regulated systems that manage use through a
combination of pricing and quantity controls tend to be confined to
Southern California and coastal areas with historically higher population
densities or specific technical concerns over the nature of the resource.
Elsewhere, there has been a movement from complete laissez-faire toward
local oversight systems.  The 1990s have seen parallel developments, with
both county-level ordinances and local management plans that rarely
coincide with county boundaries.  From a basin management
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perspective, strong arguments can be made in favor of management
systems uniting agencies overlying a common basin.  The key question
for these systems is whether a strictly voluntary management principle is
adequate or whether target levels and pumping restrictions need to be
developed for the program to be effective.
By virtue of the institutional history, counties in Northern California
will probably play a lead role in developing more active management
systems, even if the county lines do not coincide with the basin.  The
experiences in Glenn, Yuba, and Kern demonstrate that counties (or
countywide water agencies) can play an important convening role for
local water users.  In counties that play an active role in setting up
management systems, the “county” need not—and often should not—be
the county administration itself but rather a representative group of water
users supported by the administration.  In places where groundwater
management develops along other geographical lines—notably basins or
watersheds—county administrations nevertheless deserve a “seat at the
table” on water policy development, given their oversight role for land
use and economic development.
The state’s role in encouraging better groundwater management is
three-pronged:  providing technical assistance where requested, making
funds available to support system development, and encouraging the
adoption of programs with sound content by attaching conditions to the
release of state funds.  Because sound local management of groundwater
provides benefits to the state at large, all three measures constitute
appropriate support to system development.  Once systems are in place,
there is also an opportunity for private funding of groundwater
infrastructure, especially for municipal supply projects.
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8. The Scope for Resolving
Third-Party Issues
The ordinances restricting groundwater exports by California’s rural
counties over the past decade reflect popular concerns about the potential
negative effects of the water market on groundwater users and the local
economy and the lack of adequate protections afforded by state law.
There is statistical evidence that the restrictions have significantly
reduced overall market activity, and they may also have encouraged some
shifting of sales toward within-county buyers.  Local resistance is likely to
remain a force to reckon with in market development, especially for
long-term, interregional transfers from agricultural to urban users.
This is important because municipal demand—which did not
contribute to overall market growth in the second half of the 1990s—can
only increase in the years ahead.  Demographers forecast an increase in
the state’s population by 12 million people over the next 20 years,
corresponding to an increase in demand of roughly 3 million acre-feet at
current patterns of residential use.1  Meanwhile, roughly 800,000 acre-
feet of urban supply (nearly one-tenth of the estimated municipal and
industrial water use in the mid-1990s) will be removed at some point
over the next 15 years in the context of California’s agreement to stop
using more than its entitlement of Colorado River water.  Cities are
already looking to a range of alternatives to meet future needs, through
conservation, desalination, recycling, and increases in local reservoir
____________ 
1Calculations are based on the standard rule of thumb for per capita municipal use
in California of 250 gallons per day, or four persons/acre-foot/year.  The state’s last
available projections of municipal demand for 2020, including industrial demand, assume
a slightly higher consumption rate of 3.8 persons/acre-feet/year (Department of Water
Resources, 1998).  Per capita averages are merely summary figures, since they depend on
a weighted average of use in single-family and multifamily homes (which is lower), as well
as differences in use across areas of the state.
118
capacity.  But it is also clear that the water market—where possible in
association with groundwater banking operations—will be an element of
this portfolio.  The need for reliability, reinforced by new legislative
requirements to firm up the link between water supply and land use
planning, will naturally lead some municipal water agencies to seek long-
term contracts to shore up supplies.
There is some scope for augmenting supplies available for transfers
through efficiency-based conservation—notably through upgrades to
conveyance systems such as canal lining.  As long as such transfers do not
harm the environment or seriously alter the recharge of the aquifer, they
can take place without generating local concern.  However, it is likely
that the two key sources of water for the market will be those that have
given rise to the local resistance movement:  groundwater—either direct
or in substitution for surface water—and conservation through crop
idling.  Moreover, the scope for augmenting groundwater banking in the
Central Valley—which could potentially increase annual average water
supplies by 1 million acre-feet or more2—is inextricably linked to local
concerns about groundwater-related transfers.  Banking can, in principle,
be a “win-win” situation for local users, by increasing overall levels of
supply while making new resources available for transfer.  But local users
need to be convinced that the banks are structurally and managerially
sound, such that they do not negatively affect either the quality or
quantity of native supplies.
Moving forward will require finding solutions that provide
communities in source regions with adequate safeguards against the
potential negative consequences to local water users and the local
economy.  What have the experiences to date taught us about the scope
for positive resolution of these conflicts, and what role can policy play in
this process?
____________ 
2Estimates are from modeling exercises conducted by the Natural Heritage Institute
(see Purkey et al., 1998).  NHI concludes that an important new source of water for
banking could be obtained through reoperation of some of the state’s reservoirs.
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Local Groundwater Management as the Linchpin of
Water Marketing and Water Banking
The local movement to restrict exports through the exercise of
county police powers was a legitimate response to the threat of
uncontrolled mining of the aquifers, once the state made it clear that the
water market was open for business in the early 1990s.  Under the open-
access rules for groundwater that have prevailed in California’s rural
counties, the introduction of an export potential raises the likelihood of
exceeding the sustainable yield.  Although many of the counties that
adopted ordinances were not already in situations of groundwater
overdraft, there was generally an inadequate level of knowledge about
basin characteristics, including how quickly exports could lead to
problems for local users.  In Madera County, the ordinance was
introduced in response to similar concerns regarding the unknown
consequences of uncontrolled groundwater banking.
The ordinances can be interpreted, in this light, as a precautionary
response to a policy shift at the state level, which did not provide
adequate protections for local groundwater users.  This defensive strategy
is nevertheless suboptimal from the standpoint of local as well as
statewide interests.  A policy limited to restricting exports does little to
stabilize the aquifer in places subject to overdraft.  It also makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to make economic use of the underground
storage space, through groundwater substitution transfers and banking of
imported surface water.  Attaining these goals requires a more assertive,
comprehensive strategy of groundwater management that protects local
users while providing opportunities to address supply and quality
problems and allowing those with sound transfer and banking projects to
participate in the market.
There is an emerging consensus that this management needs to be
done at the local level.  To some extent, this conclusion is based on a
perceived political reality.  The lack of comprehensive state protections
for groundwater users is itself a function of a legal status for groundwater
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that local users have jealously guarded.  In the transition from the
traditional open-access model to a regime with some collective authority
over groundwater, solutions involving local institutions are more
palatable than centralized management by the state.  Politics aside, there
are also sound efficiency arguments to be made in favor of local control,
because both monitoring and the determination of local water demands
is best done on a decentralized basis (Provencher and Burt, 1993).
From a limited base, the decade of the rise in the water market has
also been a decade of the rise of local awareness of the need for
groundwater management in California’s rural counties.  Where this is
working best, one finds proactive, multiparty initiatives that have either
preempted the need for restrictive county ordinances or provided
alternative models that give water users the confidence to move beyond
restrictions already in place.
This shift toward active groundwater management includes a range
of “confidence-builders.”  The first is a concerted effort to increase
hydrological understanding, through data-gathering and analysis.  This
exercise is necessarily both ongoing and participatory.  Active
management—with experimentation in transfer and banking activity—
provides an opportunity to increase levels of knowledge.
The second confidence-builder is the demonstration of an effective
mitigation system for transfer and banking projects.  Key ingredients
include monitoring and information-sharing among all players, impartial
technical review of potential third-party effects, and a mechanism for
mitigating these that may include adjusting or ceasing pumping activity.
Ideally, cases where mitigation is actually necessary will be limited, but it
is crucial for water users to have the assurance that it will be available.
This also implies a willingness on the part of those engaged in a transfer
or banking project to accept new information on the limits of what may
be done with the aquifer.  Improving understanding of the aquifer can
reveal constraints as well as opportunities.
The third confidence-builder is an increased appreciation at the local
level that there are more effective and beneficial management approaches
that include benefits for those who do not directly participate in transfer
or banking projects.  These wider benefits can include improved
groundwater levels as a result of recharge projects and improved water
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quality as an outcome of new management protocols.  They can also
include improved access to surface supplies, as those directly benefiting
from an interregional transfer project “share the wealth” by transferring
some water to other local users at a lower price.
Last, but not least, individuals involved in local management
initiatives stress the key role of the process itself as a confidence-builder:
working together at the local level to craft solutions and getting to know
each other through hours and months of meetings aimed at problem-
solving.  In some cases (Sacramento and Kern), this process has benefited
from professional assistance, with mediators or facilitators using
guidelines for meeting protocols.  The successful experiences elsewhere
(Glenn and Merced) show that this is not always necessary.
All levels of government, from special water districts, to
municipalities, to counties, to the state, have a role to play in improving
local groundwater management.  Logically, the most direct roles are for
the local institutions, which need to take a leadership role in crafting
locally appropriate solutions.  Coordination at the local level is a
necessity, given the institutional patchwork of local governance on water
issues and the frequent mismatch between institutional boundaries and
the physical dimensions of basins and watersheds.  The onus for moving
forward will often be on those water districts whose members stand to
gain the most from greater market activity; they need to show they can
be team players.
Rural counties have already shown their ability to play a defensive
policing role.  In many places, the county is also a useful level of
organization for more offensive management initiatives.  Counties
provide a readily available structure for convening water users, and their
police powers can be used proactively as a safeguard in groundwater
management.  Additionally, in areas already experiencing or slated for
substantial population growth, there will be an increasing need for both
county and municipal governments to ensure the link between water
supply and land-use planning.
Some water agencies have suggested that the threat of county
intervention has been an impetus for the agencies themselves to move
forward with local groundwater management plans.  Clearly, the very
threat of the state taking on a greater prerogative over groundwater has
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been important in this respect as well.  But the state also has a positive
role to play in fostering local initiative by providing technical assistance
and financial support.  The public benefits of groundwater management
justify state support to local initiatives, and it is entirely appropriate that
access to funding be accompanied by incentives to incorporate sound
management principles.  Recent bond initiatives have made millions of
dollars available for groundwater management, and recent legislation (SB
1938 and SB 1672) has provided appropriate carrots by linking this
funding to the adoption of sound management criteria, such as the
development of target levels for the groundwater basin and the
association of multiple parties overlying the aquifer.  More direct input
by the state in the form of funding and technical assistance to
characterize groundwater basin hydrology and evaluate the potential for
conjunctive use projects is also warranted.3
Recently, the state has also adopted an incentive-based approach
through its own role as a major player on the water market.  The policy
guidelines for purchases of dry-year water for 2003 indicate that the state
expects local parties wishing to sell water to the program to ensure
adequate local supplies and minimize third-party effects (Department of
Water Resources, 2002c).  The guidelines emphasize the development of
transfer programs by local agencies through consultation with other local
parties.  This position is a natural outgrowth of the state’s position that
groundwater is covered in spirit under the no-injury laws.  It also reflects
a sensible desire for the people’s representative to avoid purchasing water
where it may generate local controversy.  But the policy is also instructive
for the water market more generally.  It suggests that buyers can play a
positive role in stimulating sounder local water management by insisting
that potential sellers work through these controversies preemptively.
Land Fallowing and Community Development
Fallowing of land to make water available for the market raises quite
different policy issues.  The problem is not one of efficiently managing a
collective resource but rather one of determining ground rules under
____________ 
3This was a principal point of consensus of the Water Transfer Workgroup (2002).
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which those with access to water rights may forgo their use by taking
land out of production and selling the water to others.  The potential
effects on the community are not losses in water availability (a physical
effect) but losses in the economic activity associated with the fallowed
land.  There is no legal tradition for compensating parties affected by this
type of transaction, which results from a private business decision to
make a different use of resources for which property rights are clear.
As we have seen, water districts differ in their policies with respect to
fallowing for transfers, and it appears that landowner-run districts are
more willing than popularly run districts to entertain fallowing as an
option.  This could be expected given the somewhat different nature of
property rights associated with the two voting rules:  Under popular-vote
districts, the district holds the water right in trust for the entire
community, whereas in landowner-vote districts the rights are more
directly tied to the farming population.  The fact that farmer-run boards
appear more willing to consider fallowing for the water market is not in
and of itself a bad thing.  Farmers are the ones best placed to know the
value of the water in their agricultural operations, and they will consider
selling only if they can earn more for it on the market.  This is the
essence of an efficiency-enhancing transaction, which augments collective
welfare.
The problem is that despite generating overall gains to the economy,
such transactions may lead to some losses, as a result of changes in
spending patterns of the farmer and others who earn income associated
with the idled land.  The studies available on this question suggest that
the aggregate local effects have been quite small for programs idling
anywhere from 6 to 29 percent of acreage, with local gains from the
program largely balancing out local losses.  But the modern track record
is limited, and there is a tendency for popular sentiment in rural areas to
target the notorious case study from California’s past where fallowing for
the market had dire consequences for the local agricultural economy—
Owens Valley.
Districts willing to engage in fallowing today argue that they have no
intention of harming the local economy.  To the contrary, they maintain
that including a fallowing component in their operations enhances
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financial stability at a time when farm prices are generally low.  These
districts now operate under a set of rules that makes a full-scale sell-out of
the Owens Valley variety highly unlikely, if not impossible.  Both state
law and locally determined guidelines limit the negative effects of
fallowing.  Section 1745.05 of the Water Code requires public review of
fallowing that exceeds 20 percent of the local water supply.  In designing
fallowing programs, water districts increasingly include restrictions to
maintain the viability of the idled land and to make sure that
participating farmers are not just in the business of selling water.  The
economics of fallowing also plays a natural mitigating role.  Farmers have
incentives to fallow the crops that generate the least profit per acre-foot,
and these tend to be the low-value, highly mechanized commodities that
generate the lowest on-farm employment and the least value-added
through further processing.
Even with this combination of operating rules and incentives to limit
negative effects to the local economy, there remains the question of
whether the community should receive something too.  At the federal
level, there are some precedents for mitigating economic effects when
policy changes in the collective interest cause a structural shift in
employment and business opportunities for some sectors or regions.
With different degrees of success, federal mitigation programs have
aimed to assist affected workers and businesses to make a transition to
other economic activities.
A parallel case could be made for mitigating the economic effects of
sizable, long-term fallowing operations, especially if they generate
systematic hardships for low-income groups or local governments
responsible for providing public services.  The water market is, after all,
an instrument of state water policy.  In the two long-term deals pending
approval, a transfer from the Palo-Verde Irrigation District to
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and one from the
Imperial Irrigation District to San Diego, funds have been earmarked for
the benefit of the local communities.  This will no doubt become a
standard component of any future deals of this type, where large volumes
of water are sold to distant urban agencies over more than a decade, with
expectations of some systematic effects on local employment
opportunities affecting low-income immigrant communities.
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For temporary or intermittent fallowing operations, such as those
undertaken in the Sacramento Valley since 2001, there are greater
questions about the appropriateness of mitigation.  The question has
come up because the two buyers, DWR and Metropolitan, have
developed a policy to provide funds for the community when buying
water made available through crop idling.  Locally, no one is quite sure
what to do with the money, because it is not clear what damages, if any,
would merit mitigation.  Involved water districts and the county
administration in Butte are even uncomfortable with this term, if what it
implies is direct compensation of affected parties.  In part, this stems
from an expectation that the fallowing programs are likely to generate
little if any hardship to low-income workers, given the highly
mechanized nature of crop production and the considerable workload
generated by land maintenance and improvement activities on fallowed
acreage.  In part, it stems from a concern that a direct compensation
program would establish a dangerous legal precedent, generate an
excessive amount of claims, and ultimately create unrealistic expectations
about the potential community benefits from water transfers.  For these
reasons, it may make more sense to think of such funds as providing
opportunities for community development rather than mitigation.
The key policy issues on the table regarding fallowing concern the
rules to limit negative community effects:  rules on the scale and content
of fallowing program design and rules concerning financial mitigation.
At present, most of these rules derive from local practice, with the
exception of the Water Code’s 20 percent trigger for public review,
introduced in 1992.  Since 1998, the legislature has considered bills
proposing to institutionalize mitigation on three occasions, although
none has met with approval.
Further legislative actions on the fallowing question should be
avoided for the time being, for two reasons.  First, there is a limited track
record on fallowing and no experience with implementing mitigation
funds.  Second, in the major short- and long-term fallowing programs
slated to occur, the transacting parties themselves have been adopting
design measures to limit negative effects and setting up funds to benefit
the community.  These cases provide the opportunity both to assess the
consequences of responsible fallowing and to experiment with the use of
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funds for community benefit.  If, as the farmers in the Sacramento Valley
and Palo Verde argue, the overall effects are not harmful to the local
economy, this may help build wider confidence in a new model for
fallowing that can displace the ghost of Owens Valley.
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Appendix A
Tracking the Water Market:  Data
Sources and Caveats
This appendix describes the dataset presented in the body of the
report and provides detailed tables on different aspects of the market.
Monitoring the statewide water market is facilitated by the fact that
many transactions involve state or federal authorities in at least one of
two ways:  as direct purchasers (as in the drought water bank and the
environmental programs) or as approvers of transactions among other
water users.  Most transfers require approval by at least one of the
following three agencies:  the SWRCB, DWR, or USBR, which
manages both the Central Valley Project and the Colorado River Project.
Although these agencies only recently developed a policy to pool data
and monitor transactions collectively,1 it was generally possible to
reconstruct past transfer activity.2  The full range of federal and state
sources was tapped.  For transactions falling outside state or federal
jurisdiction, the primary source used was the private publication, Water
Strategist, and its forerunner, Water Intelligence Monthly, which track
water markets in 14 western states.  For the early years, an additional
source was Lund et al. (1992).
____________ 
1In 2001, the website of CALFED, a joint state and federal program to address
water supply and quality issues in the San Francisco Bay-Delta, posted a preliminary
database of water transfers compiled from various sources.  Known as “On-Tap,” this
database provides considerable information but still contains many inaccuracies.  The
participating agencies intend to improve the quality of transfer monitoring for future
years.
2The one project area with incomplete records was the Friant Unit of the Central
Valley Project, a group of contractors in the east side of the San Joaquin Valley, for which
internal transactions were either incomplete or missing in some years.  For these years
(indicated by an asterisk in the appendix tables), we have adjusted the totals, setting
internal Friant trades to their average share of the total market (7 percent) in years when
data were complete.
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Because there are often discrepancies between intended transactions
and what is finally achieved, an intensive cross-checking exercise was
conducted on the data, comparing sources and contacting the relevant
water districts in the event of questions.  We also had access to the
transfer records of some large water districts in the state:  Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California, Westlands Water District, Kern
County Water Agency, and Yuba County Water Agency.  We attempted
to retain only transfers that were actually carried out, in the amounts
transferred from the point of origin, on a calendar year basis.3
The data presented in the report focus on annual flows of water
resulting from three types of transactions:  temporary transfers (under
one year), long-term transfers (more than one year), and what we have
termed “deferred exchanges.”  Whereas transfers typically involve a one-
way movement of water for monetary compensation, deferred exchanges
refer to a promise that the buyer will return water (in addition, in some
cases, to a cash payment) to the seller at a later date.  These exchanges
often contain some flexibility regarding the year of repayment to allow
for conditions of the water year.  We have considered an exchange
agreement to fall into this category as long as it does not require same or
next-year repayment.  As with transfers, the agreements on deferred
exchanges can be temporary or multiyear.  State Water Project
contractors make the most use of deferred exchanges, as project operating
rules make these preferable to outright transfers in many instances.
The annual flow data do not contain a fourth category, the
permanent transfer of water rights or contract entitlements.  Such
transfers amount to an outright sale of the rights to use the specified
amount of water in perpetuity or for the duration of the contract in
question.  Because the actual amount accessible to the buyer under these
rights or entitlements can vary with the conditions of the water year, it is
not strictly appropriate to consider an annual flow of water transferred.
____________ 
3Some inaccuracies in volumes transacted may nevertheless remain.  It was not
always possible to resolve discrepancies because of differences in record-keeping among
agencies and inconsistencies in accounting for carriage losses—the amount of water lost
during conveyance.  Some inaccuracies in the year of transfer also may remain, especially
if a transfer arrangement was initiated late in the calendar year and some of the water
actually was moved after December.
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We have therefore opted to present the data on permanent transfers
separately.
In the interests of consistency, two other types of transaction have
been intentionally excluded from the database:  short-term exchanges and
transfers within certain localized user groups.  Short-term exchanges are
same- or next-year exchanges of water among users, generally done for
purposes of timing or technical convenience.  These include, for
example, the annual exchanges between the San Benito Water District
and the Santa Clara Valley Water District, which temporarily use a
certain amount of each other’s water to gain flexibility.  This practice is
also common among the members of the Friant Unit of the Central
Valley Project.  In the San Joaquin Valley, short-term exchanges are also
used to facilitate transfers between districts not hydraulically connected.
An intermediate district (or districts) will use the water from the
transferor in exchange for letting the transferee use its water.  We have
opted not to count these types of exchanges for several reasons.  First,
they are not tracked as well as transfers:  frequently, only one of several
possible sides of the exchange appears in the records.  Second, unlike
deferred exchanges, short-term exchanges do not alter the amount of
water available to the buyer and seller over the season.  Finally, in cases
where exchanges are used to facilitate a transfer, counting them would
amount to double- (or triple-) counting the volumes being traded.
Each year, a certain number of water districts are active on both sides
of the market, selling water to one or more parties and purchasing water
from another party or parties.  Although some of these transactions may
be strictly for plumbing convenience, some represent distinctly separate
deals.  For instance, a district will sometimes act as an agent for a
landowner transferring water to lands held elsewhere and in the same
year take advantage of the opportunity to purchase water to use for
aquifer recharge.  We have opted to include these volumes of “internal”
transactions in the data presented on the total transfer market.  In total,
they represent about 5 percent of the water market.
In several parts of the state, a considerable number of local
transactions are not picked up systematically by any of our data sources.
These include transfers among users within the same water districts,
which some argue have long been a part of farmers’ water management
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practices.  Given the difficulties of tracking these transfers, for which
many districts do not maintain records, we have opted to exclude
intradistrict transactions from the database and to focus on the activity
among parties with separate water rights or contract entitlements.  It
should be noted that the volumes involved in intradistrict transfers can
be substantial.  UC Berkeley researchers have estimated that in the
Westlands Water District, one of the nation’s largest irrigation districts,
internal transactions amounted to 300,000–400,000 acre-feet annually in
the mid-1990s, or about one-third of the district’s total water supply
(Sunding, 2000).  Much of this activity is linked to the fact that some
lands in the district are affected by drainage problems, which reduce
agricultural productivity.
There are also some local transactions across districts that we have
not been able to track systematically.  Within the Kings River Water
Association, a 28-member group that shares water rights on the Kings
River, transfers can amount to as much as 20,000 acre-feet in some years,
depending on river conditions.4  There is also a substantial amount of
transfer and exchange activity—as much as 100,000 acre-feet annually—
among the 13 member agencies of the Kern County Water Agency that
share a contract entitlement with the State Water Project.  According to
agency management, these transfers are essentially for convenience,
facilitating the joint management of water from different sources
(project, river, and groundwater) in different locations within the county.
Within the Mojave Basin, where groundwater rights have been
adjudicated, there is an active annual market among rights-holders that
enables buyers to use more than their allotment.  In 2002, these trades
were estimated at over 30,000 acre-feet.5  Permanent transfers of drawing
rights also occur within the basin.  Although the Mojave Basin is the
largest adjudicated area, it is likely that such local markets also are active
in other adjudicated basins in Southern California.6
____________ 
4Personal communication, Tim O’Halloran, Kings River Water Association,
October 2002.
5Water Strategist (2002).
6For a map of adjudicated basins, see Figure B.2.
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Finally, we do not report in detail on the volumes involved in
groundwater banking, which, although not technically a transfer,
frequently involves the movement of water among parties in manners
akin to transfers.  Storing, or “banking,” water in underground aquifers
has been on the rise in California since the early 1990s.  A number of
users have developed projects to store water on behalf of other rights-
holders at a more suitable location.  These projects are by nature long-
term arrangements that allow the rights-holder to respond to dry years by
drawing down on stored reserves.
Our records, limited mainly to the operations of the State Water
Project contractors, show that close to 750,000 acre-feet were stored in
such projects on behalf of third parties since the mid-1990s in various
locations in Kern County.  The first drawdowns occurred in 2001, a dry
year.  In some of the banking projects, a market exists for the permanent
sale of storage rights—in effect, for ownership of a share of the bank
facilities.  Because banked water can be used in transfers, there are also
direct links between banking projects and the annual water market.
Transfers can involve not only water users with their own on-site
banking projects but also those banking at a distant location.  A case in
point was Santa Clara Valley Water District’s transfer of water banked in
Kern County to the Environmental Water Account in 2001.
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Table A.1
California Short- and Long-Term Water Transfers, by Type of Market
Year Total
%
Long-
Term
Direct
Government
Purchases
Within
CVP
Within
SWP
Within
Colorado
River
Project
“Open
Market”
1985 78,781 0 3,308 52,216 15,489 0 7,768
1986 156,669 0 0 147,447 7,950 0 1,272
1987 168,143 0 0 70,622 6,171 0 91,350
1988 320,872 34 119,031 87,141 300 110,000 4,400
1989 513,731 21 239,000 152,584* 2,691 110,000 9,456
1990 566,633 19 131,409 177,142* 3,561 110,000 144,521
1991 1,139,653 10 864,315 102,202* 2,696 110,000 60,440
1992 565,551 24 217,983 155,786* 4,919 138,301 48,562
1993 547,090 37 1,703 213,782* 197 202,989 128,419
1994 721,916 24 302,852 218,400* 1,726 174,688 24,250
1995 454,095 25 54,090 182,829 4,500 110,000 102,676
1996 825,185 13 69,216 270,282 207,496 110,000 168,191
1997 1,038,980 11 291,500 216,159 66,144 110,000 355,177
1998 653,054 21 60,748 145,026 201,810 110,000 135,470
1999 1,078,299 13 229,059 368,348* 241,390 110,000 129,502
2000 1,281,305 14 276,290 369,759 286,305 110,000 238,951
2001 1,257,118 22 584,349 440,252 18,240 110,000 104,277
NOTE:  Asterisks indicate that the volume reported has been adjusted to
account for incomplete data on the Friant Unit of the CVP.  All water measurements
are in acre-feet.
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Table A.2
Water Purchases, by Type of End User
Year Total Environment
Municipal
and Industrial
San Joaquin
Valley Farmers
Other
Farmers
Mixed
Purpose
1985 78,781 3,308 5,000 44,518 3,768 22,187
1986 156,669 0 5,000 69,589 13,740 68,340
1987 168,143 0 44 43,741 10,350 114,008
1988 320,872 119,031 110,500 38,878 12,366 40,097
1989 357,283 39,000 131,043 157,021 30,219 0
1990 453,576 1,500 146,735 260,562 33,779 11,000
1991 703,329 64,612 477,292 104,892 6,863 49,670
1992 530,305 101,726 198,473 188,592 12,163 29,351
1993 546,266 1,703 208,208 293,838 42,517 0
1994 615,397 81,100 203,997 249,215 27,830 53,255
1995 511,904 111,899 112,667 279,331 8,007 0
1996 825,185 72,216 220,308 503,548 29,113 0
1997 1,037,808 293,000 191,402 439,322 14,084 100,000
1998 554,411 61,748 215,956 211,029 65,678 0
1999 1,078,379 229,459 173,988 556,980 72,592 45,360
2000 1,281,305 276,290 169,826 507,841 94,146 233,202
2001 1,257,117 445,543 261,922 388,401 112,776 48,475
NOTE:  For discrepancies between total transfer amounts reported in Table A.1
and total purchases by end user listed here, see footnote 2, Chapter 2.  All water
measurements are in acre-feet.
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Table A.4
Source Regions for Environmental Water Purchases
 
Year
Sacramento
Valley
San
Joaquin
Valley
San
Francisco
Bay Area
1988 119,031 0 0
1989 39,000 0 0
1990 1,500 0 0
1991 64,612 0 0
1992 52,525 20,000 4,736
1993 0 1,703 0
1994 0 81,100 0
1995 69,899 42,000 0
1996 16,660 55,556 0
1997 45,517 247,483 0
1998 10,748 51,000 0
1999 21,559 207,900 0
2000 9,795 266,495 0
2001 80,000 335,543 30,000
NOTE:  All water measurements are in acre-feet.
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Appendix B
Groundwater Institutions and Basins
Table B.1
Counties with Groundwater Protection Ordinances, by Region
Export Restrictions
On-Site Groundwater
Use Restrictions No Ordinance
Mountain Region
Calaveras (2002)
Inyo (1980)
Lassen (1999)
Modoc (1978)
Mono (1988; 1998)
Nevada (1986–1988 only)
Sierra (1977; 1997)
Siskiyou (1998)
Tuolumne (2001)
Alpine
Amador
El Dorado
Mariposa
Plumas
Sacramento Valley
Butte (1977; 1996)
Colusa (1998)
Glenn (1977; 1990)
Sacramento (1980)
Shasta (1997)
Tehama (1992)
Yolo (1996)
Placer
Sutter
Yuba
San Joaquin Valley
Fresno (2000)
Kern (1998)
Madera (1999)
San Joaquin (1996)
Kings
Merced
Stanislaus
Tulare
North Coast
Mendocino (1995) Del Norte
Humboldt
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Table B.1 (continued)
Export Restrictions
On-Site Groundwater
Use Restrictions No Ordinance
San Francisco Bay and
Central Coast Regions
Lake (1999)
San Benito (1995)
Monterey (1993)
Napa (1999)
Alameda
Contra Costa
Marin
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
San Francisco
San Luis
Obispo
San Mateo
Solano
Sonoma
Southern California
Imperial (1996) San Diego (1991)
San Bernardino (2002)
Los Angeles
Orange
Riverside
Ventura
NOTE: Year in parentheses is year of adoption.  If two dates are listed, the first
refers to the adoption of an urgency ordinance and the second to the adoption of a
regular ordinance.  Many ordinances have been revised at least once subsequently.
Imperial County adopted an ordinance requiring conditional use permits for some
within-county groundwater uses in 1972 and added explicit export restrictions in 1996.
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Shasta
Tehama
Glenn
Colusa
Sutter
Yolo
Solano
Sacramento
Contra
Costa
Stan
islau
s
Lake
Mendocino
Humboldt
Trinity
Del
Norte Siskiyou Modoc
Lassen
Sierra Nevada
Yuba
Placer
El DoradoSonoma Napa
Marin
San Mateo
Santa
Clara
Amador
Tuolumne Mono
Merced
Mariposa
Madera
Fresno
Inyo
Kings
Monterey
San Luis
Obispo Kern
Santa Barbara
Ventura Los Angeles
San Bernardino
Riverside
San Diego Imperial
Santa Cruz
Tulare
Butte
Plumas
San
Benito
San Francisco
Alpine
Calaveras
San
Joaquin
Alameda
Orange
Figure B.1—California’s Counties
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11
2, 6
512,18
1
10,15
4
3
13
17
7, 8, 9
14
1. Raymond Basin (1944)
2. Cucamonga Basin (1958, management 
structure being updated)
3. West Coast Basin (1961)
4. Central Basin (1965)
5. Santa Margarita River Watershed (1966)
6. San Bernardino Basin Area (1969)
7. Brite Basin (1970)
8. Cummings Basin (1972)
9. Tehachapi Basin (1973)
10. Main San Gabriel Basin (1973) and 
Puente Narrows (1972)
11. Warren Valley Basin (1977)
12. Chino Basin (1978)
13. Upper Los Angeles River Area (1979)
14. Scott River Stream System (1980)
15. Puente Basin (1985)
16. Mojave Basin Area Adjudication (1996)
17. Santa Paula Basin (1996)
18. Six Basins (1998)
SOURCES:  Adjudication dates—Department of Water Resources (2001).  
Basin contours—Department of Water Resources (2002a).
NOTES:  The basins illustrated are the full basin boundaries as determined by 
DWR.  Actual adjudicated basin boundaries are defined by the court and are often 
smaller.  The dates indicate the year of final adjudication.
Figure B.2—Adjudicated Groundwater Basins
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7
2
3
8
CB
4
9
1
A
5
6
10
SOURCES:  Agency names and dates are from the Department of Water Resources (1996a); basin 
contours are from the Department of Water Resources (2002a); agency contours are from the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation (2002).
NOTES:  Special Water Districts and Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency are represented by 
administrative district boundaries (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2002).  Other district boundaries are 
represented by underlying groundwater basin boundaries (Department of Water Resources, 2002a).  
The following district boundaries were estimated using corresponding basins:  Monterey Peninsula 
Water Management District (Seaside Area subbasin of Salinas Valley and Carmel Valley), Fox Canyon 
Groundwater Management Agency (Oxnard subbasin of Santa Clara River Valley, Pleasant Valley, 
Arroyo Santa Rosa Valley, and Las Posas Valley), Mendocino City Community Services District (Fort 
Bragg Terrace Area), and Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District (Eastern Mono County portion of 
Owens Valley).
1. Monterey Peninsula Water Management District (1977)
2. Long Valley Groundwater Management District (1980)
3. Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District (1980)
4. Fox Canyon Groundwater Management Agency (1982)
5. Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency (1984)
6. Mendocino City Community Services District (1987)
7. Honey Lake Groundwater Management Agency (1989)
8. Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District (1989)
9. Ojai Groundwater Management Agency (1991)
10. Willow Creek Groundwater Management Agency 
(1993; inactive)
11. Surprise Valley Groundwater Management Agency 
(1995; inactive)
Special Groundwater Management Districts
Special Water Districts with Groundwater Control
A. Santa Clara Valley Water District
B. Orange County Water District
C. Coachella Valley Water District
Figure B.3—Special Groundwater Management Districts
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109
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NOTES:  The basins illustrated are those identified in Bulletin 118-80 (Department of Water 
Resources,1980), mapped using boundaries appearing in the 2002 Draft Groundwater Map 
(Department of Water Resources, 2002a).  Owing to name or boundary changes, the following 1980 
basin boundaries were estimated using the 2002 definitions:  Santa Cruz-Pajaro Basin (Santa Cruz 
Purisima Formation; Pajaro), Ventura Central Basin (Piru, Fillmore, Santa Paula, Mound, and Oxnard 
subbasins of Santa Clara River Valley; Pleasant Valley; Arroyo Santa Rosa Valley; and Las Posas 
Valley).
1. Santa Cruz Pajaro Basin
2. Cuyama Valley Basin
3. Ventura Central Basin
4. Eastern San Joaquin County Basin
5. Chowchilla Basin
6. Madera Basin
7. Kings Basin
8. Kaweah Basin
9. Tulare Lake Basin
10. Tule Basin
11. Kern County Basin
Basins Subject to Critical Conditions 
of Overdraft
Basins with Special Problems
A. Surprise Valley Basin
B. Long Valley Basin
C. Sierra Valley Basin
D. Owens Valley Basin
Figure B.4—Critically Overdrafted and Special Problem Groundwater Basins
Listed in Bulletin 118-80
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Appendix C
Predicting County Adoption of
Export Restrictions
This appendix describes the data sources, estimation methods, and
results of the statistical analysis of the likelihood of county adoption of
export restrictions reported in Chapter 4.
Data Sources
Farm and Agriculture-Related Jobs
The source for farm jobs is the Bureau of Economic Analysis regional
accounts data.  The source for agriculture-related jobs is the Bureau of
the Census “County Business Patterns.”  Data are from 1995.
Share of Irrigated Agriculture in Total Farmland
This series is derived from results of the 1997 Agricultural Census
(U.S. Department of Agriculture and the California Department of Food
and Agriculture).  1997 data were preferred over those from 1992, a year
with unusually low acreage figures as a consequence of the prolonged
drought.
Share of Residential Population Dependent on Groundwater
This series was approximated using information from county
environmental health officers and a 1992 survey by the Water Education
Foundation (1994).
Other Variables
Membership in the Regional Council of Rural Counties and
presence of a critical or specially designated groundwater basin are
presented in Chapter 4.
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Estimation Methods and Results
Probit regressions were used to estimate the effect on a county’s
likelihood of adopting an export ordinance of the variables presented
above, for which sample characteristics are reported in Table 4.1.  The
statistical exercise involves considering the effect of each variable on
ordinance adoption, while holding the other variables constant.
Table C.1 reports the results of two regressions, one including the
full set of variables and one excluding residential groundwater share.  The
variables used in each model are jointly significant at the 99 percent level
of confidence.  The second model produces slightly tighter coefficient
estimates because groundwater share, itself insignificant, is correlated
with the measure of critical basins.  This exclusion does not affect overall
model fit.  Both models slightly underpredict adoption of export
restrictions:  compared to the 22 actual cases (38 percent), the models
predict adoption by 20 counties (34 percent).
Most of the variables are marginally significant (at the 90 percent
level of confidence), with coefficients of the expected sign.  The effects of
each variable on the likelihood of ordinance adoption are presented in
Chapter 4.
Because some of the counties in the nonadoption group have other
types of more comprehensive groundwater management systems in
place—including adjudicated basins, special districts, or groundwater
protection ordinances that control local groundwater use—we also
performed two tests to see whether the results changed significantly when
controlling for this factor:  a multinomial logit regression distinguishing
among three possible outcomes (export restrictions, comprehensive
groundwater management systems, and no groundwater rules), and a
binomial probit with a control variable for counties with these types of
groundwater systems.  The additional “groundwater management” group
for the multinomial logit included El Dorado, Los Angeles, Mendocino,
Monterey, Napa, Orange, Plumas, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa
Clara, Santa Cruz, San Diego, and Ventura.  The groundwater
management control variable in the binomial probit included this group
plus counties with dual systems:  Imperial, Lassen, Modoc, Mono, San
Benito, Sierra, and Siskiyou.  In neither case was there a substantial
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Table C.1
Effects of County Characteristics on the Probability of
Adopting an Export Restriction
Model Including
Residential
Groundwater
Model Excluding
Residential
Groundwater
Farm employment (%) 0.045*
(0.026)
0.048*
(0.025)
Agriculture-related employment
(%)
–0.13*
(0.077)
–0.12*
(0.075)
Irrigated farmland (%) 0.004
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
Residents using groundwater (%) 0.001
(0.003)
—
Counties overlying critical/special
basin
0.23
(0.17)
0.26*
(0.16)
RCRC membership 0.27*
(0.16)
0.30*
(0.15)
Chi-squared test of joint
significance of variables in
model 20.88*** 20.72***
Log-likelihood –28.06 –28.13
Observed probability 38% 38%
Predicted probability 34% 34%
NOTES:  Coefficients are reported as marginal effects.  For the binary
variables (critical groundwater basins and RCRC membership), the coefficient
is the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.  Standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
***Indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 99 percent
level of confidence.
*Indicates coefficient significantly different from zero at the 90 percent
level of confidence.
change in coefficient estimates in relation to those reported in Table C.1,
although the loss of degrees of freedom in the multinomial logit reduces
levels of significance.
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Appendix D
Measuring the Effect of Export
Restrictions on County Water Sales
This appendix provides detailed information on the data sources,
estimation methods, and results of the statistical analysis of the effect of
export restrictions on county water sales and exports presented in
Chapter 5.
Data Sources
Annual County Water Sales and Annual County Exports
These series are developed from the water transfer database presented
in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.  Annual county sales are defined as the
sum of all short- and long-term transfers by county water users in a given
year.  For sales by cross-jurisdictional water districts, the approximate
share of the district in each county has been attributed to that county.
Annual county exports are the sum of transfers not destined for other
water users within the county.  Environmental water sales were
considered as exports from the county.  Although this water is most often
used for habitat or instream purposes within the region, it rarely is under
control of users in the county of origin.  For water districts with multiple
jurisdictions, we considered the transaction to be “in-county” if the
purchaser was in any of the district’s counties.  As such, the exports
category unambiguously includes only those transfers going from a user
within the county to a user somewhere else in the region or state.
 Because the coverage of transfers within the CVP’s Friant group was
not consistently available in all years, we have excluded internal Friant
transactions from the sales data.  This concerns five San Joaquin Valley
counties:  Merced, Madera, Fresno, Tulare, and Kern.  Since members of
the Friant group are effectively exempted in the counties with
ordinances, this should not pose a problem for interpretation of the
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results.  Trades between Friant members and other water users are
included.
County Export Restrictions
We consider that counties have an export ordinance in operation
beginning in the year of adoption, as indicated in Table C.1.  There are
two exceptions.  Because Kern County’s ordinance applies only to the
relatively unimportant desert and foothill region in the southeast, but not
to the San Joaquin valley portion of the county where population,
agriculture, and surface water entitlements are all concentrated, we have
considered Kern to have no ordinance for the purposes of this exercise.
The second exception is made for Glenn County, whose export
ordinance was effectively removed in 2000, when the new basin
management ordinance was adopted.1  The 2001 season is the first
during which Glenn water users worked under the new system.
State and Federal Policy Environment
The general effects of an improved trading environment arising from
state and federal policies to facilitate transfers are captured by a time
trend.
Agricultural Water Demand
The model uses three measures of agricultural water demand:
average county-level prices for annual crops (defined as all field and
horticultural crops), the acreage under annual crops, and the share of
perennial crops in total nonrange acreage.  All three series are constructed
using county agricultural statistics from the California Agricultural
Statistics Service databases.2
____________ 
1Although the 1990 ordinance remains on the books, the numerous persons
interviewed in Glenn, including two county supervisors, considered that the new
ordinance has supplanted it for operational purposes.
2The annual crop price is calculated using the county’s prior year output data,
valued at the statewide average price for the current year.  This captures the notion that
the farmer has an idea of the average market price for the coming season and can calculate
what he would earn by farming the same crop mix as in the preceding year.  The series is
deflated using the western states urban consumer price index, with 1992 as the base year.
Ideally, we would measure the value of crops on a per-acre-foot basis to capture the water
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In principle, we would expect water sales to be inversely related to
the average level of crop prices, which reflect the value of using water in
agriculture.  On average, real price levels have been relatively flat over the
period, hovering around $160 per ton in 1992 prices.  The range across
counties is quite large, however, with averages over $300 per ton along
the south and central coast and $100 per ton or less in parts of the
Central Valley.
As with prices, there has been little movement over time in the
average level of annual crop acreages, although the cross-county
differences are huge, with at least several hundred thousand acres in
Imperial County and most San Joaquin Valley counties (and close to 1
million acres in Fresno), and fewer than 50,000 acres along the coast.3
In part, this range reflects differences in the overall scale of agricultural
operations across counties; in part, it reflects a much higher share of
perennial crops (fruit trees, nut trees, and vineyards) in some counties.
The values span a high of over 90 percent of all nonrange farmland in
Napa and over 50 percent in San Diego, Ventura, and Madera, to only 1
percent of cropland in Imperial.  Over time, there has been a mild
upward trend in tree crops as a share of the total, moving from 22 to 26
percent on average.
Because farmers can make adjustments in annual crop acreages fairly
easily as a function of water availability, we would expect water sales to
be positively related a county’s crop acreage.  Conversely, because a
higher share of tree crops in total acreage introduces less flexibility in
water use, we would expect tree crop share to be negatively related to
water sales.
________________________________________________________ 
intensity of the crop mix.  This would require making assumptions about the irrigation
technology used in each county for each crop, however.  If anything, the use of a per-ton
measure probably dampens the effect of this variable, since low-value crops also tend to
be those with a relatively high level of water use.  Annual crop acreage includes all farm
acreage except perennials and rangeland (i.e., including irrigated pasture).  The share of
tree crops is calculated as the share of perennials in total nonrangeland farm acreage.
Both acreage measures are valued at the prior year levels to account for the fact that
decisions on water sales are generally made before final planting decisions.
3San Francisco, the only county in the sample with no commercial agriculture
(albeit some fine gardens), has no acreage recorded and no positive crop prices.
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Residential Water Demand
County population levels are used to account for residential water
demands.  The source is the annual population series from the California
Department of Finance, based on updates from the 2000 Census
(Department of Finance, 2001).  Other things equal, we should expect
counties with higher populations to be less likely to sell water.
Water Supply Conditions
Annual deliveries of project water from the CVP, the SWP, and the
Colorado River Project are captured in two measures:  senior rights and
junior rights.4  The senior rights category includes those deliveries with a
high degree of reliability, by virtue of the seniority of the contractors.
This includes the CVP settlement contractors in the Sacramento Valley
and the exchange contractors in the San Joaquin Valley, the SWP’s
Feather River contractors in Butte and Sutter Counties, and the
Colorado River contractors in Southern California.  On average, 8.3
million acre-feet are delivered annually to these contractors.  Half of this
volume is destined to Imperial and Riverside Counties and a quarter to
the four main settlement-contracting counties in the Sacramento Valley
(Colusa, Butte, Sutter, and Glenn).  The only dips in supply occurred
during the early 1990s drought, when CVP and SWP contractors’
deliveries were reduced by 25 to 50 percent in some years.
 The junior-rights category includes the ordinary project contractors
of the CVP and the SWP.  On average, these projects have delivered just
over 6 million acre-feet annually over the 12-year period, to a much
larger number of water users.  Only two counties in the sample, San
Francisco and Yuba, do not have project contractors.  Project deliveries
have generally been much more variable from one year to the next,
particularly for contractors south of the Delta.
____________ 
4For the Colorado River Project and the SWP, actual delivery data were used.  For
the CVP, we applied the annual allocation rules by type of project contractor (settlement
contractors, north of Delta and south of Delta service contractors, and Friant class 1 and
2 contractors).  Because California received surplus deliveries of Colorado River water for
the entire time period under consideration, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California is included as a senior rights-holder.  Under California’s official allocation of
4.4 million acre-feet, this agency would have its supplies cut back, as the junior rights-
holder.
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In general, we would expect counties with higher water deliveries to
be more active in the water market.  By the same token, individual
counties should be more likely to sell in years when their deliveries are
higher.
Unfortunately, detailed data on other water supplies—from
autonomous projects and from groundwater—are not available.  We do
have a general indicator of the quality of the water year, however, in the
form of the state’s most important rainfall measure—the Sacramento
Valley 40-30-30 index.5  Since market demands and water prices are
likely to be higher in dry years, we would expect this indicator to be
negatively related to sales.  The period under review contains an equal
number of dry and wet years (Figure 2.1).
Sample Characteristics
Table D.1 provides summary statistics for the complete set of
variables used for both geographical samples used in the estimations:  the
34 water-trading counties6 and the 18 Central Valley counties.7  We
have excluded 24 nontrading counties from the first group for statistical
reasons.  Two key econometric models cannot be estimated when these
counties are included.  The inclusion of counties that never trade adds no
information to the estimation of the effects of an export ordinance on
trading behavior in a fixed-effects mode.  The presence of many counties
with all zero trades also complicates the estimation of a random-effects
Tobit model.  For the state as a whole, the convergence properties of this
____________ 
5The Sacramento Valley 40-30-30 Index is the main index used by DWR to
measure water conditions in the Sacramento Valley, source region for both the CVP and
the SWP as well as several large local projects.  It is computed as a weighted average of the
current water year’s April–July unimpaired runoff forecast (40 percent), the current water
year’s October–March unimpaired runoff forecast (30 percent), and the previous water
year’s index (30 percent).  For details, see DWR’s website, http://watsup2.water.ca.gov/
hydrologic.cfm.
6The sample excludes the 24 counties for which there are no transactions records in
any of the 12 years:  Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Del Norte, El Dorado, Humboldt, Inyo,
Lake, Lassen, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Modoc, Mono, Monterey, Nevada, Plumas,
San Mateo, Santa Cruz, Sierra, Siskiyou, Sonoma, Trinity, and Tuolumne.
7Butte, Colusa, Fresno, Glenn, Kern, Kings, Madera, Merced, Placer, Sacramento,
San Joaquin, Shasta, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, Yolo, and Yuba.
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Table D.1
Summary Statistics for Annual County Water Sales and
Water Exports, 1990–2001
 34 Trading
Counties
18 Central
Valley Counties
All sales (acre-feet) 22,734 31,461
 (40,658) (45,842)
Observed probability of sales 0.69 0.89
Out-of-county exports (acre-feet) 19,465 25,419
 (39,075) (44,140)
Observed probability of exports 0.61 0.82
Agricultural and residential demand  
Annual crop prices ($/ton) 162 117
 (126) (51)
Annual crop area (acres) 205,893 294,918
 (226,721) (230,010)
Tree crop area in total (%) 23.2 22.6
 (19.7) (13.9)
Population 856,177 286,226
 (1,602,147) (292,132)
Water supply conditions  
Project deliveries (acre-feet)  
Senior rights 243,826 178,751
 (537,918) (210,645)
Junior rights 179,474 247,412
 (272,842) (346,500)
Rainfall index 8.18 8.18
 (3.18) (3.18)
County export restrictions 0.19 0.30
(1 = restriction) (0.39) (0.46)
Number of observations 408 216
NOTE:  The table reports mean values with standard deviations
in parentheses.
model are not stable.  However, regression results on the full state sample
are consistent with the findings we report below on the effects of the
export ordinances and other key variables for the 34-county sample.
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Regression Results
A random-effects Tobit model is the main specification used to
account for bunching at zero in the distribution of the dependent
variable.8  Because it is not straightforward to test for fixed effects using
this specification (Arellano and Honoré, 2001), we did so with a linear
model.  Tables D.2 through D.5 present the results for the random-
effects Tobit model and the corresponding random- and fixed-effects
linear models for all sales and exports for the water-trading counties and
Central Valley counties, respectively.  Despite the censoring in the
dependent variable, the results of the random effects linear model
correspond closely to the Tobit model results, suggesting that reliance
on the linear model for inferring properties about the Tobit model is
reasonable.  For all four models, Hausman specification tests of the
linear model fail to reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effects at
conventional levels of significance, suggesting the absence of cross-
sectional omitted variables that would bias the random-effects Tobit
results.  Consequently, the discussion in Chapter 5 focuses on the
results of the random-effects Tobit model.
Overall, the identified variables have the anticipated effects on both
sales and exports.  Among the control variables, the group capturing the
effects of water supply is highly significant.  Crop prices and annual crop
acreage, two of the agricultural demand variables, are significant for the
determination of sales within the full 34-county sample.  These factors
are not significant for the Central Valley sample, where there is less cross-
county variability.
Results pertaining to the key variables of interest—county export
restrictions and the time trend used to capture the effect of an improved
trading environment—are presented in Chapter 5.  The cumulative
market effect of ordinances (Figure 5.2) was calculated by multiplying
the number of counties affected by the per-county coefficients listed in
____________ 
8For the 34-county sample of water trading counties, 31 percent of all sales and 39
percent of all exports are zero; for the 18-county Central Valley sample, the
corresponding values are 11 percent of all sales and 18 percent of all exports.
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the left-hand column of Tables D.2 through D.5.  For the 34-county
sample, the number of counties with ordinances ranges from two in the
early 1990s to 12 in 2000.  For the 18-county sample, the range is from
two in 1990 to 10 in 2000.  The cumulative market effect of state and
federal policies (Figure 5.3) was calculated by multiplying the total
number of counties in the sample (34) by the coefficient on the time
trend reported in the left-hand column of Table D.2.
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Table D.2
Determinants of Annual County Water Sales in 34 Water-Trading
Counties, 1990–2001
 
Random-Effects
Tobit
Random-Effects
Linear
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Linear
Regression
Agricultural and residential demand  
Annual crop prices ($/ton)   –75.8** –40.8 –55.6
 (33.0) (25.9) (52.5)
Annual crop area (1,000 acres)  54.6** 37.0* 143
 (23.1) (19.7) (88.4)
Tree crop area in total (%) –96.1 –10.2 213
 (220) (176) (680)
Population (1,000) –1.5 –1.1 –0.8
 (2.6) (2.3) (32.4)
Water supply conditions  
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)  
Senior rights 23.8*** 21.5*** –140**
 (7.4) (7.2) (56.6)
Junior rights 49.2*** 42*** 51***
 (13.1) (10.6) (12.5)
Rainfall index –3,529*** –2,160*** –2,099***
 (749) (549) (575)
State and local institutional factors  
County export restrictions –14,308** –12,671** –10,770*
 (7,246) (5,563) (6,387)
State and federal policy (time trend) 3,828*** 2,442*** 2,616***
 (681) (515) (720)
Log-likelihood;  overall R2 –3,419 0.34 0.00
Hausman specification test   0.33
NOTES:  All models are estimated with a constant.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The Hausman specification test reports the probability that the
difference in coefficients of random-effects and fixed-effects regressions is not
systematic.
***Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
**Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
*Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
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Table D.3
Determinants of Annual County Water Exports in 34 Water-Trading
Counties, 1990–2001
 
Random-Effects
Tobit
Random-Effects
Linear
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Linear
Regression
Agricultural and residential demand  
Annual crop prices ($/ton) –88.9** –45.0* –59.2
 (38.4) (27.0) (52.4)
Annual crop area (1,000 acres) 37.6 15.7 97.1
 (27.2) (20.6) (88.3)
Tree crop area in total (%) –113 –17.9 215
 (254) (185) (679)
Population (1,000) –2.0 –1.2 8.0
 (3.0) (2.5) (32.4)
Water supply conditions  
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)  
Senior rights 28.3*** 24.4*** –160***
 (8.0) (7.6) (56.6)
Junior rights 43.2*** 34.5*** 44.7***
 (14.3) (11.0) (12.5)
Rainfall index –3,235*** –1,909*** –1,796***
 (831) (551) (575)
State and local institutional factors  
County export restrictions –16,948** –16,276*** –13,875**
 (7,722) (5,632) (6,378)
State and federal policy (time trend) 3,729*** 2,242*** 2,321***
 (761) (517) (719)
Log-likelihood; overall R2 –3,062 0.26 0.05
Hausman specification test   0.15
NOTES:  All models are estimated with a constant.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The Hausman specification test reports the probability that the
difference in coefficients of random-effects and fixed-effects regressions is not
systematic.
***Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
**Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
*Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
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Table D.4
Determinants of Annual County Water Sales in 18 Central Valley
Counties, 1990–2001
 
Random-
Effects Tobit
Random-Effects
Linear
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Linear
Regression
Agricultural and residential demand  
Annual crop prices ($/ton) –71.8 –57.9 –87.0
 (87.7) (91.1) (129.3)
Annual crop area (1,000 acres)  11.0 1.0 224*
 (28.8) (31.4) (130)
Tree crop area in total (%) 289 118 –278
 (364) (421) (1,659)
Population (1,000) –18.5 –7.4 163
 (21.6) (24.2) (166)
Water supply conditions  
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)  
Senior rights –7.2 –16.2 –116
 (25.6) (28.7) (75.8)
Junior rights 64.0*** 60.0*** 65.4***
 (15.4) (15.0) (17.3)
Rainfall index –5,410*** –4,482*** –4,639***
 (1,049) (969) (1,037)
State and local institutional factors  
County export restrictions –20,789** –19,038** –13,034
 (8,713) (8,397) (9,309)
State and federal policy (time trend) 4,645*** 4,094*** 3,412**
 (977) (934) (1,341)
Log-likelihood; overall R2 –2,321 0.27 0.11
Hausman specification test   0.58
NOTES:  All models are estimated with a constant.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The Hausman specification test reports the probability that the
difference in coefficients of random-effects and fixed-effects regressions is not
systematic.
***Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
**Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
*Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
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Table D.5
Determinants of Annual County Water Exports in 18 Central Valley
Counties, 1990–2001
 
Random-Effects
Tobit
Random-Effects
Linear
Regression
Fixed-Effects
Linear
Regression
Agricultural and residential demand  
Annual crop prices ($/ton) –139 –77.7 –105.6
 (102) (92.0) (130)
Annual crop area (1,000 acres) –30.7 –26.6 166
 (32.1) (31.7) (130)
Tree crop area in total (%) 409 172 –559
 (408) (427) (1,665)
Population (1,000) –10.3 –3.5 245
 (23.7) (24) (167)
Water supply conditions  
Project deliveries (1,000 acre-feet)  
Senior rights –10.9 –26.4 –126*
 (29.0) (29) (76)
Junior rights 58.6*** 51.5*** 54.7***
 (16.4) (15.1) (17.4)
Rainfall index –4,661*** –3,963*** –4,072***
 (1,109) (975) (1,041)
State and local institutional factors  
County export restrictions –26,245*** –23.481*** –16,902*
 (9,350) (8,450) (9,343)
State and federal policy (time trend) 4,220*** 3,659*** 2,699**
 (1,039) (940) (1,346)
Log-likelihood; overall R2 –2,173 0.20 0.04
Hausman specification test   0.52
NOTES:  All models are estimated with a constant.  Standard errors are in
parentheses.  The Hausman specification test reports the probability that the
difference in coefficients of random-effects and fixed-effects regressions is not
systematic.
***Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 99 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
**Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 95 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
*Indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level
of confidence in a two-way test.
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